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energética e à integração regional. Dessa forma, propõe-se que o planejamento energético 
nos países em desenvolvimento seja regional, incorporando as dimensões social e 
ambiental da energia. Com foco nos países do Mercosul, considerando inclusive 
Venezuela (2012) e Bolívia (2015), faz-se uma análise comparada geral em termos 
quantitativos e qualitativos dos mercados e da infraestrutura física dos países do bloco (e 
da América do Sul, como um todo). Em seguida, analisa-se o papel que as instituições 
regionais, como o Mercosul e a UNASUL, desempenha na área de energia, mostrando 
que sua contribuição para a integração energética da região é muito pequena. A seguir, é 
proposto um índice híbrido (SEES index) para avaliar a evolução das políticas energéticas 
do Mercosul no período 1990-2010. Posteriormente, usa-se o modelo OSeMOSYS-
SAMBA para simular quatro cenários de integração regional do setor elétrico, escolhido 
como exemplo dada a sua relevância. Por fim, conclui-se que a integração energética do 
Mercosul deve ser promovida, uma vez que reduz a necessidade de ampliação da 
capacidade de geração de energia elétrica e os impactos socioambientais dos projetos na 
área de energia.   
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contribution is very small. Next, a hybrid index (SEES index) is proposed to assess the 
evolution of Mercosur’s energy policies in the period 1990-2010. Follows the application 
of OSeMOSYS-SAMBA model to simulate four scenarios for the integration of the 
power sector, used to illustrate the case due to its relevance. Finally, we conclude that 
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The introduction will be divided into three sections. The first one (section 1.1) presents a 
general overview of the main themes and discussions of the thesis. The second one 
(section 1.2) highlights the objectives of the research, as well as its originality. Finally, 
the third one (section 1.3) presents the thesis structure and contents. 
 
1.1 General overview 
Energy has been playing an essential role in the history of societies throughout the most 
different ages. From the discovery of fire, to industrial revolutions, access, domination 
and use of energy, it has always been strategic for human survival and well-being, as well 
as for economic growth and development itself. In fact, as the binomial domain-
dependence of energy became more evident, the more obvious was the need for humans 
to develop technologies and mechanisms to have their control. 
It became important to have energy domain, mainly having access to different resources 
‘in the backyard’, that is, domestically; however, when this was not possible, different 
contractual/commercial arrangements, wars and/or interventions took place in order to 
dominate it. By dominating energy and basing an entire model of production and patterns 
of consumption on certain energy sources, dependence started increasing and seemed to 
have no return. In this sense, the binomial domain-dependency of energy began to control 
and even determine technological, economic, political, social and undoubtedly 
environmental relations within and between countries. 
Thus, energy has become and continues to be a priority theme in the national strategic 
agenda. In effect, the terms ‘countries’ and ‘national’ were intentionally detached, since 
energy has increasingly become a sensitive issue linked to state sovereignty, as it is vital 
for its development. Therefore, it was essential to have guaranteed access to energy 
somehow. 
Since energy ccan be understood as a strategic priority sector, it needs specific planning 
and policies. This is particularly true especially because energy not only provides the 
production of basic goods/services, but also guarantees the well-being of the population. 
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This rationale is confirmed by the fact that many experts and policy makers already 
consider energy as a public good (KARLSSON-VINKHUYEN et al., 2012, BARRETT, 
2007).  
Therefore, energy planning becomes paramount to guarantee energy security. However, 
two issues arise that need to be reflected upon. The first one is that energy planning need 
not be based solely and exclusively on a country’s own resources. In this way, it is 
possible to take place at regional level, being guaranteed through arrangements such as 
energy integration and/or cooperation, or even through international trade. The second 
issue is related to the concept of energy security, which, again, is intrinsic and often 
associated with national sovereignty and self-sufficiency. 
Consequently, energy is seen from the point of view of planning and security, as, once 
again, issues intrinsic to sovereignty, autonomy, independence and self-sufficiency of 
States. In this sense, it is common to see the concepts of energy security as domestic 
policies and priorities in the national agenda (SANTOS, 2014b). Nevertheless, there is 
not even a clear consensus about the real meaning of such concept (JOHANSSON, 2012, 
SANTOS et al., 2017b). 
Precisely for this reason, we seek to overcome this shortcoming rooted in the energy area 
itself. Thus, the proposal of this thesis is to discuss the theme from a regional logic, 
understanding that different countries can achieve their goals rather through strategic 
(geo)political arrangements with their neighbors. Accordingly, this thesis has a regional 
rationale, which highlights, believes, suggests and sees in regional integration an 
alternative to individual and state-centric management. 
Notwithstanding, it is important to emphasize that regional integration is an extremely 
complex concept, misunderstood and instrumentalized by different countries. Complex, 
as it is discussed in the most different areas, such as Economics, Social Sciences, Political 
Science, History, Geography, International Relations and Law, for example, without any 
consensus about its real meaning. It is misunderstood not only by different interpretations 
and approaches, but above all because it is often believed that regional integration is 
synonymous of international trade. In this way, it is often seen as a strictly economic 
issue, which ends up obscuring its social, political, institutional, cultural and historical 
nature. Finally, it is a concept instrumentalized by different countries inasmuch as, in the 
absence of commitments inherent in participating of a regional arrangement, countries in 
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some cases seek only short-term private gains, which risk the very process of regional 
integration. 
Since regional integration is such a broad topic, the focus of the thesis is on energy 
integration. Fleeing mainstream approaches, it is not assumed that energy integration is 
an exclusively technical issue, but also a (geo)political, economic, institutional, 
regulatory, and diplomatic matter. It is a cross-cutting theme, which must be understood 
as a process (rather than an end itself) to achieve multiple benefits. In order to reach them, 
there must be political will of governments to prioritize projects and initiatives that 
promote regional energy integration, even by their already intrinsically domestic and 
strategic nature. 
As an example, and avoiding any comparison that reproduces the idea that there is one 
way only to integrate, energy was the basis of the European regional integration process 
with the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), of 1951, and the European Atomic 
Energy Community (Euratom), of 1957. In the case of the current European Union (EU), 
although there was also the influence of nationalist perspectives on the energy agenda, 
the ‘sense of possession’ (DAINTITH and WILLIAMS, 1987) of energy resources was 
not enough for such resistance from countries to approach or even unify their energy 
markets1. Undoubtedly, the lower allocation of energy resources and vulnerability to 
external dependence reinforced this need to ensure regional arrangements capable of 
addressing the issue. 
But the focus of this thesis is not the European countries, but those of South America. 
When it comes to regional electricity infrastructure releated to energy integration, South 
America is naturally a better option to consider. The region has the potential to become 
self-sufficient in energy, due to its wide variety of sources and the complementarity 
between them. In this sense, South American energy integration would allow countries to 
take advantage of the region’s rich but unequally distributed resources, especially 
hydropower and natural gas.  
                                                          
1 Although the European Union (EU) originated in the energy issue in the early 1950s, it is only in 2007 
that the first ‘Energy Action Plan’.  
4 
 
In contrast to Latin America2 as a whole, it consists, firstly, of a compact 
geographical and physically contiguous unit (…) Secondly, the region 
has extensive reserves of both renewable and non-renewable power that 
can be transformed into electricity (…) Third, South America has 
successful background in the field of energy infrastructure integration 
(BIATO et al, 2016: 63). 
In this sense, and considering the South American subcontinent, where there are several 
regional integration initiatives, the particular focus of this thesis will be on the Southern 
Common Market (Mercosur), an initiative that dates back to the 1990s and initially counts 
on Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. It should be noted that the current formation 
of Mercosur encompasses more than 70% of both population and territory of South 
America. 
In this context, considering the fact that they are developing countries, the social 
dimension inherent to energy stands out. Because they are countries whose access to 
electricity is not always guaranteed to the entire population, especially in regions farthest 
away from major centers and rural areas, the guarantee and universalization of access to 
energy is of relevance in the energy strategy of these countries. Likewise, the region has 
geographical particularities such as the Andes Mountains Range, the Amazon Forest, the 
Atacama Desert and Patagonia Glaciers, which make it necessary to respect the 
geophysical and environmental constraints that are imposed on the region. Therefore, 
exploring regional integration as a means of guaranteeing basic rights3, such as access to 
energy and respect for the environment, can be seen as an alternative and necessary 
development mechanism. 
Another feature of the region is the continued increase in energy demand, either through 
greater access to energy services or through changes in the living, production and 
consumption habits of the population. The United Nations Economic Commission for 
                                                          
2 It is worth noting that in Central America there is the famous and successful Central American Electrical 
Interconnection System (SIEPAC) energy integration project. This infrastructure includes compensation 
equipment and substations extending over 1,800 km of 230-KW transmission lines, connecting 15 
substations through 28 access bays. The SIEPAC line connects Panama to Guatemala, through Costa Rica, 
Nicaragua, Honduras and El Salvador, but is still far from realities such as Nordpool, Real-Time Energy 
Market (PJM) and Iberian Electricity Market (MIBEL). See Appendix A. 
3 Highlighted in the International Energy Charter at the Ministerial Conference (The Hague II) in 2015. 
CEIA and RIBEIRO (2016) stress that energy should be seen as a right, not as a commodity – since it can 
be considered as a key factor in achieving social justice (job creation, provision of basic social services, 
and better income distribution).  
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Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) also highlights the urbanization of certain 
regions as one of the reasons why there is such an increase in energy demand. To meet 
this challenge, electricity is most adaptable to urban areas, given its form of control, use 
of appliances and ease of adapting it to transportation.  
Therefore, countries in the region need to plan supply-side and energy-efficiency (EE) 
policies to deal with these pressures. However, although there are diversity and 
complementarity of resources, particularly energy resources, the region has paradoxically 
an unmet demand, with frequent supply crises in the Mercosur region and limited 
investments in energy infrastructure. Precisely because of this, the relationship between 
the existence of natural resources and the available energy is not direct, what poses more 
challenges to (regional) energy management and planning (DESIDERÁ NETO et al., 
2014).   
Recently, there was the adhesion of Venezuela (2012)4 to Mercosur and Bolivia’s 
adhesion as a full member is ongoing. This enlargement of the bloc (an increase in the 
number of States Parties) is extremely interesting, especially when it comes to energy 
endowment. According to BP, Venezuela has the largest oil reserves in the world and 
already has regional energy projects such as Petrocaribe, Petroandina, Petrosur and 
Petroamerica. In turn, Bolivia has the regional experience of the Bolivia-Brazil Gas 
Pipeline (GASBOL) and, like Venezuela, has relevant hydroelectric potential and the 
possibility of creating international interconnections with neighbouring countries.  
There are many justifications for this thesis. Unlike the context of the 1970s, when the 
price of oil increased with the 1973 and 1979 crises, the current global energy scenario is 
distinct from that of nearly half a century ago. The International Energy Agency (IEA) 
itself, in the 2014 Medium-Term Coal Market Report, draws attention to the significant 
increase in coal consumption, often justified by emerging economies, to the supply of 
shale gas, as well as to the discovery of new oil reserves (in addition to new exploratory 
techniques that allow for greater longevity of the ‘black gold’).  
Against this, and in the face of the world logic, the sustainable development imperative 
and the promotion of access to clean and renewable energy lead to the need to implement 
                                                          
4 At the end of the research period and elaboration of the thesis, the country ended up being suspended and 
kicked out from Mercosur. However, this situation is not yet clear or fully defined, which is the reason why 
Venezuela has remained in the analysis. 
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new policies and energy planning, incorporating new variables and objectives into the 
feasibility analysis of projects of energy infrastructure. It should be noted that energy has 
recently been chosen as a goal with its own identity among the sustainable development 
goals (SDG), and it is not only seen a means to achieve other goals like in the millennium 
development goals (MDGs). As a first step towards meeting these new challenges, the 
Sustainable Energy for All (SE4All) was formulated, which is a nonprofit organization 
working with leaders in government, the private sector and civil society to drive further, 
faster action toward achieving Sustainable Development Goal 7 (affordable and clean 
energy). 
Although many studies discuss and use the concept of energy security to reach these 
energy goals, there is no consensus about its meaning, nor about the methodologies and 
variables used to analyze it. It is a broad concept, generic, context-dependent and 
therefore vague and often empty. Thus, it is an insufficient concept to analyze certain 
cases and regions. 
Albeit it is a very widespread concept, few studies work with energy security in the face 
of a regional logic, mainly because of the influence of nationalist and state-centric 
perspectives that prioritize strategic energy studies. Consequently, little research, 
focusing on regional cooperation and integration as ways of ensuring energy goals, has 
been conducted so far. When they exist, they do focus on Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) countries.  
With regard to Mercosur, it is often associated only with intra-bloc trade (among its 
members) and, although there are sub-working groups (SGTs) dealing with energy and 
environmental issues, little has been done and officially published about the region’s 
energy planning. 
As a direct consequence of the systematic absence of studies that overcome the national 
perspective, there are few critical comparative studies in the energy sector. There are no 
recent studies working with comparative energy policies within Mercosur to date. 
Actually, there are some studies that encompass Latin or South American countries, 
consequently they evaluate Mercosur countries, but they do not respect the official 
composition of the regional bloc. 
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Finally, the research is also justified by the inexistence of papers discussing regional 
energy integration, striving to promote a connection and a dialogue between contributions 
from areas such as economics, international relations and energy planning, considering, 
for example, economic, political, diplomatic, regulatory, physical, infrastructural, 
environmental. Although it may seem obvious, it is necessary to look at the theme in its 
entireness and consider its different facets and perspectives; otherwise, ignoring the cross-
cutting nature of the theme will lead to partial, biased and limited contributions. 
 
1.2 Objectives 
Therefore, the general objective of this thesis is to analyze the issue of energy integration 
within the Mercosur countries, relating it to the suggested concept of regional energy 
security. By defining the scope of the thesis to Mercosur, the space and time analysis are 
automatically delimited. Regarding the area analyzed, it includes the original 
configuration of the block (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay), as well as Bolivia 
and Venezuela; with regards to time analysis, the post-signing period of the Treaty of 
Asunción (1991) will be evaluated to date, what will serve as a basis for the creation of 
scenarios in energy modeling by 2050.   
 Among the specific objectives, we can highlight; 
 To review the evolution of the concepts of energy security and regional 
integration, pointing out their contributions and limitations; 
 To propose the concept of regional energy security to analyze cases of regional 
integration/cooperation and/or regional blocs; 
 To make a comparative analysis of the current energy reality of the Mercosur 
countries, highlighting national initiatives related to regional integration; 
 To evaluate the evolution of Mercosur's regional energy security between 1990 
and 2010, based on the set of own elaboration indicators that generate socio-
environmental-energy security index (SEES index); and 
 To create scenarios of regional electric integration, considering different premises 
and projects, to measure the impact of the promotion of regional integration on 
the need for new electric projects, in the expansion of installed capacity and 
generation, as well as in greenhouse gas emissions (GHG). 
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The originality of the thesis lies on many issues. The thesis deepens the dynamics of 
integration to the detriment of regional conflict, which itself is original and innovative – 
mainly because, as already mentioned, energy issues are often considered to be associated 
with autonomy, self-sufficiency and national sovereignties. In addition, and related to the 
previous argument, the proposal of problematization of the concept of energy security 
aims to deal with gaps that exist in the literature, although it is a widely accepted and 
reproduced concept. In suggesting the SEES index, we are not only (re)defining and 
offering a new approach to energy planning, but also associating it with the new 
environmental paradigm (NEP) (DUNLAP and VAN LIERE, 1978, GADENNE et al., 
2011). 
Because it is a analysis of (part of) South America, it is not intended to indiscriminately 
apply the theories of regional integration that were created to understand the European 
case, such as the neo-functionalist – which basically focuses on the relevance of 
supranational institutions. In fact, intergovernmental theory will be used, which 
disregards this focus and highlights the greater autonomy and sovereignty of the countries 
involved in the process of regional integration. 
With regard to the particular case of regional integration under analysis, it is worth noting 
that this is one of the first works that considers the initial formation of Mercosur 
(Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay), as well as Venezuela and Bolivia. Finally, it 
should be noted that the methodological design and the criteria of analysis are original 
and innovative, insofar as it aggregates different areas, such as international security, 
regional integration, sustainable development, public policies, as well as energy 
indicators/modeling. Thus, bibliographical research and theoretical development have 
influences from Economic Sciences, Political Science, International Relations, Security, 
Energy, Environment and Development, for example. 
The assumption is that greater regional energy integration is better for the region, what 
will be ratified in different chapters and sections of this thesis. In addition, another 
assumption of the research is that Bolivia’s effective accession process will be finalized, 
so that the country can be considered a Mercosur State Party. Finally, another assumption 
is that the electrical integration is the ideal case study to be analyzed in this thesis due to 




1.3 Presentation of thesis structure and contents 
Figure 1 shows the structure of its chapters. Note that chapters include quantitative and 
qualitative primary sources such as statistics, forecast data, norms, laws, international 
treaties, agreements, memorandum of understanding, regulatory frameworks, decisions, 













Chapter 1 is the introduction itself. It presents the theme of the research, as well as the 
boundaries to the space (Mercosur) and time of analysis (1990 onward), as well as 
methodology, justifications, general objective and originality of this study. It seeks to 
clarify to the reader the basis on which the thesis will be conducted, as well as the 
ontological (research nature), epistemological (perception of reality of research) and 
methodological (research techniques and methods) choices of the research. 
Chapter 2 is subdivided into 3 sections, which constitute the ‘literature review’. The 
quotes are due to the fact that this chapter is much more than a simple review of what has 
been discussed recently on the topics covered; in fact, it makes a critical and positioned 
presentation on the following topics: energy security (section 2.1), regional integration 
and Mercosur (section 2.2) and energy integration (section 2.3). Numerous papers, such 
as articles, reports and chapters of national and international books have been used as a 
basis for the main key concepts of this thesis. It is worth mentioning that the discussion 
about the concept of energy security is focused on three dimensions: social (subsection 
2.1.1), environmental (subsection 2.1.2) and regional (subsection 2.1.3). Likewise, the 
debate on energy integration is subdivided into benefits and barriers (subseciton 2.3.1) 
and market integration modalities (subsection 2.3.2). 
Chapter 3 presents qualitative and quantitative national data and analyzes the energy 
sector of the countries under study. The national and regional quantitative primary sources 
are databases such as World Databank, sieLAC, ECLACstat, CIER, COCIER, BP, WEC 
and national energy ministries. The chapter will be organized in two parts. The first one 
provides a comparative analysis of different primary quantitative data on energy power 
plants and international interconnections; private participation in generation, transmission 
and distribution; and gas pipeline network and natural gas reserves in the region, for 
example. The second part provides a comparative analysis on the energy sector of each 
analyzed countries: Argentina (section 3.1), Bolivia (section 3.2), Brazil (section 3.3), 
Paraguay (section 3.4), Uruguay (section 3.5) and Venezuela (section 3.6). There are 
information such as geographical and economic overview; structure of energy markets, 
separated by electricity, and oil and gas (O&G); summarized energy balance; binational 
projects, whether hydroelectric plants or gas pipelines; and international (cross-border) 
interconnections and international trade, for example. 
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Chapter 4 deals with the same topic from a regional perspective. It presents energy 
information in the framework of Mercosur (section 4.1) and UNASUR (section 4.2) on 
the basis of regional qualitative primary sources such as norms, laws, international 
treaties, agreements, memorandum of understanding, regulatory frameworks, decisions, 
recommendations, decree, resolutions, framework agreements, declarations, programs 
and planning. About 110 primary sources of Mercosur were consulted and analyzed, 
highlighting 25 Mercosur’s official energy regulations (1993-2012), as well as 66 
frequency of Mercosur’ Sub-Working Group (SGT-6) Environment meetings (1996-
2015) and 16 frequency Mercosur’s of SGT-9 Energy meetings (2005-2011). Besides, 2 
comparative analysis based on Chapter 3 are carried out: (i) a comparative analysis of 
electric power industry in Mercosur countries; and (ii) a comparative analysis of O&G 
industry in Mercosur countries. Concerning UNASUR, five main documents dealing with 
the energy issue are analyzed, such as the South American Energy Treaty (2010), as well 
as the last 10 IIRSA-COSIPLAN reports in order to identify the relevance of energy 
projects in terms of participation in the number of projects and amount (US$ million).  
Chapter 5, as well as the two previous ones, will also be divided into two main sections: 
SEES index (section 5.1) and Scenario modeling (section 5.2). In the first section, it is 
created a new hybrid index called socio-environmental-energy security (SEES), whose 
main objective is to analyze the evolution of Mercosur energy policies in the past (1990-
2010). Then, the second section proposes energy scenarios using the Open Source Energy 
Modelling System – South America Model Base (OSeMOSYS-SAMBA), a model of 
planning for the expansion of long-term energy systems, whose objective is to analyze 
present and possible integration scenarios in the future (2015-2050). It is divided into two 
subsections, which present the key assumptions (subsection 5.2.1) and the results 
(subsection 5.2.2) achieved by every modeled scenario: reference integration scenario 
(RIS), weak integration scenario (WIS), moderate integration scenario (MIS) and strong 
integration scenario (SIS). They consider expansion and new international 
interconnection lines, new binational hydroelectric plants, new contractual arrangements 
(swaps) as well as regulatory harmonization. 
Finally, Chapter 6 presents the main conclusions of this thesis, as well as some 
recommendations. It seeks to summarize its main findings, highlighting the need to 
review regional policies on regional energy integration, including the results in the light 
of the models used. Thus, it seeks to clarify the main points related to regional integration 
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associated with the energy issue in order to contribute to reduce confusion in the literature 
and, consequently, to the decision making of the matter in question. Appendices with 
additional information (figures, tables, and maps) are then displayed. Finally, References 





2. Energy security and regional integration  
 
This chapter is more than a simple ‘review of the literature’. As highlighted before in the 
Introduction (Chapter 1), an effort is made to combine different approaches and 
perspectives where dialogue is often non-existent, also in order to clarify the theoretical 
foundations essential to the main debates proposed by this thesis. Ergo, we cite authors 
from Economic Science, Political Science, International Relations, Energy Planning5, 
Energy Engineering and Environmental Sciences, for example. 
More than just presenting a diversity of texts, reports and papers that deal with the subject 
in the last years, this chapter incites debate and reflection. It presents not only the main 
concepts but also their evolution over time, as well as their inconsistencies. In addition, 
at the end of each section and subsection, the author’s position on the subject is clearly 
marked so that the reader understands the path through which the text is being conducted. 
In this way, this chapter is divided into three sections. The first section deals with Energy 
security (section 2.1), presenting the evolution of the concept, based on the context of the 
1970s oil shocks. There are three subsections that highlight the relevance of incorporating 
into the analysis social (subsection 2.1.1), environmental (subsection 2.1.2) and regional 
(subsection 2.1.3) dimensions. This section is particularly important because it will create 
the conceptual bases that will justify the creation of the SEES index (subsection 4.1), to 
be detailed later. 
The second section deals with the concept of regional integration (section 2.2), focusing 
in particular on the Mercosur case. The section highlights the need to promote an 
interdisciplinary approach to the issue, addressing and facing the complexity it demands. 
A brief presentation of the historical process of creation and consolidation of Mercosur is 
presented, finally introducing some data that show the regional asymmetries and intra-
bloc inequalities (within the bloc) that exist and that consequently need to be considered 
in studies, projects and policies designed for the region. 
Finally, the last section deals specifically with energy integration itself (section 2.3). 
Being then split into two subsections, the first one deals with the benefits associated with 
                                                          
5 To access Energy Planning contributions, see CHEVALIER (1973), HELM (2002, 2011, 2014), MARTIN 
(1974, 1988, 1990, 1992, 2000), PERCEBOIS (1986, 2008),   
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promoting energy integration, as well as its main barriers (subsection 2.3.1). Following 
are different market integration modalities (subsection 2.3.2), which are then subdivided 
into binational plants (HPP), interruptible flow (opportunity interchange), firm energy 
contracting (flow per firm contract), market coupling (loose volume coupling, tight 
volume coupling and market splitting. It is a more technical subsection, based on legal, 
commercial and regulatory framework, which is too little addressed in the regional energy 
integration literature for South American countries6. 
 
2.1 Energy security7 
There are various approaches to dealing with energy security. For BUZAN et al. (1998) 
and WÆVER (1995, 1998), the security approach generally manifests itself through the 
following three steps: (i) threat identification; (ii) emergency action proposal; and (iii) 
breaking free of regular rules of security. Ergo, ‘it is by labelling something [as] a security 
issue that it becomes one’ (WÆVER, 2004: 13), so the securitization becomes ‘a social 
and intersubjective construction’ (TAURECK, 2006: 3). 
The concept of energy security comes typically from the 20th century, more precisely 
from the period of the oil shocks, when the central concern of the period was the reduction 
of dependence on oil imports, particularly in OECD countries (SANTOS, 2015, UNDP, 
2009, VIVODA, 2010, YERGIN, 1991). The academic debate ended up weakened with 
the stabilization of the oil price (1990s), but it again played a leading role in the countries’ 
strategic agenda, in particular due to the increasing demand in Asia, the interruptions in 
gas supply in Europe and the decarbonisation of energy systems (CHERP and JEWELL, 
2014, CHESTER, 2010, HANCOCK and VIVODA, 2014, YERGIN, 2006). 
In fact, price and guarantee of demand from primary sources such as oil and gas strongly 
influence the literature on energy security (ANG et al., 2015, CHESTER, 2010, IEA, 
2013, ISBELL, 2007, JAMASB and POLLITT, 2008, MULLER-KRAENNER, 2008, 
SPANJER, 2007, UNDP, 2004, WESLEY, 2007). However, energy security is not 
                                                          
6 On the other hand, it is common to find studies and projects that evaluate these modalities analyzing 
different existing European cases, as in BAUMANN (2014) and CRETI et al. (2010). 
7 This section comes from a paper published in Energies, December 2017. See: SANTOS et al., 2017b, 
“Evaluating Energy Policies Through the Use of a Hybrid Quantitative Indicator-Based Approach: The 
Case of Mercosur”, Energies, v. 10, n. 12 (Dec), pp. 2140-2155. 
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limited to this. Therefore, it is essential to understand the concept, especially because it 
presents a dynamic definition and dimensions that evolve as circumstances change over 
time. In this sense, Chester (2010) sums up the multiple aspects of the term ‘energy 
security’, noting that an inherent characteristic of the concept is risk management 
(interruption, unavailable power supply, capacity failure, dependence on sources of 
unsustainable energy, etc). 
VAN DER HOEVEN (2011) reaffirms this argument, arguing that promoting energy 
security means mitigating risks and managing the uncertainties related to the future of 
energy markets. To that end, KUCHARSKI and UNESAKI (2015) stress that it is 
necessary not only to define the energy system but its components and behavior in order 
to perceive its vulnerabilities, risks and threats, suggesting the adoption of the complex 
adaptative systems (CAS) approach.  
However, according to CHERP and JEWELL (2014) the energy security concept should 
take into account three main issues: ‘security for whom?’, ‘security for which values?’ 
and ‘security from what threats?’. Relating it to the concept of securitization, the authors 
evaluate how the approach of 4As (availability, accessibility, affordability and 
acceptability) influences the understanding of these issues. In raising such questions, the 
authors guarantee a more critical reflection of the concept itself, as it makes room for an 
analysis of the actors (consumers and producers), values and threats. 
KRUYT et al. (2009) emphasize that there are four main elements in the understanding 
of energy security, which are: (i) availability of energy; (ii) accessibility; (iii) costs; and 
(iv) environmental sustainability. VON HIPPEL et al. (2011) also highlight four variables 
that need to be incorporated into the concept, namely: (i) environment; (ii) technology; 
(iii) demand side management; and (iv) sociocultural factors.  
Thus, it is clear that there are several interpretations and understandings about the concept 
of energy security, which has undergone changes since the 1970s. In nearly 50 years, the 
International Energy Agency (IEA) has had to incorporate these changes into its own 
definitions of energy security. In 1985, it is defined as ‘an adequate supply of energy at a 
reasonable cost’ (IEA, 1985: 29); in 2007, however, it is stated that ‘energy security 
always consists of both a physical component and a price component, (but) the relative 
importance of these depends on market structure’ (IEA, 2007: 32). It is only in 2010, 
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however, that its definition includes ‘while respecting environmental concerns’ (CHERP 
and JEWELL, 2014).  
Today the agency’s website contains the following definition:  
‘the IEA defines energy security as the uninterrupted availability of 
energy sources at an affordable price. Energy security has many 
aspects: long-term energy security mainly deals with timely 
investments to supply energy in line with economic developments and 
environmental needs. On the other hand, short-term energy security 
focuses on the ability of the energy system to promptly react to sudden 
changes in the supply-demand balance.’ (IEA website). 
Ergo, it is clear that the environmental and investment question would be exclusively for 
the long-term analysis, while the short-term ones focus on the mismatch between supply 
and demand.  
The World Energy Assessment stresses that energy security is more than just ensuring 
the availability of abundant oil reserves at affordable prices, highlighting the need to 
analyze the long-term in face of a new economic environment and the promotion of 
sustainable development (UNDP, 2000). SIMS et al. (2007) show the relevance of 
innovative supply-side technologies, which, by allowing new technologies to become 
commercial and competitive, will make it possible to promote the participation of clean 
energy at local, regional and global levels. ‘Technology innovation efforts will need to be 
complemented by new market designs, new policies and by new financing and business 
models, as well as technology transfer’ (IRENA, 2017b: 13). 
With regard to the definition of the concept of energy security, there is a significant 
tendency to present indicators to evaluate it. VON HIPPEL et al. (2011), VIVODA (2010) 
and SOVACOOL (2011), for example, use this methodology to measure and compare the 
evolution of energy security in the most diverse countries. In turn, LÖSCHEL et al. 
(2010) are the first authors to suggest a differentiation between ex-ante and ex-post 
indicators. 
As in TONGSOPIT et al. (2016) and YAO and CHANG (2014), the concept of energy 
security has evolved over time, addressing new issues such as efficiency, international 
relations (cooperation or energy integration), environmental protection and institutional 
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dimensions. The contemporary scope of the concept goes beyond the OECD oil importers 
as a proxy for the definition, emphasizing the role of non-state actors, from individual 
economies to global production networks (BRIDGE, 2008, CHERP, 2012). 
In this sense, there is no consensus on the concept and, consequently, on energy policies, 
which vary from energy poverty to climate change (CHERP and JEWELL, 2014). 
Therefore, it is not possible to have a single defined and accepted concept about energy 
security. Ergo, CHESTER (2010) and VIVODA (2010) define that it is a slippery 
concept, that is, hard to define universally, because it is polysemic, multi-dimensional 
and context-dependent on the nature of each country/region.  
ANG et al. (2015) provide an exhaustive analysis of 104 studies on energy security (peer-
reviewed journals, national agency reports, international organizations, and 
business/professional associations) since 2001. They also assess whether a particular 
definition is given to the concept of energy security and/or if there is an indicator to 
evaluate it, as well as if it takes into account infrastructure, prices, social effects, 
environment, governance and efficiency. They perceive that the average number of 
studies per year increased during this period and that the percentage of qualitative and 
quantitative studies is very similar, with no evidence that the subjects considered in both 
groups are different.  
The authors state that of the total of the studies analyzed, 80% present definitions on 
energy security, without a broad acceptable consensus. Once again, it becomes clear that 
it is a highly context-dependent concept, so there are sporadic references to the concept 
in an abstract, vague and unfocused way (CHESTER, 2010, ANG et al., 2015), which 
reinforces the argument that there is no unifying methodology to the energy security 
assessment (TONGSOPIT et al., 2016). 
In light of the evolution of the concept of energy security, as well as the complexity of 
meanings and methodologies, it is necessary to understand three significant differences 
when it comes to this subject:   
 Classical vs. Contemporary studies: in the 1970s and 1980s, energy security 
basically meant the stable supply of cheap oil under threat of embargoes and price 
manipulation by exporters (CHERP and JEWELL, 2014, YERGIN, 1988). In this 
sense, the concept was very close to national values such as political and economic 
19 
 
independence, territorial integrity, sovereignty when formulating policies, and 
self-sufficiency in oil. On the other hand, contemporary studies on energy security 
incorporate a number of other factors, taking into account climate change 
mitigation, regional agreements, equitable provision of energy services, socio-
political stability, climate change and, in general, promoting sustainable 
development (CHERP et al., 2014, 2012, GOLDTHAU, 2014, YERGIN, 2006);  
 Developed vs. Developing countries: ANG et al. (2015) and KANCHANA and 
UNESAKI (2014) emphasize the need to take into account the profile and 
socioeconomic status of countries when analyzing the concept of energy security. 
For more developed countries, the concept represents a resilient energy system 
with uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price (WINZER, 
2012) – even for less developed countries, it can be understood as access to 
modern energy services (UNDP, 2011). MARTCHAMODOL and KUMAR 
(2012: 653), however, extend the concept to developing countries, stating that it 
refers to ‘sufficient energy supply (quantity and quality) to meet all requirements 
at all times of all citizens in affordable and stable price, and it also leads to sustain 
economic performance and poverty alleviation, better quality of life without 
harming the environment’. In fact, it is in the developing countries where there 
are the majority of energy-intensive industries producing goods (SANWAL, 
2010, 2012, 2014), but despite this transition, it is still possible to find energy-
intensive industries in certain developed countries. Precisely because of the focus 
of the analysis being on developing countries, such a distinction is fundamentally 
important, since they will be responsible for the largest increase in emissions in 
the future (SCHÜLLER, 2012); and 
 Short-term vs. Long-term analysis: generally, in the short and medium-term, 
energy security focuses on the impacts of price shocks or unanticipated supply 
disruptions, as well as on operational failures; but in the medium-term the 
promotion of renewable energies (RE) can be considered to deal with dependence 
on oil (KUCHARSKI and UNESAKI, 2015). On the other hand, in the long-term 
it is mandatory to consider the demand profile, infrastructure, depletion of 
reserves, technological innovation, climate change, adaptability of systems, and 
other variables (KUCHARSKI and UNESAKI, 2014, SMIT and WANDEL, 
2006). KISEL et al. (2016) suggest that the analysis should be divided into short 
and long-term; for them, in the short-term, energy security can be basically 
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measured by the potential that the energy system has to deal with disturbances 
(operational resilience), while in the long-term it is necessary to consider (i) 
technical resilience and vulnerability; (ii) economic dependence; and (iii) political 
affectability – oscillations to (geo)political influences. It is important, however, to 
understand that energy policies that may lead to increased energy security in the 
short-therm may not guarantee it in long-term (ANG et al., 2015). In the past, for 
example, several projects have ensured short-term energy security, assumed as a 
guarantee of supply, without necessarily considering their social and 
environmental impacts. Itaipu Binacional, energy integration project through 
binational dam between Brazil and Paraguay of the 1970s, is an example of such 
reality.  
In making these considerations, it is necessary to highlight the analysis of the concept of 
energy security in the different countries and regions, associating it with the approaches 
that fully consider their impacts on social, economic and environmental variables. This 
proposal is in line with the argument of the former Secretary-General of the UN, Ban Ki-
Moon, who, taking into account the sustainable development agenda, stated that ‘the 
problems we face are interdependent. Poverty, hunger, insecurity, climate change, 
environmental degradation, energy scarcity – these challenges demand holistic and 
integrated solutions’ (UN NEWS CENTER, 2013). In this way, nothing more appropriate 
than treating the subject in an interdisciplinary and integral way. In addition, it is fully in 
line with the targets of the sustainable development goal 7 (SDG 7), that seeks to ensure 
access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all. 
In this sense, the following subsections will stress the challenges to be incorporated into 
energy policies, especially when it comes to the analysis of energy security in developing 
countries. At the same time, beyond the social and environmental dimensions, there is a 
discussion on the benefits of promoting energy security at the regional level, which 
challenges the mainstream national logic of addressing the issue. It is thus suggested an 
innovative and alternative approach to current policies for the promotion of energy 
security, taking into account new dimensions (social and environmental) in the face of a 




2.1.1 Social dimension 
In particular, when analyzing developing countries, it is essential to take into account 
regional and national inequalities and asymmetries. Critics have already drawn attention 
to social inequalities when using energy indicators for certain regions (TONGSOPIT et 
al., 2016)8. To CHERP and JEWELL (2014), for example, a central issue in contemporary 
studies of energy security is precisely to identify and explore the relationships between 
energy systems and social values.  
For developed countries, sustainability focus almost exclusively on environmental issues, 
while issues such as poverty and equity are fundamentally important and urgent in 
developing countries (KEMMLER and SPRENG, 2007). Ergo, considering social 
indicators is essential for developing countries, such as those related to energy poverty 
(PEREIRA JÚNIOR et al., 2008, SANTOS et al., 2017a, VERA and LANGLOIS, 2007).  
It is therefore clear that energy indicators are not limited exclusively to energy issues 
themselves. VIVODA (2010) argues that human security is among the challenges that 
need to be incorporated into the new concept of energy security, emphasizing that the 
conceptualization of energy security must consider the provision of basic energy services 
such as access to electricity.  
ANG et al. (2015) highlight the relevance of social issues in countries where energy 
poverty or connectivity is a major concern. In the analysis of the Greek energy system, 
ANGELIS-DIMAKIS et al. (2012) use three indicators to analyze the social dimension 
(percentage of households with access to commercial energy sources, percentage of 
household income spent on energy, and share of household expenditures on energy for 
each income group). According to IRENA (2017b), it is worth emphasizing that the 
approach to this suggested energy transition could fuel economic growth and create new 
employment opportunities. Once again, the relationship between the social and energy 
dimensions is clear and real. 
 
                                                          
8 Consumers are the weakest link in the energy chain. 
22 
 
2.1.2 Environmental dimension 
Some authors take into consideration the issue of environmental impact in understanding 
the concept of energy security, as often seen in the analysis of developed countries or in 
the medium/long-term general analysis. However, what is ‘environmentally acceptable’ 
varies among different actors, such as local people, environmental non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), industries, and nation states (CHERP and JEWELL, 2014).  
The APERC’s (2007: 6) definition on energy security is ‘the ability of an economy to 
guarantee the availability of energy resource in a sustainable and timely manner with the 
energy price being at a level that will not adversely affect the economic performance of 
the economy’. CHESTER (2010), CHEVALIER (2006), HUGHES (2012), 
KANCHANA and UNESAKI (2014), KRUYT et al. (2009), KUCHARSKI and 
UNESAKI (2015), TONGSOPIT et al. (2016) and WINZER (2012) are some of the 
authors who also consider the environmental and climate change impacts on energy 
systems in their studies.  
VON HIPPEL et al. (2011) emphasize the need to reformulate energy security policies in 
order to allow them to deal with environmental issues such as climate change and global 
warming, which may represent one of the main challenges to the traditional (classical 
perspetive) thinking of energy security. ANG et al. (2015) argue that sustainability and 
environmental issues are directly related to energy security, due to emissions that 
contribute to global warming, air pollution and other risks such as forest flooding and oil 
spills.  
The EUROPEAN COMMISSION9 (2001) and PASQUALETTI and SOVACOOL 
(2012) also stress the need to incorporate environmental concerns into energy security. In 
developing an energy security index, SOVACOOL (2013) also includes environmental 
sustainability as a dimension of energy security, considering indicators such as land use, 
water, climate change and pollution.  
As ANG et al. (2015) highlight, the weight of social and environmental effects on energy 
security definitions has grown significantly, particularly post 2010 – even though they 
are only about 40% of the cases analyzed. They evaluate that in recent studies the 
                                                          
9 Environmental protection has been an important part of the European Union’s (EU) energy policy since 
its inclusion in the Single European Act of 1986 (LANGSDORF, 2011). 
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environmental dimension occupies the second area most addressed, only behind the 
economic one; in turn, the social aspects occupy only the fifth position, behind 4As and 
energy supply. 
Moreover, the authors perceive that the weight of both themes varies greatly between 
official reports, journals and other publications; the environmental theme is cited in about 
40% of journals and only about 15% of official reports; in turn, the percentage of social 
agenda is 30% and 40%, respectively. Ergo, it is noteworthy to reinforce how the different 
sources attribute different weights to the same variables, which once again ratifies the 
lack of consensus on the concept of energy security. 
With regard to the current global value chains (GVC), with extraction, exploration and 
production of a country fragmented in other countries and/or continents, it is essential to 
consider the argument of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR).  
In addition, OBANI and GUPTA (2016) emphasize the need to consider the current 
economic recession in major economies in the North, which has several impacts both 
domestically and internationally. At the same time that it reduces the anthropogenic 
emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the short-term, it can increase it in the 
medium/long-term associated with their recovery. Due to the uncertainty as to the net 
result of these movements, as well as to the current scenario of international crisis, many 
researchers are studying the effect of the recession on global climate change policy 
(SHUM, 2012).  
It is also worth noting that developing countries are often even more vulnerable to 
environmental pollution due to weak environmental institutions and laws, population 
growth, and poverty (LYNCH et al., 2017). In addition, such vulnerability is aggravated 
because they have less access to funding for their development needs. 
 
2.1.3 Regional dimension  
Indeed, as CHERP and JEWELL (2014) argue, YERGIN’s (1988) classic definition of 
energy security does refer to the idea of a purely national concern. This influence, present 
in the mainstream of economics and international relations (IR), shaped this issue to 
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become a priority of the national agendas of each country. In this way, they represent 
state-centered definitions of the concept of energy security.  
Moreover, there is a clear influence of a market-centric definition, which ‘is clearly based 
on the pure Walrasian market with its self-equilibrating properties. Markets are assumed 
to be cleared through price adjustments’ (CHESTER, 2010: 892). This approach assigns 
a limited role to States, a challenge that needs to be revised and overcome.  
Therefore, another challenge that should be incorporated into the new concept of energy 
security (contemporary perspective) is the consideration of the international question, 
since ‘energy security policies must also address international (regional and global) 
implications of energy security challenges’ (VIVODA, 2010: 5259). In fact, as stressed 
by ANG et al. (2015), CEIA and RIBEIRO (2016), DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND 
CLIMATE CHANGE (2006), GOLDTHAU and SOVACOOL (2012) and SANTOS and 
VARELA (2016), countries have increasingly engaged in foreign policy and energy 
diplomacy10 to ensure national energy security from different arrangements with 
exporting countries – often neighboring countries.  
Ergo, there are few detailed studies on regional11 energy security rather than national 
energy security, although it is widely known that ‘interconnections of neighboring grids 
(electricity and gas networks) into regional grids greatly enhance energy security’ 
(UNDP, 2000: 130). Besides, promoting regional energy security reduces costs and 
ensures a more efficient use of reserves and electricity.  
However, TONGSOPIT et al. (2016) and KANCHANA and UNESAKI (2014) are some 
of the few authors who have quantitative studies measuring the evolution of regional 
energy security, in the specific case of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN). Thus, it is mandatory to stress the need to incorporate the regional approach 
in energy security studies, given their collective benefits. For the region of South/Latin 
America, the work carried out by CIER (2010) and MOURA (2017) stand out.  
                                                          
10 There is no consensus on what the concept actually means. It is mostly used in the geopolitics debate on 
access to resources and points to a strategic and instrumental use of foreign policy to secure a country’s 
energy supplies (GOLDTHAU, 2010). Energy diplomacy phenomenon is nothing new, but has emerged as 
a powerful concept in public discourse. 
11 There are fewer studies when dealing with regional agreements/blocs, although there are some that deal 




This increased interdependence between producer and consumer countries makes the 
classical definition of energy security more challenging. VAN DER HOEVEN (2011) 
emphasizes the importance of energy integration in improving performance and reducing 
uncertainties, even though the author does not make a proper distinction between this 
policy strategy and the international trade of different energy sources. CHESTER (2010) 
points out that in the 21st century access to different energy sources depends on a complex 
system of global markets, vast cross-border infrastructure, and interdependencies with 
financial markets and technology, given the inability of countries to be self-sufficient.  
JERVIS (1978), for example, defines that the security of one state reduces the security of 
another. Consequently, in view of this ‘security dilemma’, which can also be applied to 
the world of energy, it makes sense to rethink an approach to ensure increased regional 
energy security. VIVODA (2010) disagrees that the gain of energy security of one state 
necessarily represents the loss of others, but also highlights the relevance of the regional 
approach remains fundamental. This approach is consistent with KEOHANE and NYE’s 
(2001) argument, which suggests the creation of institutions in order to reduce transaction 
costs and promote gains in international cooperation. 
Notwithstanding, CHESTER (2010) and SANTOS et al. (2016a, 2016b, 2016c) highlight 
the risk of political instability when one thinks of regional energy security, as occurred 
with the interruption of gas supply in GASBOL12 (between Bolivia and Brazil) and more 
recently in Europe13 (Russian gas). It is worth mentioning that hindering or refusing to 
sell energy to importing countries is often referred to as ‘energy weapon’ (LÖSCHEL et 
al., 2010). 
Relating the environmental area to the regional level, LIU, WU and HUANG (2017: 152) 
argue that ‘climate change can not be addressed without global cooperation and action, 
which in turn depends on an equitable distribution of responsibility’. SANWAL (2012) 
                                                          
12 There was nationalization of Bolivian hydrocarbons (oil and natural gas) by Decree n. 28,701/2006 
(‘Héroes del Chaco’), signed by former-president Evo Morales. The case included military occupation of 
the refineries, including those of Petrobras, under the allegation that foreign companies earned a lot and 
paid little to the Bolivian state. This event led to a crisis in the relationship between Brazil and Bolivia, 
especially since the former imported Bolivian gas since 1999 through GASBOL. 
13 The European case, as well as the South American one, highlights the vulnerability of the energy security 
of the countries to the need to import energy. About 65% of the gas consumed by the European Union (EU) 
countries is imported, whose almost half come from Russia – and much of that total has to pass through 
Ukraine. Events of disruption in the supply of Russian gas to the EU have already occurred in 2009 and 
2014, but more recently the geopolitical crisis following the annexation of the Crimea by Vladimir Putin 
has led the EU to review its dependency situation by considering the import of liquefied natural gas (LNG) 
from the Middle East or US shale gas. 
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emphasizes that international cooperation was first suggested only in 1972 during the 
World Summit on the Human Environment held in Stockholm. In this sense, such authors 
rightly defend the need to consider regional cooperation and integration to achieve 
sustainable development, which is particularly true for developing countries. 
With this section, we hope to have made it clear that the concept of energy security is 
time-dependent, space-dependent, fits almost everything and has been (re)framed since 
the 1970s. It then represents an old-fashioned, context-dependent and unreliable concept, 
but at the same time it has played and continues to play in some contexts an important 
role in energy policy14. As the focus of the thesis precisely relies on developing countries 
in the South American subcontinent, particularly Mercosur, the need to take into account 
social, environmental and regional dimensions stands out. 
Social dimension, because in these countries a significant part of the population does not 
even have access to electricity, especially in the most isolated and/or rural regions. In 
addition, it is important to consider the increase in energy demand in certain countries 
(due to a more energy-intensive industrial and residential consumption), what urges the 
need to offer and guarantee universal access to energy, a proposition understood as human 
right. Environmental dimension, due to a series of international conventions, such as the 
recent Paris Agreement and SDG 9, there is a growing need to reduce the use of non-
renewable fossil fuels and to mitigate CO2 emissions. Thus, including both social and 
environmental dimensions highlights the close relationship between energy security and 
sustainable development.  
Regional dimension has done the link between energy security and regional integration, 
because both concepts have in their nature the nationalist and state-centric characteristics. 
In this way, the thesis proposes an alternative approach to state-centered policies, rooted 
in concepts as state sovereignty, energy self-sufficiency and domestic energy planning. 
Undoubtedly, the consideration of these three dimensions does not exclude the relevance 
of the economic one (traditionally embedded in the concept of energy security). 
 
                                                          
14 Our objective is not to deny the relevance of the concept, but to present its evolution and its limitations 
to discuss the theme in question. In this sense, our idea is to propose the concept of regional energy security 
and, to this end, chapter 5 will evaluate the evolution of Mercosur regional energy security since its 
formation through the creation of SEES index and OSeMOSYS-SAMBA modeling. 
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2.2 Regional Integration and Mercosur 
The main goal of this subsection is to emphasize the time and space of this analysis. 
Instead of analyzing this issue from the perspective of a country (state), here an analysis 
concerning a group of states (regional blocs) will be carried out. For this purpose, it is 
necessary to make some reservations to the concept of regional integration, as well as to 
the consequences coming from its multiple interpretations. 
First, it is important to highlight the existing confusion in the literature (even the 
specialized one) about the real sense of regional integration. Economic Science, Political 
Science, Social Sciences, International Relations, Geography, History and Law, for 
example, have dramatic ontological, epistemological and methodological differences to 
address the issue. Thus, for some it is a question of borders only, while for others it is a 
trade agreement, or common social rights/identities, or free transit of people and 
goods/services, or even legal harmonization. 
In addition, most of the studies on the subject present a state-centric bias, i.e., it analyzes 
the cases identifying in the countries (States) the only relevant actors in the process 
(LACHER, 2003). Although this approach is limited, as there are other equally important 
actors in the different decision-making processes, such as organized civil society, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), public and private companies, it ends up prevailing 
in the different studies and works mainly for the ease of access to data and information15.  
In accordance with ECLAC (2009:1) [emphasis added], ‘regional integration is the 
process through which different national economies seek mutual benefits, complementing 
themselves mutually’ and it can be divided into three distinct categories: (i) economic and 
commercial integration; (ii) political integration; and (iii) physical integration16.  
There is a long literature that discusses the concept, policies and practices of regional 
integration. In advance, it is worth noting that this literature is influenced by a Eurocentric 
vision of the consolidation process of the current European Union (EU) (SÖDERBAUM, 
                                                          
15 To some extent, although Chapter 3 deals with subnational issues, the focus of the thesis analysis is 
statecentric, so that comparisons can be made with the other studies available in the literature. 
16 The existing debate on the relationship between ‘economic/comercial’’, ‘physical’, and ‘political’ 
integration is deep and interdisciplinary. However, the focus of this project relies on the last one, since it is 
the one less present in the literature and because we believe that debates envolving physical integration is 
impregnated by political and economic factors (too). 
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2013), as well as being different from the one that discusses international cooperation17, 
a concept that is often used as a synonym for regional integration. Specifically regarding 
Latin American literature, especially in South American countries, the role played by 
presidents is often highlighted (PALESTINI and AGOSTINIS, 2018). 
It is clear that integration is a process from the beginning, that is, it is not an end in itself. 
Therefore, it is a governance arrangement that allows a group of states to reach an end 
goal. ‘Regional integration can be understood as a multifaceted process through which 
the promotion of common and joint policies in a given region is aimed at reducing the 
region’s asymmetries and inequalities, as well as promoting socioeconomic well-being.” 
(SANTOS and DINIZ JÚNIOR, 2017: 23). 
Despite the third category listed by ECLAC (2009) being less discussed in the current 
literature, it is important to note its intense relationship with the other ones, as well as its 
direct impacts on socioeconomic development of countries involved in the process of 
regional integration. Therefore, this thesis focus on this ‘traditional type of integration’18, 
that is, physical integration, exactly due to this specificity, even because the discussions 
on infrastructure investments take place at this level and such investments pave the way 
for structural and significant changes in an economy. 
However, it is necessary to limit the goals of this research, in order to taper off the topic 
to be studied, and as a result, to ensure a great deal of detail in this analysis. In this sense, 
within the range of physical integration, there are three main sectors: (i) transportation; 
(ii) communications; and (iii) energy. Since ‘energy’ is transversal to all other sectors 
mentioned, it is worth making it the target of this research, also due to its externalities 
experienced by other sectors of a given economy – such as lowering the cost and price of 
energy for the industrial, residential and service sectors. 
Besides, the theoretical mainstream on regional integration in South America focus 
almost exclusively on the commercial issue and considering this fact we will not focus 
on it. Among the most cited works19, BOHARA et al. (2004), BUSTOS (2011), YEATS 
                                                          
17 Regional integration is more related to a long-term project, whose central objective is to promote 
collective well-being, reducing regional asymmetries. See BÖRZEL (2016). 
18 Unlike the mainstream approach of the theme of physical integration, (geo)political, social, economic 
and environmental variables will not be ignored. 
19 The research was carried out based on the texts mentioned and, of greater relevance, through the Web of 
Science, taking into account the keys “MERCOSUR” and “MERCOSUL”. 
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(1998), OLARREAGA and SOLOAGA (1998), LEIPZIGER et al. (1997) and 
FRANKEL et al. (1995) accentuate, once again, only transactions and commercial 
policies as proxies for the bloc integration. BOND et al. (2001), for instance, draw a direct 
line between deepened regional integration and multilateral trade agreements. 
VENABLES (2003) and PUGA (1999), similarly, address only commercial issues when 
they, in reality, refer to regional integration20. In this thesis, this approach will not be 
followed. 
The Common Market of the South (Mercosur) was founded in 1991 through the Treaty 
of Asunción (TA), being driven by Brazilian and Argentinian then Presidents Fernando 
Collor de Mello and Carlos Menem, respectively. Their main goals were to build up a 
common market21 between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. Notwithstanding, 
it is still worth noting that Mercosur is a direct consequence of a series of old bilateral 
agreements between Brazil and Argentina, the return of democracy and liberalization 
environment (MECHAM, 2003, SANTOS et al., 2016d). It refers to the concept of the 
Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA), created in the 1960s, whose successor, 
the Latin American Integration Association (LAIA), was founded in the 1980s. 
By signing the Treaty of Asunción (TA)22, the idea was that a free-trade zone (FTZ) 
would have already been established by the end of 1994 so that, subsequently, a customs 
union could be established as well through progressive trade liberalization. In reality, it 
is known that intra-bloc trade had significantly increased. The most immediate antecedent 
of this block formation was the Brazil-Argentina Integration Act signed in 1986 between 
Presidents José Sarney (Brazil) and Raúl Alfonsin (Argentina). Both of them were the 
first presidents of their countries after the end of dictatorial regimes. This Act gave birth 
                                                          
20 It is noteworthy that the majority of the (most accessed) works on Latin/South American regional 
integration date back to the 1990s and early 2000s when the theme was a regional priority. There is also 
evidence of the diversity of calls for papers and journals that insist on this limited relationship between 
regional integration and trade, such as the ‘Integration and Trade Journal’ of the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IADB). 
21 For BALASSA (1961), there would exist a steps notion in order to deepen regional integration, and it 
would begin with a Free Trade Zone (FTZ), then it would come a Customs Union, followed by a Common 
Market and, last but not least, an Economic and Monetary Union would take place. However, as indicated 
by BERNAL-MEZA (2008), when it comes to Mercosur, it is often associated to an imperfect Customs 
Union. 
22 See: http://www.mercosur.int/innovaportal/file/719/1/CMC_1991_TRATADO_ES_Asuncion.pdf. 
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to the Program of Integration and Economic Cooperation (PICE) that largely influenced 
South American integration policy (ARAÚJO, 2012). 
Afterwards, the Treaty of Integration, Cooperation, and Development between Brazil and 
Argentina was signed in 1988. An important decision adopted in the Protocol of Ouro 
Preto (POP)23 was the recognition of the international juridical personality of 
MERCOSUR. This recognition gives to this economic bloc the competence to negotiate, 
on its own behalf, agreements with third parties, groups of countries and international 
organizations. 
Mercosur is frequently interpreted from this intergovernmentalist theory, since 
institutions at state level prevail, that is, a bloc with no (or few) supranational character. 
In this scenario, states resist to the definition and creation of top-down policies, what 
gives them higher autonomy when establishing their own domestic policies. 
‘“The absence of any supranational procedures keeps nation states as 
the sole locus of sovereignty” seems appropriate here and presents 
limits to the application of the governance model to Mercosur. In most 
cases, the institutions at stake are purely intergovernmental, rather than 
supranational, and function according to the principle of unanimity, 
thus lacking the autonomy and independence that their European 
counterparts enjoy’ (ALMEIDA MEDEIROS, 2004: 93).  
It is still worth noting that the geopolitical24 and historic context of that period is very 
unusual, impacting the institutional and regulatory framework of the bloc. The countries 
of the region had back then used a model of Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) in 
a political scenario of national dictatorships. In this sense, the Washington Consensus in 
the 1990s, as well as the redemocratization of the economies, led Mercosur to be known 
as a model of ‘open regionalism’ (DOMINGUEZ, 2007, MECHAM, 2003, HIRA, 1998, 
ECLAC, 1994).  
This means that despite having interest in strengthening the relationship with neighboring 
countries, the countries were simultaneously interested in taking advantage of expanding 
international flows (trade and investment) above all, as a means of economic recovery 
                                                          
23 See: http://www.mercosur.int/innovaportal/file/721/1/1994_protocoloouropreto_es.pdf.  
24 To deepen the relationship between geopolitics, natural resources and energy, see BRUCKMANN 
(2016), RODRIGUES (2016), SENHORAS et al. (2009), BECKER (2004) and KLARE (2001).  
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after the “lost decade” (1980). As a consequence, the 1990s saw the spread of free market 
economics and democracy, not least in Latin America, where military governments 
dissolved. Countries began dismantling state structures, privatizing, deregulating 
commercial and financial activities, and opening up their economies. This movement was 
accompanied by technological and communications advances, allowing integrated global 
product and factor markets to emerge through the movement of goods, services, capital 
and even labor (MECHAM, 2003). 
This brief introduction on the bloc formation is basically to contextualize the main goal 
of this research, since it is not part of its scope to detail the historical formation of 
Mercosur. Actually, from this historical review, as well as some critiques already made, 
we will be able to better understand the purpose of this work. 
Under this outline, it is necessary to grasp why we need to add Venezuela and Bolivia to 
the analysis, from now on ‘Mercosur+2’ or ‘Mercosur 6’. SANTOS and SANTOS (2015) 
discuss the temporary suspension of Paraguay from Mercosur, when “Mercosur 
announced the decision of its Heads of States, in June 29th, 2012, during its 18th Meeting 
of the Common Market Council, which took place in the city of Mendoza. Thereupon, 
Venezuela joined the bloc in a troubled political scenario (SANTOS et al., 2016).25 Not 
to forget, Venezuela was part of another integration initiative in the region, the Andean 
Community (AC/CAN)26 until 2006. 
Bolivia, on the other hand, ratified its Mercosur membership in July 201527, being even 
depicted in the official website of Mercosur among its full members. Also, the following 
piece of information is to be found in the official website:  
                                                          
25 ‘It gives continuity to the idea that countries need to be democratic in order to be part of this integration, 
what also justifies the turmoil concerning Venezuela’s entrance in Mercosur’ (MARIANO and 
RAMANZINI JR., 2012: 34). The Ushuaia Protocol in 1998 highlights the ‘democratic clause’, which 
determines that countries that break the democratic rule shall be suspended from the bloc (SANTOS et al., 
2017). 
26 Despite its troubled political scenario, the country remains in Mercosur since December 1st, 2016. In 
accordance with Mercosur’s official website, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is suspended from all 
rights and obligations inherent to its status as a State Party to Mercosur, in accordance with the provisions 
of the second paragraph of Article 5 of the Ushuaia Protocol. Due to the fact that this is a recent happening 
and this is the first time it occurs in the bloc, the country remains in the scope of this thesis. See: 
http://www.mercosur.int/innovaportal/file/2485/1/2006_PROTOCOLO_ES_AdhesionVenezuela.pdf. 
27 In accordance with Mercosur’s official website, the Protocol of Bolivia’s Accession to Mercosur was 
already signed by all the States Parties in 2015 and is now being incorporated by the congresses of the 
States Parties. Despite being already considered a full member, this information is not so accurate 
throughout the whole website, since it is also found that this country is still on the path of becoming a 
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‘The Plurinational State of Bolivia signed the Protocol of Accession to 
the Common Market of the South (Mercosur) on Friday, July 17 [2015] 
in Brasilia. (...) The entry of Bolivia reaffirms the consolidation of the 
process of integration of South America, based on the mutual 
reinforcement and convergence of the different subregional integration 
efforts and mechanisms. It also accommodates new trade flows, 
productive integration and investments. The Plurinational State of 
Bolivia will gradually adopt the normative acquis of Mercosur, no later 
than four (4) years from the entry into force of said Protocol.28’. 
Even briefly, we mention that there are many different integration initiatives in South 
America. As already mentioned, Venezuela used to be part of CAN and Bolivia is still 
listed as one of its members. Other projects, as the Initiative for the Integration of the 
Regional Infrastructure of South America (IIRSA) and the Union of South American 
Nations (USAN/UNASUR) also address, in a way, the energy issue.29 Therefore, this 
issue will still be called upon later on in this thesis. 
Table 1 presents a series of socioeconomic indicators for Mercosur and each member 
country, namely: area (km2), total population (in million of inhabitants), urban population 
(% of total population), life expectancy (in years), birth rate (annual average rate/1000 
inhabitants), mortality rate (annual average rate/1000 inhabitants), human development 
index (HDI), Gini index, gross domestic product (GDP) at current prices (billion of 
dollars), global export f.o.b (million of dollars), global import c.i.f. (million of dollars), 
and global balance of trade in goods (million of dollars). 
 
 
                                                          
member. See: http://www.mercosur.int/innovaportal/file/4054/1/2015_protocolo-adhesion-de-bolivia-al-
mcs_es.pdf. 
28 See: http://www.mercosur.int/innovaportal/v/6923/2/innova.front/bolivia-ingresa-al-mercosur.  
29 Not only are there projects from IIRSA in Mercosur, but IIRSA has also become a Technical Forum of 
USAN recently. The predominant geoeconomic view in the conception of IIRSA should be left aside and 
(instead it should exist) a geopolitical concept of regional infrastructure integration comprehending: 
mobility and prioritization of the region’s continentality and maritime [potencial], occupation and political, 
economic and social cohesion of areas and borders, usage of its resources in favor of an automous 
development of South America (PADULA, 2011). 
33 
 































2,800,400 43.8 91.9 76.0 17.36 7.57 0.827 42.7 545.5 57.7 55.6 
Bo 
1,098,580 10.9 68.9 69.0 23.55 7.35 0.674 45.8 33.8 7.0 8.4 
Br 
8,515,770 207.7 85.9 75.0 14.41 6.09 0.754 51.3 1,796.2 185.3 143.5 
Pa 
406,752 6.7 59.9 73.0 21.15 5.69 0.697 48.0 27.4 9.4 9.8 
Uy 
176,220 3.4 95.5 77.0 14.14 9.35 0.795 41.7 52.4 7.0 8.1 
Ve 
912,050 31.6 89.0 74.0 19.33 5.57 0.767 44.8 482.4 23.930 13.6 
Source 





WB (2016)2 WB (2016) WB (2016) 
Source: Own elaboration based on WB Statistics and UNDP Data; GDP = gross domestic product; HDI = Human Development Index; f.o.b. = free on board (price 
of merchandise made available at the place of manufacture or storage); c.i.f. = cost, insurance and freight (price includes merchandise cost and insurance and freight 
costs); Merchandise imports and exports in current US$; 1 = Ar (2014) and Ve (2006); 2 = Ve (2014). 
                                                          
30 The value reached US$ 97.4 billion in 2012, when the oil price exceeded US$ 100/barrel. 
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Table 1 shows that there are many differences between the countries within Mercosur, in 
terms of area, population and socioeconomic development. Due to these asymmetries, it 
is necessary to take into account the social dimension when it comes to (energy) policies 
in the region, because mitigating such asymmetries is one of the main goals of any 
regional integration process (SANTOS, 2016).  
Ergo, based on the historical information and quantitative data presented, it is expected 
to have clarified the perspective that the thesis assumes when it comes to regional 
integration. Here, regional integration is not political, neither economic/commercial, nor 
physical; it is a mix of different perspectives that add up, complement each other, and 
often overlap. When discussing regional integration, we do not have in mind just 
exchanges and/or trade flows; in fact, we look at geopolitical, institutional, regulatory, 
and social issues that are dynamic and therefore transform over time31. 
In this sense, it is important to consider the current Mercosur as a consequence of a long 
historical process that officially dates from the early 1990s. Although conversations and 
prior agreements had already taken place in previous decades, Mercosur is indeed born 
with a strong economic and commercial bias, which partly justifies the insistence on this 
bilateral relationship (Mercosur-trade) to the present day. Although the social, energy and 
environmental agenda, for example, has only advanced more particularly from the mid-
1990s and 2000s on, it is important to emphasize that there can be no progress of regional 
integration without political will of governments (SANTOS, 2014a). Thus, regional 
integration can be understood as a social phenomenon (NUTI, 2006), needing not only 
the public initiative to make it viable and promote it, but the State itself can create the 
bases and conditions for the participation of other actors, citizens, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), private agents, among others. 
Considering that, it is important to place this debate within the temporal scope of the 
second half of the decade of 2010. In fact, unlike what has occurred especially since the 
1990s, regional integration as a political process does not seem to be a priority for the 
                                                          
31 At this point, we insist on not using the term ‘to advance’ or ‘to develop’, because both are embedded in 
a unidirectional, positivistic and hierarchical connotation. Here, as already pointed out, we avoid this kind 
of approach, even because specialized literature frequently incurs this error. This type of posture almost 
makes the European Union (EU) the most advanced and therefore appropriate and correct model to be 
followed in most cases – which is not supported by the recently different conflicts and dilemmas that the 
EU has been facing, as the pioneering case of Brexit. 
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region. The shaken relations with Venezuela can confirm this, since for the first time in 
the history of Mercosur the democratic clause of the Ushuaia Protocol32 is applied to 
suspend and withdraw political rights from a state party (SANTOS et al., 2017c). In 
addition, especially with the political changes that occurred in Brazil in 2016, it was 
evident at different times its interest in making relations in Mercosur more flexible, 
raising efforts to make feasible the (old-fashioned) bilateral trade project with the 
European Union (EU). More recently, Argentina’s movement of threats to leave Unasur 
is also noticeable. 
It is important to show that although the literature deals with the case almost exclusively 
from an intra-bloc trade perspective, we concluded that Mercosur has undergone 
enlargement and deepening processes along almost 30 years of its existance. 
‘Enlargement’ in the sense that it had the accession of new States Parties, such as 
Venezuela (mid-2012) and Bolivia (in process since 2015), as well as Associated States 
(Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Suriname and Peru); thus, all the countries of South 
America are part of Mercosur. ‘Deepening’ in the sense that although it originally had its 
focus on trade, the bloc’s agenda expanded, touching social, political, environmental and 
energy issues, for example. 
 
 
2.3 Energy integration  
After analyzing the issues related to regional integration, understanding it as a 
multifaceted and dynamic process, and focusing on the Mercosur case, this section aims 
to discuss the particular case of energy integration. Once again, it is important to note that 
although energy integration is considered a branch of physical integration33, this thesis 
understands that energy integration comprises a set of perspectives, being a physical and 
infrastructure theme, but also a political, institutional, economic, social and 
environmental one. 




33 According to the classification of ECLAC (2009). See section 2.2. 
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OXILIA (2009) claims that there is no precise definition on energy integration in the 
current literature, suggesting that it should be interpreted as a process that involves at 
least two countries and that aims at some activity part of the energy industry  through a 
permanent installation and based on a specific agreement that guides the relationship rules 
between the parties. However, this conceptual definition does not lead to a great deal of 
difficulty in coping with this theme, especially if we consider the mutual area of 
intersection between energy integration and development. This interface makes this 
concept become even broader.  
Also, for LIMA and COUTINHO (2006: 363) ‘energy integration and, more widely, 
infrastructure integration, represents the cornerstone of a new level of regional 
integration’, what is perfectly in line to the central argument of this thesis. In other words, 
it is defended that (energy) integration allows a series of positive externalities and benefits 
with multiplier effects to take place in other sectors and in the production chain. 
Still concerning the debate on the relevance of studying (energy) integration, FUSER 
(2011) extends the definition to the goals of energy policies in South America, even 
defending its tight relationship with the increase of the standard of living of the 
population. Additionally, DIAS LEITE (2007) defends that energy and socioeconomic 
development walk hand in hand, having reciprocal impacts and, under this approach, it 
would be impossible not to associate such a debate with countries’ joint, long-term 
national strategies.  
In accordance with SANTOS et al. (2013) and SANTOS (2014a), the states deal with this 
sector by taking into account ordinary notions such as energy planning, diversification of 
energy matrix, and energy self-sufficiency. We note that such concepts are equally 
important when linked to energy security. Particularly, the concept of self-sufficiency 
ends up being a great barrier to the promotion of regional energy integration. 
As a consequence of the previous section, it was possible to establish that energy 
integration must be marked and analyzed not only by commercial energy flows, but also 
by institutional, regulatory and political features. In this way, and as in the concept of 
energy security, it was identified that there is a lot of resistance to new approaches and 
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methodologies that go beyond the strictly national and state-centric character, by either 
academics or policymakers34. 
There are several benefits and barriers associated with energy integration. Thus, each of 
these benefits, which justify the promotion of this modality of integration, is briefly 
presented and discussed below. Then, the obstacles are presented as well, showing the 
reason why, despite the associated gains with integration, South America is still at an 
embryonic stage35 when it comes to this topic. 
 
2.3.1 Benefits and barriers 
The South America region, in contrast to other regions of the world that have already 
advanced more in this modality of integration, has a relative cultural-linguistic unity, 
absence of ethnic-religious conflicts, greater agricultural area of the globe, ample supply 
and diversity of resources natural36, due to the abundance of water, sun and energy 
resources (CASTRO et al., 2009).  
As already shown, energy integration is capable of stimulating effective regional 
integration, since it has externalities and multiplier effects on other sectors of the 
economy (ECLAC, 2009, SANTOS, 2014a) and on local industry (PADULA, 2011). In 
addition, energy integration is able to reduce regional asymmetries, increasing social 
equity (QUEIROZ and VILELA, 2011). 
Due to the nature of investments associated with (physical) energy integration, it has a 
medium/long term central role in regional development (FUSER, 2011). In addition, it 
can be argued that since it does not and can not reproduce what has happened in other 
regions, energy integration allows the integration of the region to be based on a ‘proper 
view’ of how this process should be carried out (FERRER, 2006). 
                                                          
34 Therefore, evaluating the history of South American energy integration may mean for many to analyze 
the failure of energy integration in the region. 
35 The energy exchange is less than 5% of the generation of 2014, of which 93% responds to Paraguay’s 
exports through its binational dams. There are interconnection infrastructures with very low utilization and 
difficulties to increase the levels of interchange (CIER, 2016a). 
36 The region has a rich range of energy resources but is unevenly distributed. Ergo, regional energy 
integration could optimize the use of these resources (CIER, 2017c). It can also be facilitated by the absence 
of major geopolitical conflicts in the region (RAMOS, 2016). 
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Given the growing need to consider different actors and institutions in the decision-
making process, especially when dealing with regional and/or subcontinental projects, the 
promotion of energy integration (of Mercosur) needs to incorporate new agents into 
decisions (SANTOS, 2014a). Among them, we can highlight local governments, the 
private sector and the populations involved in project areas. 
Particularly when it comes to integration and energy in the region, we can highlight the 
existence of a diversity of multilateral entities that deal with the theme (SANTOS, 2014a, 
SALOMÃO and DA SILVA, 2008), such as: Latin American Integration Association 
LAIA/ALADI), the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and its South 
American Energy Council (CES), the Initiative for the Integration of Regional 
Infrastructure in South America (IIRSA), the Latin American Energy Organization 
(OLADE)37, the Regional Energy Integration Commission (CIER), the Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), the Andean Community of 
Nations (AC/CAN), and the Common Market of the South (Mercosur) through the 
Mercosur Structural Convergence Fund (FOCEM). UDAETA et al. (2016) also add the 
role of Regional Association of Oil, Gas and Biofuels Sector Companies in Latin America 
and Caribbean (ARPEL) and Latin American Integration Association (LAIA). 
It is clear that one of the main arguments for the promotion of regional energy integration 
in any region is to guarantee energy security and increase the reliability of the system 
(CASTRO et al., 2015, MOREIRA and PINTO, 2013). In this sense, the countries 
involved in the project would be able to deal with common demands and bottlenecks 
(BERNI, MANDUCA and BAJAY, 2013), based on mutual gains. To do so, they would 
need to work on a coordinated and cooperative logic (OXILIA, 2009). It would promote 
economies of scale38 in the region and stimulate the more efficient allocation of (scarce) 
resources, creating favorable conditions for the business environment and productive 
                                                          
37 OLADE defines energy integration as any process or project that involves a long-term installation, 
interconnection or transaction, either binational or multinational, supported by coordinated national 
policies, based on a common regulatory framework, focused on a more efficient use of energy resources or 
infrastructure and aimed at meeting energy requirements regardless of the geographical location of the 
different centers of supply and demand (OLADE, 2017). 
38 Increasing the scale may allow the monetization of resources that until 10 years ago were not suitable to 
be used on large scale, like wind and solar energies. In addition, it could provide a better use of renewable 
energies (CARRASCO, 2017). 
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investment in the energy sector, as well as encouraging regional joint energy planning 
(RAMOS, 2016, SANTOS, 2014a, 2014b). 
Once again based on economic justification, and linked to the previous one, it is argued 
that regional energy integration guarantees the joint and more rational use of shared 
natural resources, existing facilities (CARRASCO, 2017) and investments to be made39 
(BIATO, 2016, CEIA and RIBEIRO, 2016, CASTRO, 2011, LUYO, 2011, CAMPOS et 
al., 2010, QUEIROZ and VILELA, 2010), offering a more efficient service, of higher 
quality and with lower cost (CIER, 2016b, PADULA, 2011). This argument is 
particularly important if one considers the importance of sustainable development40, the 
fact that the direct consequence of this benefit is the reduction of operating and production 
costs (ISA, 2016, RAMOS, 2016, WEINTRAUB, 2008), as well as the possible reduction 
of tariffs41, precisely relevent when it comes to developing countries, which may affect 
the demand for this resource. 
In the case of countries in South America, particularly the Mercosur countries, the 
possibility of exploring synergies derived from hydrological complementarity, as well as 
different sources, has been highlighted (PAREDES et al., 2017, MOURA, 2017, 
RAMOS, 2016, ZANETTE, 2013, CASTRO et. al., 2011, 2012). Thus, there is evidence 
of a strong complementarity between the different pluviometric regimes in the region, 
which suggests the joint planning of the dispatch of hydroelectric dams, construction of 
new ventures and joint management of decision-making. 
Again, in the context of South America and particularly the Southern Cone, there is a 
diversity of financial sources coming from regional and international financial institutions 
that have, among their portfolio of projects, those involved in the issue of energy 
integration (PADULA, 2011, SANTOS, 2014a). Among them are the following: the 
                                                          
39 Equally, the integration in terms of energy equity helps the purpose of savings by allowing to postpone 
investments in generation, to take advantage of the benefits of hydrological complementarity and resources 
of the energy matrix, and to reduce operational costs to be able to transfer these savings to the final 
consumer (CIER, 2016b). Therefore, investing heavily in a sector or seeking inefficient solutions will limit 
the resources allocated to other areas such as health, education and other communication infrastructures, 
such as roads, ports, etc. It would be a bad use from the social point of view, a loss of value and would also 
delay the development (CARRASCO, 2017). 
40 In the VII Latin American and Caribbean Seminar on Energy Efficiency, April 2016, in Montevideo 
(Uruguay), the Executive Director of CIER, Eng. Juan José Carrasco, highlighted the importance of energy 
efficiency as a pillar for sustainable development (CIER, 2016a). 
41The most affordable price of energy allows a better level of international competitiveness and insertion 
of the countries of the region (MAYA, 2015). 
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Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the World Bank (WB) and its International 
Finance Corporation (IFC), the Venezuela Economic and Social Development Bank 
(BANDES), the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES), the Development Bank of Latin 
America/ Andean Development Corporation (CAF), the Economic Commission for Latin 
America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), the Financial Fund for the Development of the Río 
de Plata Basin (FONPLATA), Common Market of the South (Mercosur), through 
FOCEM, and Latin American Energy Organization (OLADE)42. 
It is important to consider that energy integration, as joint regional planning by states, can 
(and should) prioritize renewable sources, including the incorporation of Non-
Conventional Renewable Energy (NCRE)43. This is especially possible and feasible in 
Mercosur countries, given the profile of their energy matrix, therefore energy integration 
in these terms can contribute to reduce CO2 emissions and fight against climate change 
(CIER, 2016b, RAMOS, 2016). 
Often in the literature, it is stressed the importance of Brazil44 in the region’s energy 
integration process. This should be due to (i) being the largest energy market in the region, 
with a consistent economic model for expanding production capacity; (ii) having borders 
with 10 of the 12 countries in South America; and (iii) its previous expertise in national 
energy integration, with the creation of the National Interconnected System (SIN)45 
(BIATO et al., 2016).  
This integration of Brazilian submarkets allowed savings of around 20% of investments 
(MOREIRA and PINTO, 2013). Likewise, it should be mentioned that Brazil also has 
                                                          
42 More recently, it is worth noting the Chinese project known as ‘One Belt, One Road’, as well as the 
country’s closer ties with countries in the region, such as Chile and Bolivia, through the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB). See: https://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/Asia-and-Latin-America-Strenthen-
Economic-Ties-20170513-0003.html. 
43 They have less social and environmental impact, such as the generation of energy from biomass, SHPs, 
wind, solar, tidal energy, geothermal. The following are some examples of NCRE projects: biomass 
cogeneration plants, plants organic waste, wind farms, small hydro passing, solar plants. 
44 For many authors, Brazil would be the ‘natural candidate’ for regional leadership (MALAMUD and 
SCHMITTER, 2011). It is worth mentioning that the country in fact tried to break the inertia of the regional 
integration agenda with the launch of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) in 2008. 
45 In addition to its privileged geographic location in the South American subcontinent, the Brazilian 
Electric System (BES/SEB) presents a consistent and dynamic model, with very solid institutional and 
economic bases and an efficient financing pattern (CASTRO, 2010). It is worth mentioning that SIN is the 
largest interconnected transmission system in the world. 
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some interconnections with the neighboring countries' electricity system (MOURA et al., 
2012), which will be better presented and discussed in Chapter 3. 
Notwithstanding, QUEIROZ et al. (2013) emphasize that the regional predominance in 
terms of strategic resources and political power leads to a questioning and distrust of its 
neighbors when it comes to Brazil’s potential hegemony in the subcontinent. Ergo, they 
argue that, on the one hand, there was a greater political interest during Lula’s 
governments (2003-2010) on the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), the 
Initiative for the Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South America (IIRSA) and the 
investments of the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) and Bank of Brazil (BB) in 
the sector. On the other hand, this led to an increasing fear concerning Brazil’s power in 
the region46, what jeopardizes Mercosur’s own progress (BIATO, CASTRO and 
ROSENTAL, 2016), since it brings to the surface the fear of other countries that would 
have to operate under the aegis of  a regional sub-imperialist Brazilian logic. 
In this sense, the obstacles to regional energy integration begin to appear. In addition to 
the issue of Brazilian hegemony in the region, there is a significant lack of convergence 
and consensus on political, macroeconomic and microeconomic issues, which makes any 
regional integration initiative a major challenge (BAER, CAVALCANTI and SILVA, 
2002, CARRANZA, 2003, BIATO, 2016, SANTOS, 2014a). This reality ends up being 
reflected in the asymmetry of development and technical and technological power 
between Brazil and its neighbors, especially the smaller ones (BIATO, CASTRO and 
ROSENTAL, 2016). 
An obstacle to this broader integration process is the Brazilian commercial model applied 
since 2004, since it relies on the sale of electricity certificates (physical guarantee), 
defining a closed, planned and operated model in an optimized and centralized way. It is 
not trivial to incorporate into this model the energy imported from other countries, unless 
there is contractual and legal security to consider it in the long-term Brazilian energy 
planning. 
                                                          
46 With the great participation of Brazilian banks, companies and contractors in these projects, there are 
inevitably questions about the (real) intentions and Brazilian objectives with these integration projects. The 
term ‘regional sub-imperialism’ (MARINI, 2012) and/or ‘bandeirantes de la XXI century’ (BIATO, 2016) 
is often found in the literature on regional integration, especially among non-Brazilian Latin researchers. 
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In general, there are institutional and regulatory asymmetries that make the 
implementation of energy integration projects in the region too complex and costly 
(CASTRO, 2009, CEIA and RIBEIRO, 2016, QUEIROZ et al., 2013). This complexity 
and diversity should be reduced in order to minimize economic uncertainties, legal 
insecurities and political risks (FUSER, 2011, SOLOMÃO and DA SILVA, 2008). 
Since the regulatory framework of South American countries was based on different 
experiences in time and space, the current model presented by each country is quite 
different, especially regarding the environment, opening up to private (and foreign) 
capital and strategic planning of the sector (SANTOS, 2014a, VÉLEZ, 2005). 
Consequently, institutional conditions in the region still have a major influence over the 
technical, commercial and contractual relations in the integration process (QUEIROZ and 
VILELA, 2010). 
In this sense, these authors present some cases that clearly show the risk associated with 
this obstacle: (i) the change in gas sales in Bolivia, in 2006; (ii) the interruption of 
Argentina’s 2,000 MW supply, in 2007; (iii) the renegotiation of the Itaipu agreement, 
requested by Paraguay; (iv) the rationing of energy in Venezuela, with consequences for 
the supply of energy in Roraima; and (v) the drastic reduction in the supply of Argentine 
natural gas to Chile. 
The harmonization of these regulatory asymmetries has been fundamental since the 
earliest stages of energy integration, when it seeked to establish common and clear trading 
rules for participating countries in order to promote the energy sector’s own dynamics 
(MOREIRA and PINTO, 2013, ZANETTE, 2013). 
Related to that obstacle, the fear of loss of national sovereignty and political distrust are 
at the root of any regional integration initiatives, particularly those that touch on sensitive 
issues such as infrastructure and legal, regulatory and regulatory arrangements (BIATO, 
2016). Specifically concerning the issue of energy, this fear is evident in national energy 
plans, in which terms such as energy self-sufficiency and national energy sovereignty and 
energy security are the priorities of every country (SANTOS, 2014a, 2014b). ‘The major 
obstacle to the development of new supplies is not geology but what happens above 
ground: namely, international affairs, politics, decision-making by governments (...)’ 
(YERGIN, 2006: 74).    
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Thus, in a similar way to what happened in Europe, it is necessary to create common 
political foundations to facilitate and encourage regional energy integration. Therefore, 
as electricity is a fundamental input for production of goods and services, in addition to 
guaranteeing the social well-being of families, trust based on consistent political 
arrangements can give the guarantees that countries need (CASTRO, 2016). 
In order to avoid political risks and ‘loss of sovereignty’ in the majority of extra-national 
energy projects, countries seek to promote enterprises of binational nature47. However, 
the logic of these actions has almost always been subordinated to the interests of national 
energy planning and not to an integrated and systemic policy for the whole region; in 
other words, each country individually designs its annual energy plan, its investment 
prospects, and its short/medium term interests (SANTOS, 2014a, 2014b). Despite this 
hurdle, RAMOS (2016) argues that regional planning should contemplate and respect the 
autonomy of the energy policies of each country, so it suggests the establishment of a 
flexible commercial scheme.48. 
Although in South America there is the hydroelectric plant of Salto Grande on the 
Uruguay River (Ar-Uy), Itaipu on the Paraná River (Br-Py) and Yacyretá on the Paraná 
River (Ar-Py) as an example of large dams (SANTOS and SANTOS, 2016, QUEIROZ 
and VILELA, 2010, UDAEDA et al., 2006), it should be noted that the strong binational 
profile of most of the bolder projects concerning regional energy integration can be 
considered as an obstacle to effective regional/multilateral energy integration 
(BERTINAT and ARELOVICH, 2012, BIATO, 2016, MOREIRA and PINTO, 2013, 
SANTOS, 2014b, SENNES and PEDROTTI, 2008), but it can also be assumed as an 
intermediary step for this. Most of the time, these projects are born through international 
bilateral treaties, which are difficult to be legitimized (RAMOS, 2016). 
Although the existence of different sources of financing can be considered as a facilitator 
for regional energy integration, the cost of such loans may actually make the financing 
issue a barrier (ARELOVICH, 2012, CARRASCO, 2017). It is worth mentioning that 
                                                          
47 ‘In South America, infrastructure constructions interconnecting the network industries of different 
countries were historically based on bilateral (binational) commitments. Thus, bilateral commitments can 
be considered as the basis of the institutional framework of the construction of infrastructures existing in 
South America.’ (HALLACK, 2014: 354). 
48 Ergo, it is necessary to evaluate the existing trade-off between prioritization of regional planning vs. 
national one, as they may shock or even be incompatible. 
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ventures in the energy sector often require large initial investments, which only have 
medium/long term returns (long payback). 
However, since they are developing countries, they tend to have higher country risk, 
which means that interest rates on loans are higher. Thus, in order to deepen South 
American energy integration, it is necessary to face project financing, which should have 
lower interest rates, longer paybacks, and more flexible conditionalities (SANTOS, 
2014a). 
Information and technological issues can also constitute barriers and obstacles to full 
regional energy integration. Information on net future demand forecast, futures markets 
and price estimates are basic and necessary prerequisites for national markets to be 
included in a regional one (ZANETTE, 2013). Different technologies can also pose 
difficulties when (i) there are differences between countries that generate, transmit and 
distribute electricity at different frequencies (50Hz or 60Hz in South America); (ii) 
several countries have borders on the Andes or the Amazon Rainforest, being separated 
from their neighbors by geographical obstacles and/or demographic voids with a large 
territorial extension; and (iii) coincidentally in the Mercosur countries, the exchange 
(imports or exports) of energy with Brazilian market depends on frequency conversion. 
Climatic adversities can particularly affect the hydrological regime, changing the 
pluviometric regime and consequently damaging the generation of energy in the turbines 
of the hydroelectric plants (CASTRO, 2010, 2011). Therefore, meteorological 
uncertainty especially affects countries whose share of hydroelectric production is 
significant (LANDAU, 2008a, 2008b) – as is the case of Brazil, Colombia and Paraguay. 
The Brazilian blackout (power outage) of 2001 is an exemplary case of how poor resource 
management and the lack of internal interconnection to promote supply in scarce areas 
pose a real risk to the security of energy supply. In this way, regional energy integration 
represents an alternative to energy security, since it increases the reliability and quality 
of the system, reducing emergency risks and blackouts (CIER, 2016b). 
The environmental issue is considered by many to be an obstacle to the advancement of 
regional energy projects, either because they make the creation of certain hydropower 
plants more expensive or even impossible. However, it is important to consider that South 
America has the Amazon region, the current exploitation center for hydroelectric 
potential. At the same time, in addition to the environmental issue itself, there is a social 
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issue associated with it in the region, since there are several riverine, indigenous and local 
populations that are directly or indirectly affected by such projects. In this sense, 
‘Serious damages caused by the implementation of power plants on 
traditional populations of the Brazilian Amazon (Tucuruí, Balbina), 
Chile (Bio Bio) and Colombia (Arru) are equally known. Binational 
projects did not escape the same problem, such as the problems seen in 
Yaciretá and even in Itaipu where the situation of Guarani Oco’y 
remains unresolved.’ (VAINER and NUTI, 2008 apud CEIA and 
RIBEIRO, 2016: 145) 
Briefly, ISA (2016) points out that the key factors for regional energy integration can be 
framed in the 5Rs methodology49. (i) Resources: to take advantage of available 
complementarities (hydrology, demand, etc.); (ii) Rules: to make agreements and basic 
harmonization of regulatory and regulatory frameworks; (iii) Networks: to develop 
transmission infrastructure in a coordinated manner with national planning; (iv) Support 
from governments: to ensure will and commitment, backed by policies and agreements; 
and (v) Regional vision: to deepen processes of cooperation and energy integration in the 
region. It is also emphasized that self-supply does not necessarily aim at optimization, 
and should not lead to the protection of energy resources, what is completely in line with 
thesis argument. 
Recently, changes in the electric scenario have added challenges to the energy integration 
of the countries, constituting great challenges even for modeling, such as ‘(i) the growing 
and large scale participation of renewable sources, especially the intermittent ones; (ii) 
contingency of the power source due to environmental restrictions; (iii) the strong 
presence of distributed generation; and (iv) the advancement of Smart Grids in 
distribution systems.’ (RAMOS, 2016: 73-74). Also noteworthy is the difficulty to 
consider the storage of energy, such as batteries50, which leads to the need to consider 
new technical, commercial and regulatory aspects that must be taken into account, 
affecting the business model and the tariff structure (CIER, 2016b). Indeed, the increment 
                                                          
49 It makes sense only in Portuguese or Spanish, as resources, rules, networks, government support and 
regional vision mean Regras (reglas), Redes, Respaldo dos governos (respaldo de los gobiernos) and visão 
Regional (visión regional). 
50 For users, they guarantee for example the increase in reliability, the increase in the quality of energy, the 
reduction of the number of interruptions, the efficient use of energy, the lower cost of energy, the use of 
renewable energies, and the decrease of polluting emissions. For distributors, for instance, they allow the 
reduction of losses, free system capacity and decrease in investment (CIER, 2016b). 
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of new renewable sources (such as wind, solar and biomass) and the introduction of new 
non-renewable sources (such as shale gas and LNG), as well as new configurations by 
the demand side (energy efficiency, electric vehicle, smart grid and distributed 
generation) are challenges to integrated regional energy planning. 
As ‘side effects’, energy integration can lead to reduced energy self-sufficiency (energy 
interdependence) and the operational autonomy of systems, which is one of the main 
resistance to its implementation. Moreover, given the need for harmonization of 
regulatory frameworks, the complexity of defining legal frameworks, treaties, norms and 
rules, as well as possible shocks in diplomatic relations between countries, should be 
highlighted. It is also possible to stress the increase in risks related to changes in the 
previously agreed conditions, through interventions by governments, such as through the 
definition of new legislation and taxation (subsidies and administered prices) and the 
expropriation of assets. 
These obstacles are reflected in the loss of energy and dynamism of the forums 
responsible for the regional (energy) integration agenda, in particular in the Common 
Market of the South (Mercosur) and in the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). 
Without political will, the project has no support and strength to overcome national 
demands of each country (RAMOS, 2016, SANTOS, 2014a). On the other hand, when 
there is political will, the regulatory frameworks will be adjusted to guarantee the most 
economic and safe operation of the systems (CIER, 2016b). 
From the existence of different benefits and barriers to energy integration in Mercosur, 
we established that it would be necessary to deal with issues of commercial, operational 
and institutional natures. Events such as nationalization of assets (Bolivia and 
Venezuela), interruption of contracted energy supply (Argentina to Chile, and Venezuela 
to Roraima, and Petrocaribe) and request for renegotiation of the agreement signed 
(Paraguay for Brazil, in the case of Itaipu) created a bad and pessimistic history for the 
advancement of the process. In addition, the relative abundance of energy resources of 
the countries of the region does not push for integration, leading to (i) sub-optimal 
exploitation of these resources; (ii) overestimation of the need for investments; and (iii) 
underutilization of existing facilities and opportunities. 
With regards to commercial nature, it is necessary to facilitate international energy 
exchange and to consider risk management, especially in long-term contracts; with regard 
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to the operational nature, it is necessary to consider the regional planning and the technical 
peculiarities of each market; regarding the institutional nature, it is essential to promote 
regulatory harmonization and to develop regional energy alliances and treaties. We then 
conclude that all these issues, in a progressive way, will guarantee the legal certainty, 
credibility and transparency necessary for the execution of the projects, whose profile is 
generally capital intensive and long term.   
 
2.3.2 Market integration modalities 
The main purpose of this subsection is to present the different modalities of market 
integration, in order to find out which would be ideal in the case of the Mercosur countries 
and South America in general. In this way, and without intending to make a deep 
institutionalist analysis of theories of regional integration, it will be seen that different 
modalities pass between two extremes, which can be identified with the 
intergovernmentalist model and the neo-functionalist model. 
Before evaluating each case, it is important to establish what is meant by institutions in 
this work. By institutions it is understood a normative set oriented to certain objectives, 
as well as the instruments that guarantee its execution, in order to direct the individual 
behavior in a certain direction (KEGEL and AMAL, 2012). In this sense, they would 
constitute the restrictions created by the societies themselves, which define the limits 
where exchanges and individual choices occur, establishing rights, prohibitions and 
sanctions provided by law and social conventions.   
Ergo, institutions reduce uncertainties, stimulate cooperation and improve economic 
coordination; at the international level, create an environment of greater predictability 
and security in international relations and thus overcome problems of cooperation 
between States. In both cases, they generate greater confidence over information and align 
mutual expectations of agents (SANTOS, 2014a). 
In a simplified way, the institutional framework based on the neofunctional model has a 
strong supranational character, that is, there is a transfer of power from the countries 
involved to a higher level. This is the case of some European Union (EU) institutions, 
which restrict and impose targets, policies and rules on countries participating in the 
regional bloc. On the other hand, the intergovernmental model has strong autonomy and 
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independence of the parties involved, so there is no assignment of sovereignty in favor of 
a supranational body responsible for a top-down decision making. This case is closer to 
the institutions part of Latin American integration models, where states, due to a colonial 
and more recently dictatorial past, resist relinquishing national sovereignty to 
supranational decision-makers. 
Although there may be different possibilities for institutional arrangements in energy and 
various aspects that determine the integration model (legal, political, commercial, 
technical, institutional, geographical, etc.), as it has already been said, the integration 
depends above all on political will. Therefore, it requires the acceptance of commitments 
where regional gains prevail over national interests, thus overcoming the tension between 
integration and sovereignty. 
Since the second half of the 20th century, mainly since the late 1960s, joint projects have 
been developed in the energy area, the oldest being the Itaipu Binacional and the energy 
interconnection of Acaray, both projects carried out between Brazil and Paraguay. At the 
same time, in the early 1970s, other projects were conducted, such as the construction of 
the Yacyretá Binational Plant, involving Argentina and Uruguay. 
From a historical point of view, the evolution of the energy markets of the region took 
place as follows: (i) 1980s: the first integration works are consolidated, initiating the 
relationship between agents from different countries. Basically of binational character, 
the State corresponded to the exclusive responsible for the development of the sector, 
assuming that the electric industry was a natural monopoly; (ii) 1990s: with the 
macroeconomic and regulatory reforms, emphasis is placed on the economic efficiency 
of the enterprises. Ergo, there is a request for new investments, as well as private 
participation in them; and (iii) 2000s: the decade represents a significant shift in the 
orientation of some countries. Consequently, there is less openness in the energy sector, 
changes in certain regulatory guidelines and inclusion of subsidies. The need to ensure 
security of supply as well as to reduce energy dependency is emphasized. 
Thanks to the changing profile of the integration of energy markets, there is confusion 
about the concepts of energy integration and cooperation, which makes these terms used 
as synonyms in the literature51. In this thesis, energy cooperation corresponds to an 
                                                          
51 Such confusion is not limited to the energy issue, but is particularly frequent in the economic and physical 
approaches to integration. 
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(intermediate) stage of the regional (energy) integration process, according to the model 
theorized by ISA as indicated in the figure below. 
 
 
Figure 2. Expected evolution of energy markets integration 
Source: Adapted from ISA (2007); * TIE = International Energy Transactions. 
 
Based on Figure 2, it is noted that the first four moments of the regional energy 
integration process formulated (steps 0 to 3) deal with national markets that progressively 
build physical interconnections between countries, and then, by the coordinated dispatch 
and then integrated dispatch among them. So far, there have been distinct forms of energy 
cooperation between countries; however, the next stage, that of ‘regional integration’ 
(step 4), which is marked by the presence of regional operator, regional administrator and 
regional agents, is shaped by the existence of a regional market.   
According to RUIZ-CARO (2006, 2010), it is possible to identify three types of 
(economic) benefits in electric interconnection enterprises, namely: (i) Construction of 
binational hydroelectric plants: they started operating around 1980 and were built by state 
companies (whose costs and investments were recovered through the remuneration of the 
energy generated by the plants); (ii) Firm energy sales: assures the company that sells a 
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flow of resources to cover the costs and financing of interconnection works; to the 
company that buys, it assures the guarantee of supply of its demand; and (iii) Opportunity 
exchange: takes advantage of marginal cost differences between interconnected systems, 
without excluding the possibility of (longer term) contracts. 
According to BIATO et al. (2016), there are three main modalities of energy integration 
in the region. The first group incorporates binational hydroelectric dams, being less 
advanced. The second group is intermediate and “only involves power purchase and sale 
agreements on the spot market. It does not establish synergies capable of levering more 
ambitious projects or initiatives, thus being limited to meet emergency needs and 
demands with flexibility” (Ibid.: 65). The third group does not involve joint ventures, but 
aim to export/import electricity through medium and long-term contracts. 
Figure 3 below shows the evolution of energy markets integration suggested by Altieri 
(2015). The further to the right, the more advanced is the process of integration of the 
energy systems of the region. 
 
Figure 3. Evolution of energy markets integration  
Source: ALTIERI (2015) 
 
RAMOS (2016) points out that there are two modalities of market integration: (i) 
construction of binational plants; and (ii) electric interconnection between markets. The 
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first is the most used in the region, when two countries build a (border) plant for strategic, 
geopolitical and/or economic reasons. This is the case of Itaipu (Br-Py, 14 GW), Salto 
Grande (Ar-Uy, 1,9 GW) and Yacyretá (Ay-Py, 3,1 GW)52, in which the country with the 
largest consumer market often leverages the project and, most of the time, fulfills the role 
of economic viabilizer of the enterprise, guaranteeing its financing.53  
These examples refer to ‘conventional’ binational dams, but there may also be joint uses 
located entirely within a single country (‘non-conventional’ binational dams). This is the 
case of ventures such as in Bolivia (Rio Madeira and Cachuela Esperanza) and Peru 
(Inambari), since both countries lack scale in order to enable explotation and the 
economic feasibility of the respective projects. However, as shown, the integration 
through the construction of binational power plants can be assumed as an obstacle to the 
effective integration of regional electric markets. 
In turn, the electric interconnection between markets has more long-term character and 
can be divided into four types. Despite its particularities, advantages and drawbacks, all 
seek the same end, which is to allocate scarce cross border grid capacity in the most 
efficient way (ONDŘICH, 2014). 
Opportunity Interchange (interruptible flow) is the first stage, when the volume and price 
offer is interruptible, usually ‘for a determined period with very specific conditions 
related to the source to be provided and pre-established commercial conditions.’ 
(RAMOS, 2016: 81). It is then an exceptional and conjunctural energy exchange, thus 
vulnerable to the momentary interests of countries involved. In every energy exchange, 
economic and regulatory negotiations need to be (re)evaluated, what reduces the 
dynamism of the negotiations, without substantially and structurally affecting the energy 
balance of the countries involved. 
The second stage of the electrical interconnection of markets is Firm Energy Contracting 
(flow per firm contract), when the parties involved define bilateral contracts. ‘In Brazil, 
contracting could be made in the Free Hiring Environment (ACL) or the Regulated Hiring 
Environment (ACR). In ACR the transaction would be mandatorily made through 
                                                          
52 The presentation of binational plants and international energy interconnections in South America will be 
made in Chapter 3. Appendix B presents the Central American international interconnections, as well as 
the Central American Electrical Interconnection System (SIEPAC). 
53 The country that provides the financing often receives reimbursement in the form of energy (or abatement 
of the cost of the fee paid). 
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centralised auctions aiming to serve Utility Companies.’ (Ibid.: 94). Auctions can happen 
either for new energy (longer periods) or existing energy (shorter periods). 
In this case, there is influence on the price by the Short-Term Market (MCP) of each 
country due to this amount of firm energy. In this way, it is up to each country to define 
the price in the MCP and how to incorporate this amount into consideration. In addition, 
there is more exposure and vulnerability on the exporter side, since much of the trade 
rules (structure and regulation negotiation) is defined by the importer country, and it is 
subject to possible penalties. 
Unlike the previous case, Firm Energy Contracting already requires greater coordination 
between the energy planning of the countries involved during the contract period, despite 
the autonomy they still have. 
Advancing in the market integration modalities, Market Coupling represents the third 
stage of the electric interconnection of markets. ‘Market coupling is defined as the use of 
implicit auctioning involving two or more power exchanges (PXs).’ (BAUMANN, 2014: 
30). It is possible to affirm that some of its advantages are in being economically efficient, 
and also provide regional incentives. Some of its drawbacks is the absence of incentive 
for Transmission System Operator (TSO) to expand capacity (VAN BLIJSWIJK and DE 
VRIES, 2011). 
Besides, ‘the countries involved (…) shall demand at least a minimum regulatory 
harmonisation when considering the energy volumes and short-term price formation of 
each country, as well as volumes offered and demanded, and energy planning.’ (RAMOS, 
2016: 82). It is important to stress that with not enough interconnections, ‘there will not 
be a single price between the coupled countries. (...) Prices between countries will differ 
for as long as bottlenecks in the transmission systems and in particular on interconnectors 
remain, even after market coupling.’ (ONDŘICH, 2014). 
There are three different kinds of coupling markets, the first two ones are volume-related 
and the last one is price-related. Volume coupling can be defined as a ‘coordinated day-
ahead auction involving two or more power markets [where] cross-border volumes 
computed by an Auction Office are transferred to the power exchanges, which consider 
them as price inelastic bids into their local system.’ (ENTSO-E, 2010: 2). This form of 
implicit allocation has a ‘more humble’ objective than price coupling (JANSSEN et al., 
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2012), allowing the coupled markets to stay more independent while being coupled 
(GLACHANT, 2010). 
The first kind of volume coupling is the Loose Volume Coupling. In this case, ‘the volume 
traded between two countries or regions is calculated in a first step and then prices are 
calculated separately in a second step.’ (BAUMANN, 2014: 31).  
‘Each country defines its curve relating the Marginal Cost of Operation 
(CMO) and interchange (export or import curve) with price and 
quantity offers. A single and common algorithm between countries 
crosses export and import offers and sets the interchange flow. Thus, 
each country shall be entitled to internalise the results of this singly 
algorithm in the short-term market pricing, as well as commercial and 
regulatory discounts in its models.’ (RAMOS, 2016: 95).   
As one can imagine, in order to carry out coordinated studies, it is necessary that countries 
have free access to the electromagnetic data of all others involved. Therefore, each 
country must act in a non-discriminatory way between the companies that make up the 
coupling so that the relationship can be reliable and lasting54. 
The second kind of coupling markets is the Tight Volume Coupling.  
‘[It] implies a coordinated dispatch among countries, and the 
interchange is defined through a single computational model based on 
simplified systems information. Each operator internalises the 
interchange flow in its model and sets prices for the short-term market 
in this approach. Transactions occur in each country’s short-term 
market and, obviously, respect the commercial rules of the country in 
which the amount is being settled. This allows national energy policies 
to remain autonomous.’ (RAMOS, 2016: 83). 
‘The term “tight” means in this context that the traded volume is calculated based on all 
relevant information such as the amount of cross border capacity, order books of all 
energy exchanges and TSOs in the coupled area.’ (TENNET, 2013 apud BAUMANN, 
2014: 31). This is the main difference compared to Loose Volume Coupling, because now 
the calculation is performed using all relevant information. ‘In case of a structural 
                                                          




balance, the short-term interchange can even overcome the volume of the amount hired 
generating differences that would be settled in the short-term market.’ (RAMOS, 2016: 
83)55.   
Last, but not least, there is also the Price Coupling as the third kind of coupling markets, 
which is used the most. Price coupling was first introduced in 2006 between France, 
Belgium and the Netherlands, known as Trilateral Market Coupling (TMC), having the 
advantage of avoiding price56 or flow discrepancies like exports from a high price zone 
to a low price zone or price differences in case of no congestion (ENTSO-E, 2010, 
GLACHANT, 2010, TENNET, 2013, WEBER et al., , 2010).  
‘Price coupling requires a single computational model to calculate the 
Marginal Cost of Operation (CMO) of member countries and 
interchange flow occurs based on detailed information of countries’ 
electrical energy systems. National operators internalise interchange 
flows established by the model and calculate short-term prices with the 
same computational model. So that this mode works, the coordination 
level should be extremely high and countries lose autonomy in their 
policies, thus requiring an Integrated Energy Planning comprising not 
only electricity but generation sources that shall be used and how this 
is related to other energy markets, such as the gas market.’ (RAMOS, 
2016: 83). 
The most advanced example of this model is Central West Europe (CWE), involving the 
operators of France, Germany, Belgium, The Netherlands and Luxembourg, and the 
electricity exchange EPEX-SPOT.  
Finally, the fourth and final stage of the electric market interconnection (market 
integration) is Market Splitting, corresponding to full market integration. Among its 
advantages we have it being economically efficient, having increased liquidity, and 
providing locational incentives. Among its drawbacks, we have the fact that there is no 
                                                          
55 A successful example of this approach is Nordpool’s coupling with CWE, includying 
Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. 
56 ‘A single price is not and should not be the only or even the best criterion according to which progress 
towards achieving a well-functioning single market is judged. There can be, for example, situations in 
which prices between the two or more countries are very similar due to abuse of dominant market power 
of a dominant market participant in one or more countries’ (ONDŘICH, 2014). 
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incentive for Transmission System Operator (TSO) to expand capacity (VAN 
BLIJSWIJK and DE VRIES, 2011). 
‘it would only count on one operator for countries of the bloc being 
integrated, and each country or region would be treated as a submarket 
similar to what Brazil conducts internally in the National 
Interconnected System (SIN) operation. For example, it would be as if 
the SIN operation model was replicated on a larger scale, encompassing 
all countries that wish to be integrated where each country represents a 
submarket or zone. There would be a single algorithm to define the 
dispatch and to form the CMO and the short-term market price.  Given 
this integrated operation, almost full harmonisation in countries’ 
regulation, generation and transmission expansion criteria and 
commercial assets remuneration rules is necessary.’ (RAMOS, 2016: 
84). 
There are different definitions to Market Splitting and they basically rely on different 
usage of terms. ‘In Scandinavia market splitting is used as an expression for a method 
where a single market is “split” in case of congestion. In continental Europe, (…) often 
means the coordinated use of power exchanges where different neighboring markets are 
operated separately before congestion.’ (BAUMANN, 2014: 29). 
Although it seems unlikely to happen in the South American subcontinent, the most 
controversial point would be the definition of a single operator, which implies a loss of 
countries’ autonomy and the fear that this operator acts in a discriminatory manner 
benefiting countries with the largest consumer market. Generally, the two most advanced 
examples are MIBEL (Portugal and Spain) and Nordpool (Norway, Sweden, Finland and 
Denmark). 
Figure 4 presents a summary table of the different market integration models 
(interruptible flow, flow per contracy, loose/tight volume coupling, price coupling, and 
market splitting) in terms of its operation, interchange, short-term market (MCP) price, 
contract, ballast, MCP, commercialization rules, energy planning, and show international 
experiences as examples of each modality. Here, the aim is to consolidate the concepts 




Figure 4. Summary of Markets Integration Modalities57 
Source: Adapted from RAMOS (2016); MCP = short-term market; MER = (Central American) Regional 
Electricity Market; LP = long run; CWE = Central West Europe. 
 
In the Fourth Ibero-American Seminar on Renewable Energies (SIBER IV), Rafael 
Ferreira, Advisor to the Presidency of the (Brazilian) Energy Research Company (EPE), 
said that this future harmonization must take into account the sovereignty of each country, 
identify the interface points, generate an adequate framework for investments, design a 
cost structure that does not generate distortions in the short term and create mechanisms 
                                                          
57 To check more European market coupling initiatives, see Appendix A. 
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so that countries that are transit (which are not buyers or sellers), accept interconnection 
until the Market integration (CIER, 2017a). 
Ergo, it is necessary to show integration paths by sequential stages. Starting by proposing 
alternatives for energy exchanges in both current interconnections and new 
generation/transmission projects that allow progress in the integration process would be 
an important first step. Then, go through optimization and opportunity exchanges, long-
term contracting of firm energies, coupling of markets until full market integration would 
correspond to expected steps. 
Notwithstanding, the region still does not have a common vision and long-term strategy 
on energy integration. Each country seeks its energy self-sufficiency and secondly seeks 
to sell surpluses to amortize its over-investments. These strategies have shown that they 
are not safer, they are more expensive and, in turn, do not allow the development of 
unconventional renewable energies to their full potential. 
Considering the current regulatory frameworks of the Southern Cone countries, RAMOS 
(2016) suggests: (i) Direct bilateral contracting, which in the Brazilian case could be both 
in the Free Hiring Environment (ACL) and in Regulated Hiring Environment (ACR)58; 
(ii) Interchange defined by the buyer and limited to the contracted value; (iii) Pricing and 
trade rules should be defined in/by each country; (iv) Non-delivery of energy hired 
implies purchase at MCP and payment of penalties; and (v) Energy Planning should 
include partial coordination in order to safeguard an important level of independence for 
countries signatory of agreements/treaties for energy integration59. 
‘Short, medium and long-term integration modes should be defined 
considering specific planning, operation and trade aspects for each 
interchange modality, making progress in the construction of a plan for 
the implementation of the necessary projects (Plants, Transmission 
Lines and Substations), also preparing legal and commercial 
frameworks that allow for the integration with consistent and attractive 
basis for Agents, including international treaties among the countries 
involved for the sake of legal security also supporting the financial and 
                                                          
58 In the latter case through new and/or existing energy auction. 
59 ‘If Brazil is the importer, the volume hired represents generation and may ballast sales and, on the other 
hand, generation charges must be paid. If Brazil is the exporter, export should be represented as load and 
shall present contractual coverage with the payment of consumption charges.’ (RAMOS, 2016: 87). 
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operational safety of transactions to be conducted in the markets of each 
Country involved.’ (Ibid.: 88-89).   
Thus, the author flexes his commercial vision of regional energy integration, highlighting 
the need for diverse planning through short, medium and long-term perspectives. In 
addition, it is worth noting that no matter the deadline, different agreements must consider 
the procedures and referrals applicable to exceptional cases, such as shortages and/or 
energy crisis situations.   
Thus, many consider that building an integrated energy market like the European one in 
the South American region is unlikely to happen due to the different barriers already 
presented (see subsection 2.3.1). This is aggravated, because the commercial model of 
Brazil, the largest regional energy market, (i) is for physical guarantee of purchase/sale, 
not for energy; and (ii) the physical guarantee can only be calculated in a modeled system 
as being ‘closed in itself’. In this way, the characteristics of the Brazilian market grounded 
in the concept of ‘ballast’ (physical guarantee) make integration similar to the European 
model impossible to happen60. This ratifies section 2.2, which states that the models of 
integration are particular and should not mimic the European one, taken as right and ideal, 
therefore corresponding to what must be followed. 
Given these limitations related to the architecture of the Brazilian commercial model, the 
country should play an incremental role, granting a regulatory environment in which 
neighboring countries that want to buy/sell electricity from the Brazilian market do so 
with free access and clear and non-discriminatory rules61. 
Consequently, RAMOS (2016) suggests that Brazil incorporate a list of recommendations 
in order to create a favourable marketplace for regional integration: (i) Clear regulatory 
mechanisms62 for energy import and export, considering the particularity of the cases; (ii) 
Allow the participation of importers in electricity auctions; (iii) Encourage the 
construction of projects aimed at exporting63; (iv) Financial guarantees and commercial 
                                                          
60 ‘Europe is the most advanced continent in this sense, having examples of integration by coupling 
methodology (volume and price) and examples of full integration, which is also known as market splitting.’ 
(RAMOS, 2016: 93). 
61 Such was the case between Colombia and Ecuador. 
62 Even by the existence of possible barriers due to the nature of the operation of the Brazilian institutional 
model, such as thermal dispatch out of the merit order and resulting charges, what artificially affect prices 
in the short-term market and impact costs of several agents. 
63 There are many power plants construction opportunities in the Amazon, as well as wind and thermal 
projects in the Southern Cone region. 
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aspects as exchange rate and risk-taking; and (v) Specific allotments of the trade rules 
system that can derail a commercial interchange process by adding costs affecting the 
economic feasibility of the energy interchanged. However, the exclusively commercial 
focus of the suggestions made by the author is clear, and it is a limitation from the point 
of view of guaranteeing the goal.  
‘Brazil’s integration with other Southern Cone markets with which it 
has borders should be established as “Loose Volume Coupling” where 
each country [has its Operator and] calculates its Marginal Cost of 
Operation independently and is free to continuously set purchase and 
sale prices by adding the margin it deems appropriate in relation to the 
pure marginal cost in electricity connection point(s) (addition of 
congestion costs, for example).’ (RAMOS, 2016: 93-94). 
Again, it is perceived that the author’s proposal has limitations. Undoubtedly, this is due 
to the influence of conjunctural factors and the current scenario of regional energy 
integration (since the current context of Mercosur is characterized by dispatch based on 
contracts). Ergo, there is no optimization between systems. Without a single operator, the 
exploitation and management of the region’s natural resources will not be optimized and 
therefore the subject will continue to be treated in the light of trade flows, either from 
bilateral agreements or from the international energy interconnections region.   
However, as discussed in section 2.2, care and caution are required when interpreting 
these models in stages, which suggest the normative idea that institutionalization is 
necessarily positive per se. The existence of these new rules and actors do not necessarily 
guarantee the optimization of regional energy planning, since political will and respect 
for the rules are fundamental requirements. 
Although this caveat is taken into account, the central argument of this thesis is that, with 
regard to the issue of South American energy integration, the creation and development 
of these institutions would benefit the process. Certainly, like any other model, there are 
simplifications and normative abstractions (the process does not necessarily have to go 
through all the stages presented, which are not dated in time). The purpose of these 
schemes is to present the movement expected to be achieved when there is a regional 
intention to develop a model of energy integration, demonstrating the degree of political 
and institutional consolidation of the steps themselves. 
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In general words, regarding market integration modalities, it was perceived that current 
energy intergration in Mercosur is based on the spot market and (bilateral) contracts. 
Thus, there is no effective joint regional planning, nor optimization between systems, but 
only opportunities exchanges64. Although regional market splitting is desired, it is 
important to consider that as long as there is not something really regional, it is necessary 
that the countries at least take into account the plans of their neighbors when preparing 
their energy expansion and operation plans. Undoubtedly, this will be a first step towards 
a path of regional energy planning. 
 
In general, the purpose of this chapter was to present and discuss the three main concepts 
of the thesis. In proposing a related discussion between energy security and regional 
integration, analyzing South American energy integration, it was emphasized that 
regional energy integration is capable of promoting regional energy security. Thus, the 
level of analysis were changed, surpassing the national one and proposing a regional 
dimension. 
After reviewing the different interpretations of the concepts discussed in the chapter, our 
objective was not to establish a single definition based on the contribution of the different 
disciplines that discuss each of these concepts. In fact, the idea was to present the diversity 
of approaches and interpretations and, in the end, to show that our understanding of the 
concept considers its multidisciplinarity feature. In this way, we consider the 
environmental, social and institutional variables (politcs, culture, rules, i.e.) in a regional 
dimension.  
                                                          
64 Cases like Itaipu, with stable and predictable long-term supply mechanisms are, unfortunately, an 
exception in the region. 
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3. National perspectives 
 
The main purpose of this chapter is to introduce the energy scenario in the Mercosur 
countries. The base-year of following analysis is 2015 in order to standardize the data 
depicted in upcoming tables and figures; thus, the methodology used to carry out a 
comparative data analysis for the different countries is guaranteed. The national 
quantitative primary sources are databases such as World Databank, sieLAC, ECLACstat, 
CIER, COCIER, national energy ministries, British Petroleum (BP), World Energy 
Council (WEC). In addition, the use of national and regional qualitative primary sources 
such as norms, laws, international treaties, agreements, memorandum of understanding, 
regulatory frameworks, programs and planning are emphasized. 
The chapter will be divided as follows: first, a comparative analysis of different primary 
quantitative data on energy power plants and international (cross-border) 
interconnections in South America; binational hydroelectric power plants in South 
America; exchanges of electric power between countries; evolution of electricity 
consumption; private participation in generation, transmission and distribution; gas 
pipeline network and natural gas reserves in South America; reserves and resources for 
Mercosur, among others. Data and information related to electricity, natural gas, oil, 
uranium and coal resources and reserves are presented respectively. 
Next, Argentina (section 3.1), Bolivia (section 3.2), Brazil (section 3.3), Paraguay 
(section 3.4), Uruguay (section 3.5) and Venezuela (section 3.6). At country level, the 
following structure can be expected: (i) a brief geographical and economic presentation 
on the six countries previously mentioned; (ii) the consequences of privatization and 
institutional reform, since this is paramount when analyzing country’s energy integration; 
(iii) presentation of energy markets existing structures, separated by electricity and oil 
and gas (O&G); (iv) figure showing summarized energy balance in ktoe; (v) detailed 
electricity sector installed capacity, with information on recent investments and projects 
in electricity and renewable sources; (vi) detailed presentation of binational projects, 
whether hydroelectric plants or gas pipelines; (vi) discussion of current public projects 
that have not gone forward; (vii) presentation of international (cross-border) 
interconnections and international trade; (viii) figure presenting energy trade, both 
exports and imports; (ix) information on projects and investments in the hydrocarbon 
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sector, detailing when dealing with oil or gas; and (x) presentation of main challenges 
that each country faces, as well as opportunities for new ventures. When countries do not 
have enough information on any of the topics mentioned above, it is not going to be 
mentioned.   
It must be noted that it is not the purpose of this chapter to make a detailed energy sector 
analysis at country level, nor to present the regulation of each of them, whether in 
electricity or O&G sector. Actually, the goal of this inquiry is to exhibit the main 
country’s geoeconomic and electroenergetic characteristics, highlighting their 
relationship with regional integration. Exactly due to this reason, existing experiences in 
terms of energy interconnections, as well as binational HPPs and gas pipelines will be 
showed as well.  
Regarding the energy sector of the countries being studied, it should be noted that reforms 
in their electric industries followed a common pattern with variations of their own: (i) 
vertical disintegration of the industry; (ii) transfer of assets to private sector; (iii) 
separation of functions from the State and creation of independent regulatory bodies, 
policy makers and management control; and (iv) rebalancing of tariffs and 
reduction/targeting of subsidies. The reforms of the energy sector in Latin America and 
the Caribbean (LAC) have generally implied, for many countries, the privatization of 
assets, the disintegration of energy chains and a conceptual change regarding ends and 
means in the public services formerly centralized within the State. In many cases, this has 
implied an increase in rates or increasing needs for subsidies. In both instances, for not 
prioritizing specific public policies concerning social rate and its scope, the social impact 
has been and still is negative, mainly after 2003, where the scenario of international 
energy prices is modified (CIER, 2013a). 
It is important to mention that in addition to considering the energy market structure at 
country level, when we cope with energy integration, it is crucial to draw attention to 
current projects on physical infrastructure – stressing that the process of regional 
integration does not necessarily imply an increase of intra-bloc trade. Having said that, 
energy infrastructure and regional development have an intrinsic and close relationship 
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that needs to be highlighted65, particularly in the context of developing countries. In this 
way, it is important to understand how this relationship occurs, shedding some light onto 
the different variables that need to be taken into account. 
Therefore, and ratifying the view presented in section 2.2 and subsection 2.3.1, 
integration is not understood by increased trade flow. From the energy point of view, 
deepening energy integration may lead to increased imports and exports of energy 
(electricity, oil and byproducts, and gas), but this is not necessarily true66. 
Considering nine South American countries over the period 1980-2005, APERGIS and 
PAYNE (2010) show the causality from energy consumption to economic growth and the 
fact that the region is among the world’s leader in energy sources such as oil, natural gas, 
hydroelectricity and ethanol. Taking into account that these are developing countries, 
some of them facing shaken economic situations, investing in energy can lead to positive 
externalities for the other sectors of the economy. 
In the energy policies context, especially considering investment in physical 
infrastructure, it is mandatory to emphasize the role of energy cooperation and 
integration67 as alternatives to national policies aimed at energy self-sufficiency 
(MARES, 2008, SANTOS, 2017), by allowing a better use of resources by taking 
advantages of complementarities between countries (OCHOA et al., 2013, RAMOS, 
2016). As highlighted in subsections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2, it is necessary to overcome the 
narrow state-centric characteristic of most national plans of the different countries. 
Table 2 presents energy and environmental indicators for Mercosur. It contains electric 
power consumption (kWh per capita), access to electricity (% of pop.), renewable energy 
                                                          
65 ‘There is a strong relationship between the quality of energy infrastructure, competitiveness, and 
economic growth. (…). Blackouts and brownouts are very costly and are a disincentive to invest in 
manufacturing, while the investments required to provide back-up generation lead to increased costs. 
Fluctuations in voltage and power frequency also cause machine damage, financial and economic losses, 
and variations in product quality.’ (YÉPEZ et al., 2016:21). 
66 As noted in subsection 2.3.2, there are different dimensions of common electricity markets, namely (i) 
infrastructural integration; (ii) regulatory integration; and (iii) commercial integration (PINEAU et al., 
2004).  
67 ‘Out of the different energy sources, the most promising one from a regional viewpoint is electricity. It 
provides multiple comparative advantages: tariff modicity, employment of consolidated technologies and 
other innovative ones (wind and solar) and environmental sustainability. Its largely technologically and 
technically dominated characteristics favour the installation of integrated transmission networks capable of 
guaranteeing continuous and uninterrupted supply of energy over long distances. Additionally, electricity 
favours the inclusion of large social segments, distant from development benefits and opportunities. Both 
factors explain the replacement of non-renewable and pollution-generating sources in the region since 
market reforms of years 1980-90.’ (BIATO et al., 2016: 61-62). 
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consumption (%), total natural resources rents (% of GDP), emission intensity GDP US$ 
2010 (t/MUS$ 2010), CO2 emissions (kt) and CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita). 
 


































Ar 3,052 100.0 10.77 1,18 413,56 204,025 4.7 
Bo 753 90.0 16.82 7,92 797,36 20,411 1.9 
Br 2,601 99.7 41.81 2,91 206,30 529,808 2.6 
Py 1,564 99.0 63.12 2,20 256,66 5,702 0.9 
Uy 3,068 99.7 55.43 1,64 138,60 6,747 2.0 
Ve 2,658 99.1 12.30 15,252 766,60 185,220 6.0 
Source: Own elaboration based on World Databank and sieLAC; 1 = 2014 ; 2 = 2013; 3 = % of total final 
energy consumption. 
 
Electricity coverage in Latin America has increased substantially over the last decades, 
rising from 50% of the population in 1970 to more than 95% in 2015. The 1990s 
witnessed a period in which many countries had difficulties in expanding their networks, 
especially in isolated and rural areas. Only a combination of political efforts has made it 
possible to reach current situation, in addition to (i) the use of social tariffs and pro-
competitive regulation; and (ii) renewable technologies are becoming a relevant solution 
for the rural area. Although there are high rates of electrification in the region, energy 
consumption is still very low in many areas – mainly rural areas (BANAL-ESTAÑOL, 
CALZADA and JORDANA, 2017)68. When it comes to electricity access, ‘electricity 
needs to be affordable for consumers and tariffs should be adequate to allow service 
providers to expand the grid, as well as to operate and maintain their facilities.’ (YÉPEZ 
et al., 2016: 8). 
                                                          
68 It is important to take into account the fact that ‘energy access issues particularly affect women and 
children, as well as indigenous people and AfroCaribbean populations.’ (YÉPEZ et al., 2016: 5). 
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It is very clear that access to electrification occurs on a very diverse basis, which is 
expressed in the share of renewable energy consumption in each of the countries. Under 
Mercosur, Paraguay reaches about 63.12% while Argentina reaches only 10.77%. 
Countries such as Venezuela and Bolivia, in turn, have 15.25% and 7.92%, respectively, 
of share of total natural resources rents (% of GDP)69. Undoubtedly, in absolute terms, 
Brazil also stands out, but in relative terms (% of GDP), the weight of this income falls. 
All data is intertwined as we consider CO2 emissions, which are related to the energy 
sector of the countries, as well as their other productive sectors. Once again, the relative 
and absolute differences between the Mercosur countries stand out. 
Still with regard to renewable energy, noteworthy is the October publication of 2017 
Renewable Energy Country Attractiveness Index (RECAI), which sets Argentina, Brazil 
and Uruguay in 11th, 17th and 35th respectively. Argentina and Uruguay have improved 
their position when compared with a previous index, while Brazil has worsened70. 
Table 3 shows production, consumption and energy surpluses and deficits, by country. 
The total production (Mtoe) and consumption (Mtoe) of Mercosur accounted for 74.5% 
and 80.6% of the total in South America (SA), respectively. In addition, considering only 
Mercosur, Brazil accounts for 49.6% of production and 63.6% of consumption, while 
















                                                          
69 As previously argued, a significant challenge arises within Mercosur, given the entrance of Venezuela 
and Bolivia – since the latter has its energy production mainly based on natural gas and the former in crude 
oil and by-products. On the other hand, Mercosur founding members have a predominantly hydroelectric 
profile. Still, it is possible to see that the recent entrance of both Venezuela and Bolivia contributes 
positively to ensuring a bigger diversification of Mercosur energy matrix and power generation mix. 
70 See: http://www.ey.com/gl/en/industries/power---utilities/ey-renewable-energy-country-attractiveness-
index-our-index.   
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Ar 73 87 -14 -16% 
Bo 23 9 14 156% 
Br 286 299 -13 -4% 
Py 7 5 2 40% 
Uy 3 5 -2 -40% 
Ve 185 65 120 185% 
Mercosur 577 470 107 23% 
Cl 14 37 -23 -62% 
Co 126 35 91 260% 
Ec 30 14 16 114% 
Gy 0 1 -1 -100% 
Pe 26 25 1 4% 
Su 1 1 0 0% 
SA 774 583 191 33% 
Source: Own elaboration based on CIER (2017b) and MME (2016). 
 
It is also worth noting that the positive balance presented by Mercosur (107 Mtoe) is 
strongly influenced by the presence of Bolivia (+156%) and Venezuela (+185%)71. The 
other extra-Mercosur countries in South America only produce 197 Mtoe and consume 
113 Mtoe, respectively 34.1% and 24.0% of Mercosur’s values. Due to its relative size, 
Chile stands out as a country with high external dependence on energy (-63%). 
Exchanges of electric power between countries (GWh) are presented in Table 4. On the 
total exports, Paraguay stands out, accounting for 41,450 GWh (93.1%) of total exports 
from South America. On the import side, Brazil (34,947 GWh, 78.5%) and Argentina 






Table 4.  Electricity exchanges, between countries, in GWh (2015) 





                                                          
71 Venezuela exported slightly above 180% of its energy needs (MME, 2016). 
67 
 
Ar   229 - - 7,479 - 1,313 - 9,021 20.3% 
Br 56   - - 33,971 - 7 913 34,947 78.5% 
Co - -   45 - - - - 45 0.1% 
Ec - - 457   - 55 - - 512 1.1% 
Uy 2 - - - - -   - 2 0.0% 
Ve - - 3 - - - -   3 0.0% 
Total 
exports  58 229 460 45 41,450 55 1,320 913 44,530 100.0% 
% exports 0.1% 0.5% 1.0% 0.1% 93.1% 0.1% 3.0% 2.1% 100.0% - 
Source: Own elaboration based on CIER (2017b) 
 
Mercosur countries have played a leading role in electric power exchanges in South 
America. They account for 43,970 GWh (98.8%) of exports and 43,973 GWh (98.8%) of 
electricity total imports from South America. In other words, they are not only the main 
sources, but also the main destinations of electricity in transit in the region. This is also 
one of the main reasons why this present thesis focuses on Mercosur countries, and not 
on UNASUR countries. 
Although the accession of potentially interesting new countries from the point of view of 
energy exchanges is positive for the energy integration of the region, it is important to 
consider that the more countries participate in the arrangement, the greater the existing 
asymmetry. Therefore, given the recent enlargements that have taken place in Mercosur, 
RODRIGUES (2012a) sheds light onto the need of (only) analyzing institutional and 
regulatory issues on energy integration within and between Mercosur countries, following 
HIRA (2003) and VARELA’s (2015) lead. 
Figure 5, Figure 6, Table 5, Table 6 and Table 7 come from CIER (2017), whose base-
year is 2015. The document is entitled ‘Energy Information Synthesis of the CIER 
Countries: Information on the energy sector in South American, Central American and 
the Caribbean countries - Year 2015’. 
Figure 5 shows that cross-border interconnections are spatially concentrated in the Andes 
or Southern Cone, what justifies why different authors and project methodologies analyze 
South American energy integration divided into two large blocs of countries. This is the 
case of the famous CIER Project 15, which divides South America into Andean 
Community (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru) and Mercosur (Argentina, Brazil, 
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Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay)72. In the following figure, it is possible to see in detail 
whether the interconnections are operating/existing, under construction or under study. 
In addition, we present the operating and under study HPPs. 
 
 
                                                          
72 Although there is a footnote in the project mentioning that countries that participate in the Mercosur and 
Andean Community (CAN) groups are not necessarily members of the homonymous commercial unions, 
the fact is that this methodological decision contributes to hinder regional comparative studies. This 
happens because there is no formal methodological accuracy when it comes to studying and evaluating such 
countries. This positioning confirms the fact that Venezuela is not considered in the region of South 
America. The project report (CIER, 2011) justifies that it was not possible to include Venezuela in the study 
due to the deadline limits for data delivery. Furthermore, CIER 15 makes another conceptual mistake in 




Figure 5. Power plants and international interconnections in South America 
 Source:  CIER (2017b).  
 




 Argentina: Ministry of Energy and Mining (MINEM); 
 Bolivia: National Load Dispatch Committee (CNDC); 
 Brazil: Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME); 
 Colombia: Mining and Energy Planning Unit (UPME); 
 Paraguay: National Electricity Administration (ANDE); 
 Perú: Ministry of Energy and Mines (MINEM); y 
 Uruguay: National Administration of Power Plants and Electric Transmissions 
(UTE). 
  
It is observed that almost all countries have interconections with a neighboring country. 
However, when analyzing electricity exchanges between countries, they do not seem 
relevant. 
Table 5 shows the main binational hydroelectric power plants in South America. Again, 
all of them are located in Mercosur countries, particularly in the Southern Cone. 
 
Table 5. Binational Hydroelectric Power Plants in South America 




A Br-Py Itaipu  Paraná 14,000 In operation 
B Ar-Uy Salto Grande Uruguay 1,890 In operation 
C Ar-Py Yacyretá Paraná 3,200 In operation 
D Ar-Br Garabí-Panambí Uruguay 2,200 Under study 
E Ar-Py Corpus Christi Paraná 3,400 Under study 
Source: Adapted from CIER (2017). 
 
Binational plants are detailed by countries involved in the project, river, installed capacity 
(MW) and status. The weight of Itaipu (14,000 MW) is evident, corresponding to 56.7% 
of the total installed capacity of binational hydroelectric power plants in South America. 
In addition, it should be noted that Garabí-Panambí (2,200 MW) and Corpus (3,400 MW) 
are still under study, so they do not contribute to the generation of electricity and income 
for the countries of that region. 
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Table 6 features the power plants and international interconnections in South America 
showed in Figure 5. This table shows countries involved, location of the enterprise, 
voltage (kV), installed capacity (MW) and current status with frequency. It is clear that 
countries of the Andean region (Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela) have a 
frequency of 60 Hz such as Brazil, but unlike Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay and 
Uruguay, whose systems operate at 50 Hz73. 
 
Table 6. Power plants and international interconnections in South America 






1 Co-Ve Cuestecita (Co) – Cuatricentenario (Ve) 230 150 Operating (60 Hz) 
2 Co-Ve Tibú (Co) – La Fría (Ve) 115 36 Operating (60 Hz) 
3 Co-Ve San Mateo (Co) – El Corozo (Ve) 230 150 Operating (60 Hz) 
4 Co-Pa Cerromatoso (Co) – Panamá (Pa) (Co) 300 Under study (HDVC)   
5 Co-Ec Jamondino (Co) – Pomasqui (Ec) 230 2501 Operating (60 Hz), 4 circuits 
6 Co-Ec Jamondino (Co) – Pomasqui (Ec) 230 2501 Under construction (60 Hz) 
7 Co-Ec Ipiales (Co) – Tulcán (Ec) 138 35/113 Operating (60 Hz) 
8 Ec-Pe Machala (Ec) – Zorritos (Pe) 230 110 Operating (60 Hz) 
9 Br-Ve Boa Vista (Br) – El Guri (Ve) 230/400 200 Operating (60 Hz) 
10 Bo-Pe La Paz (Bo) – Puno (Pe) 230/220 150 Under study (50/60 Hz) 
11 Br-Py Itaipu 500/220 14,000 Operating (60/50 Hz) 
12 Br-Py Foz de Iguazú (Br) – Acaray (Py) 220/138 50 Nonoperating (60/50 Hz) 
13 Ar-Py El Dorado (Ar) – Mcal. A. López (Py) 220/132 30 Operating (50 Hz) 
14 Ar-Py Clorinda (Ar) – Guarambaré (Py) 220 90 Operating (50 Hz) 
15 Ar-Py Yacyretá 500 3,200 Operating (50 Hz) 
16 Ar-Br Rincón S.M. (Ar) – Garabí (Br) 500 2,000/2,200 Operating (50/60 Hz) 
17 Ar-Br P. de los Libres(Ar) – Uruguayana(Br) 132/230 50 Operating (50/60 Hz) 
18 Ar-Uy Salto Gde. (Ar) – Salto Gde. (Uy) 500 1,890 Operating (50 Hz) 
19 Ar-Uy Concepción (Ar) – Paysandú (Uy) 132/150 100 Emergency Op. (50 Hz) 
20 Ar-Uy Colonia Elia (Ar) – San Javier (Uy) 500 1,386 Operating (50 Hz) 
21 Br-Uy Livramento (Br) – Rivera (Uy) 230/150 70 Operating (60/50 Hz) 
22 Br-Uy Pte. Médici (Br) – San Carlos (Uy) 500 500 Operating (60/50 Hz) 
23 Ar-Cl CT TermoAndes (Ar) – Sub.Andes (Cl) 345 633 Operating (50 Hz) 
24 Ar-Bo Yaguacua (Bo) – Tartagal (Ar) 500  Under study 
Source: CIER (2017b); 1 = double circuit; HVDC = high-voltage, direct current. 
                                                          
73 As already mentioned, this is one of the reasons why it is usual to model the region by dividing the 




Table 7 shows the evolution of electricity consumption during 1990-2015, in 
kWh/inhabitant. It varies widely among Mercosur countries and has grown significantly 
over the last decades. 
 
Table 7. Evolution of electricity consumption, in kWh/inhabitant (1990-2015) 
Country 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 
Ar 1,459 1,882 2,438 2,871 3,367 3,575 
Bo 284 378 468 521 697 849 
Br 1,554 1,886 2,142 2,402 2,821 2,966 
Py 641 890 1,044 1,212 1,627 2,137 
Uy 1,521 1,934 2,386 2,518 2,838 3,146 
Ve1 2,837 3,226 3,697 3,940 4,002 4,272 
Mercosur2 1,383 1,699 2,029 2,244 2,559 2,824 
Cl3 1,051 1,763 2,748 3,358 3,648 4,028 
Co 1,058 1,088 983 1,058 1,209 1,371 
Ec 589 734 839 1,147 1,408 1,636 
Pe 444 558 776 937 1,223 1,536 
AS 1,422 1,674 1,946 2,208 2,564 2,755 
Source: Own elaboration based on CIER (2017); No data for Guyana and Suriname. 1 = Correspond to 
2014, the latest information available; 2 = Calculated as a means of Ar, Bo, Br, Py, Uy e Ve; 3 = Does not 
include Central Salta located in Argentina. 
 
Table 8 shows the profile of generation, transmission and distribution of electricity by 
country. Given the heterogeneity existing within the territory, both in terms of resources 
and in the political orientation, the adopted regulatory framework has varied according to 
each specific case. The nature of each activity changes greatly from country to country, 
especially in the generation sector. 
In general, countries can be divided into two groups. First, there is the group made up of 
countries with the greatest State intervention or participation. This is the case of Bolivia, 
Paraguay and Uruguay. However, this group also presents several differences within. In 
the second group, Argentina and Brazil can be found. The two countries with the greatest 
territorial extension on the subcontinent have a strong State participation in common in 
regulatory terms, with constant changes in normative aspects. The participation in the 
ownership of companies varies in the three segments. Private, public companies and even 
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some of mixed capitals coexist, although the first group is the largest among the three of 
them. 
 
Table 8. Generation, transmission and distribution of electricity markets, by country  
Country 



































































Source: Own elaboration based on AZUAJE and MORALES (2015) and COCIER (2016, 2017a, 2017b); 
1 = not implemented; 2 = public and private property; 3 = mostly public. 
 
Based on recent Colombian Committee of the CIER (COCIER) reports, a brief summary 
of each segment is presented. As previously mentioned, the generation activity shows 
very heterogeneous models according to each country. Competition with both private and 
public companies is usually the rule, although in some cases it is more oligopolistic due 
to high levels of concentration. In other cases, there are situations of monopsony with the 
existence of a single buyer that puts the bidders in a situation of lower market power 
(COCIER, 2016).   
The organization of the transmission activity is country by country, although there are 
certain similarities between some cases. Bolivia and Brazil74 are characterized by being 
                                                          
74 Like Chile, Colombia and Peru. 
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oligopolistic markets where concessioned companies can be both private and public. In 
some cases, they also differ according to voltage levels. Paraguay, Uruguay and 
Venezuela75 have in common that the transmission segment is carried out by publicly 
owned monopolies vertically integrated. Finally, Argentina has a monopoly, but with 
regional separation. This is due to the fact that transport by extra high voltage is carried 
out only by one company (TRANSENER), while the so-called trunk transmission is 
carried out by different companies that separate their areas according to geographical 
criteria (COCIER, 2017a). 
In some cases like Bolivia and Uruguay76, the distribution is an ordinary regime 
characterized by the existence of supply contracts between market generators and 
distributors (except in Bolivia, which although regulated have not yet been implemented) 
and a spot market, generally valued at marginal cost. Argentina77 originally had ordinary 
schemes, but then it started changing as various regulations were implemented. Contracts 
between private parties are no longer allowed and transactions can only be carried out 
with the CAMMESA operator at fixed prices. Brazil, on the other hand, has the contract 
market divided into two environments, regulated (ACR) and free (ACL), and also has 
four different spot markets according to the region (N, NE, S, SE). Paraguay and 
Venezuela are divergent from the rest since they do not directly have a wholesale market 
regime because there is a single monopolistic company and vertically integrated in all 
activities (ANDE and Corpoelec). In Argentina and Brazil78 most of the capital are 
private, while in Bolivia and Ecuador it is public. Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela 
would be the extremes of the region, since the activity is carried out by a single public 
capital company in the three cases (COCIER, 2017b). 
Table 9 presents a snapshot of private participation by subsector in December 2010, 
showing the heterogeneity of market composition across Latin American countries. It is 
possible to argue that most countries tend to have a relevant degree of public participation, 
with state-owned utilities as key players in the three sub-sectors (BALZA et al., 2013). 
 
Table 9. Private participation in generation, transmission and distribution, in % 
                                                          
75 Like Ecuador. 
76 Like Colombia and Peru. 
77 Like Ecuador. 
78 Like Peru. 
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Country Generation Transmission Distribution 
Ar 73 100 66 
Bo 35 87 82 
Br 38 14 70 
Py 0 0 0 
Uy 3 0 0 
Ve 0 0 0 
Source: BALZA et al. (2013); Venezuela started the process of re-nationalizations in 2007 and Bolivia in 
2011. In Paraguay and Uruguay, distribution refers to billing by private utilities. 
 
Evidences based on analyzes of developing countries in the 1980s and early 2000s 
highlight that good regulatory governance has a positive and statistically significant effect 
on per capita generation capacity (CUBBIN and STERN, 2006), and that performance 
improvements resulting from private participation depend on the presence of an effective 
regulatory regime that stimulates management (ZHANG et al., 2008). However, it is 
important to note that the effect of privatization on electricity prices is not clear 
(NAGAYAMA, 2007, 2009). 
Privatization itself does not necessarily lead to better results (such as improved labor 
productivity, higher capital utilization, increased generating capacity, or higher output) 
unless it is coupled with independent regulation (ZHANG et al., 2008). We are 
completely in line with this argument. Nevertheless, there are studies that find that 
privatization has increased access to electricity services in Argentina, Bolivia, Mexico, 
and Nicaragua, particularly for lower income groups (MOOKHERJEE and McKENZIE, 
2005), while others studies analyzing 10 Latin American countries (LAC) find mixed 
results (ANDRES et al., 2008). 
Figure 6 and Table 10 show gas pipeline networks and natural gas reserves in South 
America detailing whether they are operating/existing, under construction, in project or 
under study. In addition, the gas basins of the region are presented. Table 10 details the 
countries involved in each gas pipeline network, location of the project, diameter (inch), 
capacity (Mm3/d) and current status. As can be seen from the table, many gas pipelines 




Figure 6. Gas pipeline networks and natural gas reserves in South America 
Fonte: CIER (2017b). 
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Table 10. Gas pipeline networks and natural gas reserves in South America 






1 Ar-Cl San Sebastián (Ar) – Pta. Arenas (Cl) (Bandurria) 10 4 Existing (sin. op) 
2 Ar-Cl Batería de Recepción 7 – T. del Fuego 6 1,5 Operating 
3 Ar-Cl Pta. Dungeness (Ar) – C. Negro (Cl) (Dungeness) 8 2 Existing (sin. op) 
4 Ar-Cl El Cóndor (Ar) – Posesión (Cl) 12 2 Existing (sin. op) 
5 Ar-Cl Pta. Magallanes (Ar) – Posesión (Cl) 18 1 Existing (sin. op) 
6 Ar-Cl L. La Lata (Ar) – Concepción (Cl) (Gas Pacífico) 24-20 3,5 
In operation on 
the Argentine side 
7 Ar-Cl La Mora (Ar) – Santiago (Cl) (Gasandes) 24 10 
In interruptible 
operation 
8 Ar-Cl Cnel. Cornejo (Ar) – Mejillones (Cl) (Gasatacama) 20 9 
Existing 
(nonoperating) 
9 Ar-Cl Gasod. Norte (Ar) – Tocopilla (Cl) (Norandino) 20 8,5 
In interruptible 
operation 
10 Ar-Bo Ramos (Ar) – Bermejo (Bo) 8-13 1,2 Operating 
11 Ar-Bo Campo Durán (Ar) – Madrejones (Bo) 24 7 
Existing 
(nonoperating) 
12 Ar-Bo Miraflores (Ar) – Tupiza (Bo) (Puna)   Under sudy 
13 Ar-Br Cnel. Cornejo (Ar) – S. Paulo (Br)   In project 









16 Ar-Uy Gto. Entrerriano (Ar) – Casa Blanca (Uy) 16 5-2 
Existing 
(nonoperating) 
17 Ar-Uy Bs. Aires (Ar) – Montevideo (Uy) (C. del Sur) 24-18 (1) 6 
Operating in 
limited service 
18 Bo-Br Río Grande (Bo) – S. Paulo (Br) 32 30 Operating 
19 Bo-Br Río Grande (Bo) – Cuiabá (Br) (GASBOL) 18 2,8 Operating 
20 Co-Ve Est. Ballena (Co) – Maracaibo (Ve) (Transcaribe) 18 4,2 Operating 
21 Ar-Bo 
Campo Durán (Ar) – Campo Grande (Bo) (Juana 
Azurduy) 




Despite the region potential for gas integration, none of the LAC countries is explicitly 
pitching for the construction of integration gas pipelines in the short or medium term. 
Only Bolivia, after the construction of a smaller high capacity pipeline to increase gas 
shipments to Argentina, raises the possibility to increase the capacity of shipments to 
Brazil. However, it is a currently remote possibility. Its main problem is to develop and 
produce on time all the gas committed in its contract with Argentina. The trend is assured 
today in the export-import of LNG, which calls into question the need for more capital-
intensive investments in new gas pipelines (D’APOTE and CASTAÑOS, 2016, CAF, 
2013c) and makes room for a new regional dynamic in terms of potential LNG trade 
between countries.   
Table 11 below presents data such as oil reserves (Gbbl), natural gas reserves (Gm³), 
uranium reserves (kt), coal reserves (Mt), hydropower resources (TWh), power plant 
capacity (GW) and refining capacity (kbbl/d).  However, it should be noted that due to 
the great uncertainty about proven, possible and probable reserves, as well as the existing 
ones with respect to unconventional resources (such as shale gas)79, it becomes almost 

















                                                          
79 Especially for those with intention and/or decision to invest in their exploitation. 
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Ar 2.4 332.0 19.0 500.0 169.0 35.8 657.0 
Bo 0.4 281.0 - - 126.0 2.4 69.7 
Br 13.0 429.0 309.0 7039.0 1250.0 140.9 2,278.0 
Py - - - - 85.0 9.8 7.5 
Uy - - - - 10.0 3.9 50.0 
Ve 300.9 5,617.0 - 479.0 261.0 31.4 1,303.0 
Mercosur 316.7 6,659.0 328.0 8,018.0 1,901.0 224.2 4,365.2 
SA 327.7 7,256.0 333.0 14,987.0 2,842.0 277.9 5,599.0 
% Mercosur/SA 96.6% 91.8% 98.5% 53.5% 66.9% 80.7% 78.0% 
World 1,698.0 186,875.0 6,306.0 891,531.0 15,955.0 6,000.0 97,227.0 
% Mercosur/World 18.7% 3.6% 5.2% 0.9% 11.9% 3.7% 4.5% 
Fonte: Own elaboration based on CIER (2017b), MME (2016), British Petroleum (BP) and World Energy 
Council (WEC); 1 measured; 2 proved and inferred; 3 technically exploitable; bbl = barrel. 
 
Based on the data, the challenge of adding value to regional energy resources stands out. 
Considering South America, Mercosur has 96.6% of oil reserves, 91.8% of natural gas 
reserves, 98.5% of uranium reserves, 53.5% of coal reserves, 66.9% of hydropower 
resources, 80.7% of power plant capacity and 78.0% of refining capacity. In Mercosur, 
Argentina, Brazil and Bolivia catch the eye80. Venezuela has 95.0% of oil reserves, 84.4% 
of natural gas reserves, 13.7% of hydropower resources, 14.0% of power plant capacity 
and 29.8% of refining capacity. Brazil has 94.2% of uranium reserves, 87.8% of coal 
reserves, 65.8% of hydropower resources, 62.8% of power plant capacity and 52.2% of 
refining capacity. Argentina stands out because of having 8.9% of hydropower resources, 
16.0% of power plant capacity and 15.1% of refining capacity. 
Table 12 shows proven natural gas reserves in trillions of cubic feet (TCF) by country, 
for the period between 1990 and 2015. In 2015, Mercosur has 92.5% of proven natural 
gas reserves in South America, especially Venezuela (84.4% of the total). Beyond 
                                                          
80 It is noteworthy that Paraguay and Uruguay do not have reserves of oil, natural gas, uranium and coal. 
This makes the range of energy generation possibilities in these countries more narrow, which may put 
pressure on their energy security.  
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Mercosur countries, Peru and Colombia stand out with 5.7% e 1.9% of total proven 
natural gas reserves in South America in 2015, respectively. 
 
Table 12. Proven natural gas reserves, by country, in TCF (1990-2015) 
Country 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 
Ar 23.3 21.9 27.5 15.5 12.7 11.7 
Bo 3.9 4.6 24.0 26.1 9.9 9.9 
Br 4.2 5.3 7.8 10.6 14.7 15.0 
Ve 121.1 143.4 146.5 152.5 192.7 198.4 
Mercosur 152.5 175.2 205.8 204.7 230.0 235.0 
AS 168.0 190.1 219.2 220.3 247.9 254.0 
% Mercosur/AS 90.8 92.2 93.9 92.9 92.8 92.5 
Source: CIER (2016); TFC = trillions of cubic feet. 
 
Regarding the available energy data for the region, in addition to CIER’s data and reports, 
the recent creation of the Latin America and the Caribbean Energy Information System 
(sieLAC-OLADE) in 2017 should be mentioned81. The sieLAC-OLADE is an energy 
information platform that allows OLADE to integrate, process and disseminate official 
statistical, socioeconomic, legal and documental information concerning the energy 
sector of its 27 member countries, based on standardized methodologies and concepts that 
allow consolidation of information at the national, subregional and regional levels. 
In the following subsections, we will make a brief comparative analysis of several 
qualitative and quantitative variables in order to summarize projects that are related to 
regional integration and recent energy policies in the different Mercosur countries. Thus, 
we sought to shed light onto the inexistence of an effective regional policy for the bloc 
countries, since the existing policies are heterogeneous and uncoordinated. Nevertheless, 




Argentina is the second largest country in South America in terms of territorial extension 
and the third according to the number of inhabitants (after Brazil and Colombia). Its 
                                                          
81 Infographics that will be presented for each of the countries come from this database. 
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territory comprises 2.80 million km2 with a very varied geography and different climates 
due to its latitudinal amplitude and variety of reliefs. Its economy is diversified with a 
large industrial and service production as well as the exploitation of natural resources. 
However, following the patterns of the region, the main export item comes from the 
agricultural primary sector, with soy being the main component. Its population comprises 
43.8 million inhabitants and it has a per capita GDP of US$ 12,454.34 at current prices, 
which is why it is included in the segment of high-income countries. 
Like other countries in the region, Argentina also undergone a recent process of 
privatization and institutional reform of its electricity sector. Studies find evidence that it 
increases both access to and quality of service (GONZALEZ-EIRAS and ROSSI, 2007) 
for lower income groups82 (MOOKHERJEE and McKENZIE, 2005). 
In Argentina, the Ministry of Energy and Mining (MINEM) is responsible for the policies 
and guidelines of the electricity sector. The regulation and supervision are in the hands of 
the National Electricity Regulatory Entity (ENRE), although in fact the electrical 
regulation is provincial (there are 24 different regulators). Wholesale Electricity Market 
Administrator Company (CAMMESA) manages the wholesale electrical market and the 
Federal Electrical Energy Council (CFEE) is responsible for the monitoring and follow-
up of national and municipal governments. 
With regard to electricity generation, there are private and state-owned companies 
utilities, Yacyretá (Ar-Py) and Salto Grande (Ar-Uy). Regarding transmission, there is 
the Argentine Interconnection System (SADI), with two subsystems that compose it, the 
High Voltage Electric Power Transport System (STAT) and the Trunk System (ST). The 
transmission companies are Transener (only of STAT), Transba, Transpa, Transnoa, 
Distrocuyo, Transnea, Transcomahue. Concerning distribution, most of the distribution 
companies belong to private concessionaires and each province has its own. In Buenos 
Aires, they are Distribution and Marketing Company of the North S.A (EDENOR), South 
Distribution Company S.A. (EDESUR) and Distribution Company of La Plata S.A. 
(EDELAP).  Commercialization is controlled by CAMMESA and the studies/planning of 
the electricity sector are under the authority of different MINEM secretariats, such as the 
Secretariat of Strategic Energy Planning.  
                                                          
82 They argue the same for the Bolivian case. 
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Regarding the hydrocarbon sector, MINEM continues to be responsible for the design of 
policies and guidelines. Concerning regulation and supervision, the National Regulatory 
Entity for Gas (ENARGAS) regulates the gas market; there is not properly an agent 
responsible for regulating the oil sector, with the normative competence of MINEM itself. 
With regard to exploration and production (E&P), the Undersecretariat of Enargas is 
responsible for the gas sector and the Undersecretariat for Exploration and Production of 
MINEM for oil. There is great participation of Fiscal Oilfields (YPF S.A.) and private 
companies such as Petrobras Argentina, Pan American Energy Sucursal Argentina, LLC 
and Total Austral S.A. The refining, transportation and commercialization remain within 
the Undersecretariat of Refining and Marketing of MINEM and private companies. 
Figure 7 presents the Argentine summarized energy balance in 2015. Based on it, it can 
be seen that the primary supply (85,351.13 ktoe) is composed of natural gas (47,011.56 
ktoe, 55.1%), crude oil (26,695.42 ktoe, 31.3%), other primaries (4,361.63  ktoe, 5.1%), 
hydropower (3,565.00 ktoe, 4.2%), nuclear (2,203.75 ktoe, 2.6%) and coal (1.513.77 
ktoe, 1.8%). In final consumption (59,064.28 ktoe), we can see the importance of 
transport (18,722.94 ktoe, 31.7%), residential (15,056.74 ktoe, 25.5%) and industrial 
(13,400.04 ktoe, 22.7%), being 18.9% supplied by electricity. In Mercosur, Argentina 
corresponds to 18.0% of primary supply and 16.8% of final consumption. In the total 
supply, it is noted that 3.2% of crude oil, 20.3% of natural gas and 94.6% of coal are 













Argentina’s electricity sector has an installed capacity of 32,594 MW, most of which 
comes from conventional thermal (19,519 MW) and hydroelectric (11,108 MW) sources. 
It is followed by nuclear power with 1,755 MW and in terms of non-conventional 
renewable energy (NCRE) there is not much development, with an installed capacity of 
212 MW. 
According to 2017 OLADE Energy Statistics Yearbook, in terms of electricity, the life 
extension process of the Embalse Nuclear Power Plant is satisfactorily developed. The 
reconditioning will allow it to operate for a new cycle of 30 years. In addition, the plant 
will increase its power to 683 MWe, that is, 6% more than its current generation capacity. 
Regarding renewable sources, Argentina launched the 2016-2025 Renewable Energy 
Program (RenovAr)83, directed to the contracting in the Wholesale Electricity Market 
(MEM) of electricity from renewable sources with a total requirement of 1,000 MW, 
under Round 1, which would be added to the energy supply of the country, divided as 
follows: 600 MW of wind, 300 MW of solar power, 65 MW of biomass, 20 MW of small 
hydroelectric projects and 15 MW of biogas. With these new additions, the country would 
save about US$ 300 million per year in fuel imports for electricity generation and avoid 
the emission of almost 2 million tons of CO2 (MtCO2) into the atmosphere annually 
(OLADE, 2017). This plan is part of the goal established with the law 27.191/201584, in 
which the country should count on 20% of renewable energy generation until 2025 
(CIER, 2017b). 
Considering South America, Argentina is actually the last country to use its water 
resources for electricity generation, with only about 30% of its electricity coming from 
water sources (half the regional average). 63% of Argentine electricity comes from 
thermal power plants, which mostly use gas as fuel, what represents a considerable 
expenditure of foreign exchange, besides being a non-renewable resource. The country 
has only a few large hydroelectric plants, two of which are binational: Yacyretá (with 
Paraguay) and Salto Grande (with Uruguay). 
                                                          
83 See: http://www.eeeuu.mrecic.gov.ar/userfiles/v7/presentacion-energia-espanol-6%282%29.pdf.   
84 See: http://asades.org.ar/aspectoslegales/ley27191.pdf.  
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The Yacyretá Binational Entity (EBY) was created in 1973 (Treaty85 of Yacyretá) to take 
advantage of the hydroelectric potential of the Paraná River. The plant has 20 turbines 
(3,200 MW of installed capacity). The first one went into operation in 1994 and the last 
one in 1998. It is represented on the Paraguayan side by National Electricity 
Administration (ANDE) and the Argentine side by Emprendimientos Energéticos 
Binacionales S.A.  (EBISA)86 – EBY is the dam operator. The Treaty establishes equal 
rights for both parties and right of each High Contracting Party, at the cost of the work, 
of 50% of the generated energy. 
However, it should be noted that the experience of the binational hydroelectric plant of 
Yacyretá begins with an agreement between both countries in 1926, in which they express 
their interest in exploiting available hydroelectric resources in the Paraná River and the 
use of the Apipé Falls. In 1958, the governments signed an agreement to carry out 
technical studies (energy and navigability), and the Argentine-Paraguayan Joint 
Technical Commission of Yacyretá-Apipé was formed.  
In turn, Salto Grande is a project from the late nineteenth century; it was created in 1973 
(when the Treaty of Limits of the Rio de la Plata was signed) to exploit the hydroelectric 
potential of the Uruguay River. The first generating unit of this project came into 
operation in 1979, and by 1994 the project was completely paid up. It has 14 Kaplan 
turbines (1,890 MW of installed capacity) and is represented by CAMMESA, and the 
other half belonging to the Uruguayan system, administered by ADME, with the Mixed 
Technical Commission of Salto Grande as operator.87 
One of its main antecedents is the Agreement of 1946 between Argentina and Uruguay 
by which a Mixed Technical Commission was formed. The Salto Grande exploitation led 
to the interconnection of the two national systems in voltage levels of 500 kV. This 
                                                          
85 The process of signing international treaties is characterized by a series of formalities that in most cases 
involve the approval or ratification by the Congress or Legislative Assemblies of countries part of it. This 
formal component prevailing in Public International Law represents great advantages in terms of 
legitimacy, however it implies a great complexity and delay to the process, for limiting or reforming the 
commitments assumed (ABADIE et al., 2017).  
86 The Presidents of both countries signed a memorandum of understanding that includes the return of the 
balances of the contributions made by Argentina during the construction of the Yacyretá Hydroelectric and 
a plan to use the revenues of the dam to make investments and expand its generation capacity. This 
agreement reflects a restoration of relations between both countries, postponed years ago (CIER, 2017c). 
87According to its official website, Salto Grande is the most important energy producer and supplies more 
than 50% of the energy consumed in Uruguay. Meanwhile, Salto Grande provides between 7 and 8% of the 
energy required in Argentina. 
86 
 
interconnection was finalized under the Energy Interconnection Agreement (1974), and 
then with the Agreement on Execution of the Energy Interconnection Agreement of 1983.  
It is worth mentioning the Black Water Tunnel (Tunel Agua Negra) project. It is a 14 km 
tunnel that will pass under the Andes mountain range, connecting Argentina and Chile. It 
is part of a long-standing project that aims to optimize logistics and improve physical and 
also energy connection between the Atlantic Ocean and the Pacific88 (CIER, 2017c). 
There are two projects that have not yet been implemented involving Argentina: Garabí-
Panambí (Ar-Br) and Corpus (Ar-Py). In the first case, the axis of Garabí exploitation 
would then be located at kilometer 863 of the Uruguay River, about 6 km downstream 
from Garruchos (Argentina and Brazil). The installed capacity would be 1,152 MW, 
distributed in 8 turbine-generator sets. The axis of the Panambí exploitation would be 
located at kilometer 1,016 of the Uruguay River, about 10 km upstream from the localities 
of Panambí (Argentina) and Porto Vera Cruz (Brazil). The installed capacity would be of 
1,048 MW, distributed in 7 sets turbine-generator.89 It is worth mentioning that in 2008 
and 2009 the Brazilian company Eletrobras and Argentina’s EBISA signed cooperation 
agreements to jointly execute an inventory study of the Uruguay River.90 
Designed still in the 1970s, Corpus is located in the triple border between Paraguay, 
Brazil and Argentina. It is located on the Paraná River downstream from Itaipu and has 
an installed capacity of 3,400 MW. Corpus is hydrologically linked to Itaipu and 
Yacyretá, being designed to make optimal use of Itaipu Falls. In October 1979, the Itaipu-
Corpus Tripartite Agreement was signed91. ‘It is relevant to stress that the project is 
situated near highly developed basins and thereby generates benefits to the Brazilian 
preservation system and thermal complementarity to Argentina.’ (RAMOS, 2016: 93). 
Regarding international interconnections and international trade, Argentina has 
connections with four of its five neighboring countries. With Brazil there are two 
interconnections: Rincón Santa María (Ar) – Garabí (Br) of greater capacity and in force 
                                                          
88 See: http://www.ebitan.org/proyecto.php.   
89 See: http://garabipanambi.com.ar/obras_proyectadas.html.  
90 Eletrobras has decided to suspend technical and environmental feasibility studies on the Garabi HPP, 
pending the outcome of legal proceedings related to the AHE Panambi. The studies for Panambi were 
suspended due to the injunction of the 1st Federal Court of Santa Rosa, as a result of a public action by the 
Federal Public Prosecutor of the region, which was maintained by the Federal Regional Court of the 4th 
Region. See: http://eletrobras.com/pt/Lists/noticias/ExibeNoticias.aspx?ID=240.  




since the beginning of the last decade, and Paso de los Libres (Ar) – Uruguayana (Br), 
much smaller and located in the Southeast of the Province of Corrientes. With Chile, the 
country has the Termoandes Cobo (Ar) – Atacama (Ch) line, connected to the 
Interconnected System of the Norte Grande (SING). With Paraguay, there are two 
interconnections: the El Dorado (Ar) – Carlos López (Py) line and the Colrinda (Ar) – 
Guarambaré (Py) line, in addition to the binational Yacyretá plant. There are three 
interconnections with Uruguay: the Concepción del Uruguay (Ar) – Paysandú (Uy) line, 
the Colonia Elía (Ar) – San Javier (Uy) line and the Colonia Elia (Ar) – San Javier (Uy) 
line, as well as Salto Grande binational power plant. With Bolivia, the countries are not 
currently interconnected, but there is mutual interest in moving forward. 
As already stressed in subsection 2.3.2, in South America there is no regional or integrated 
market such as the Regional Electricity Market (MER) in Central America. The 
exchanges that take place between Argentina and its neighbors are given (i) under a 
framework of previously established agreements such as the cases of binational dams; (ii) 
private contracts between parties in which an agreed price is compensated; or (iii) 
generation surpluses where companies comply with the rules of the MEM and take spot 
prices (COCIER, 2016). 
Figure 8 shows Argentine energy trade, both exports and imports (2014, in 2000 US$). 
When it comes to exports, the crude oil to USA (US$ 387m; 64.4%) and India (US$ 79m; 
13.1%) stands out, as well as oil products to Chile (US$ 83m; 34.9%) and Brazil (US$ 
58m; 24.4%). When it comes to imports, the gas from Bolivia (US$ 861m; 66.4%), Qatar 
(US$ 202m; 15.6%) and Spain (US$ 132m; 10.2%) stand out, as well as crude oil from 
Bolivia (US$ 90m; 68.7%), and electricity from Paraguay (US$ 177m; 91.7%) and 




Figure 8. Argentine energy trade, both exports and imports (2014, in 2000 US$) 
 
Source: IADB Energy Database based on UN COMTRADE. 
 
Recently, the country signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with China, 
reaffirming the will to build two nuclear power plants in Argentina with financing from 
Chinese banks; one with Canadian Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) heavy water reactor 
technology, which is the same one used by the Embalse plant; and the other PWR with 
which a leap will be made towards enriched uranium and light water technology 
(OLADE, 2017). 
Regarding the hydrocarbon sector, although 89.4% of the national oil production is 
distributed in 10 companies, only YPF represents almost 50% of it; in terms of natural 
gas production, it represents around 35% (LARA, 2017). In 2016, proven oil reserves 
were 2,167 Mbbl, with a twelve-year reach. The refining capacity is 632 kbbl/d, especially 
the production of the following derivatives: diesel oil and gasoline/alcohol.  
Concerning natural gas, in 2004 the first internal supply crisis took place, and 
consequently supply restrictions began towards the Chilean market and the idea of 
integration continued to take on new forms. As the gas supply crisis in Argentina 
deepened (relieving the insufficiency of price adjustments as a mechanism to encourage 
private investment), the main adjustment variable to satisfy the growing domestic demand 
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was the progressive increase in the cuts in gas supply to Chile. These cuts, which 
occasionally represented 40% in some days of 2004, reached almost 60% for longer 
periods in 2006 and 2007 (RUDNICK et al., 2007). Although the case of Chile is one of 
the most dramatic, Argentina progressively suspended its exports to all neighboring 
countries for which export infrastructure had been built, such as Brazil and Uruguay 
(CAF, 2013e). It is thus perceived that international relations with the neighboring 
country were affected by its domestic situation, which has already been presented as one 
of the main barriers to the progress of regional energy integration (see subsection 2.3.1). 
The country has great potential in the exploitation of unconventional hydrocarbon 
resources, such as shale gas. For this reason, Argentina has sought to promote investments 
in the non-conventional oil and gas fields of Vaca Muerta, 30,000 km2 megacamp (and 
which YPF owns the concession of more than 12,000 km2), in Patagonia (south-west of 
the country), which is spread over the provinces of Neuquén and Mendoza. The area is 
the world’s second reserve in shale gas and the fourth in shale oil. However, it should be 
noted that the exploitation of unconventional hydrocarbons comes surrounded by 
environmental questions, because (i) it uses a lot of water; (ii) pollutes the water; (iii) uses 




The Plurinational State of Bolivia is located in the geographical center of South America 
with a population of 10.9 million inhabitants over an area of 1.09 million km2. Its territory 
has a very varied topography, with altitudes that vary a lot. Regarding its economy, it is 
possible to mention the agricultural sector, which is one of the most important sectors in 
Bolivia, with soy being the main product. The GDP per capita at current prices is US$ 
3,100.92, and it has a low average income level.  
In Bolivia, it is possible to cite the newly created Ministry of Energy (ME), which has a 
greater focus on renewable energies92. Policies and guidelines of the electricity sector are 
                                                          
92 This movement is in line with the goal of reducing fossil fuel consumption and increasing the indication 
of renewables, with particular emphasis on hydroelectric, wind, geothermal and solar energy. In this 
context, the geothermal project of Laguna Colorada located on the border with Chile can be highlighted. 
Another major challenge for the Ministry of Energy is to ensure the construction of the El Bala hydroelectric 
megaproject in the north of the department of La Paz, as well as the Nuclear Research and Development 
Center in El Alto. 
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the responsibility of the Vice Ministry of Electricity and Alternative Energies (VMEEA) 
and Vice Ministry of High Energy Technologies. Regulation and supervision are in the 
hands of the Electricity Control Authority (AFCSE). The National Dispatch Committee 
(CNDC) coordinates the dispatch. 
With regard to electricity generation, there are private and state-owned companies 
utilities, like Empresa Eléctrica Corani S.A. (CORANI), Empresa Eléctrica Guaracachi 
S.A. (EGSA), Empresa Eléctrica Valle Hermoso S.A. (EVH), Bolivian Power Company 
(COBEE), Empresa Rio Eléctrico S.A. (ERESA), Hidroeléctrica  Boliviana S.A. (HB), 
Sociedad Industrial Energética y Comercial Andina S.A. (SYNERGIA), Compañía 
Eléctrica Central Bulo Bulo S.A. (CECBB), Guabirá Energía S.A. (GBE), National 
Electricity Company (ENDE), ENDE Andina, Servicios de Desarrollo de Bolivia S.A. 
(SDB) y SECCO Bolivia S.A. In the same way, the production of electricity in the 
Isolated Systems (IS) is controlled by various companies and cooperatives, such as 
ENDE, Servicios Eléctricos Tarija S.A. (SETAR), SECCO Bolivia S.A., Cooperativa 
Rural de Electricidad Ltda. (CRE), Gas & Electricidad S.A. (G&E), Cooperativa de 
Servicios Eléctricos de Guayaramerín Ltda. (COSEGUA) and Cooperativa Eléctrica 
Riberalta Ltda. (CER). The transmission is up to ENDE Transmissión S.A. and 
Interconexión Eléctrica ISA Bolivia S.A (ISA Bolivia). Private actors are responsible for 
distribution, such as CRE, DELAPAZ, ELFEC, ENDE DEORURO, SEPSA, SETAR, 
CESSA, ENDE DELBENI, ENDE, EMDEECRUZ. Vice-Ministry of High Energy 
Technologies (VMATE) and the Bolivian Hydrocarbons Industrialization Company 
(EBIH) provide studies and planning concerning the electricity sector.  
Regarding the hydrocarbons sector, there is the Ministry of Hydrocarbons (MH), formerly 
the Ministry of Hydrocarbons and Energy, whose regulatory agency is the National 
Hydrocarbons Agency (ANH). Before, there was only one ministry, or the Ministry of 
Hydrocarbons and Energy (MHE). Exploration and production (E&P) are the 
responsibility of Petrobras Bolivia (Tarija, Santa Cruz and Chuquisaca Departments), 
Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos (YPBF), YPBF - Andina S.A., YBPF - 
Chaco S.A., YPBF - Petroandina S.A. Refining and transmission are the responsibility of 
Petrobras Bolivia (transport), YPBF Refinación S.A., YPBF Transporte S.A., YPBF 
Transierra S.A., YPBF Logistica S.A, while the commercialization is controlled by YPBF 
Aviación and Flamagas S.A.  
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Figure 9 presents the Bolivian summarized energy balance in 2015. Primary supply 
(8,154.41 ktoe) consists of natural gas (3,813.70 ktoe, 46.8%), crude oil (3,047.58 ktoe, 
37.4%), other primaries (1,081.34 ktoe, 13.3%) and hydropower (211.79 ktoe, 2.6%). In 
the final consumption (6,536.02 ktoe), transport (2,793.09 ktoe, 42.7%), industrial 
(1,654.76 ktoe, 25.3%), residential (1,135.46 ktoe, 17.4%) and agriculture, fishing and 
mining consumers (702.16 ktoe, 10.7%) stand out, being 10.4% supplied by electricity. 
Considering only the Mercosur, Bolivia corresponds to 1.7% of its primary supply and 
1.9% of final consumption. It is noteworthy that 79.0% of natural gas produced are 
exported and that the country stands out because it has the second largest reserves of 










Its electricity sector is composed of two separate systems: the first one (largest) covers 
the entire group of generation, transmission, distribution and consumer companies of the 
National Interconnected System (NIS); while the second one (much smaller) is known as 
the group of Isolated Systems (IT)93. They have together an installed capacity of around 
1,890 MW from 73.3% of thermal power plants and 25.4% of hydroelectric power plants.  
Regarding international trade, Art. 9 of the Electricity Law of 21/12/199494 covers 
electricity exports and imports and international interconnections. It is necessary to take 
into account that the price of the electricity tariff includes the energy component that is 
determined by the price of gas, subsidized for domestic consumption. This subsidy 
determines a cost in the domestic market lower than that of export. There are currently 
no such transactions, but Bolivia plans to export electricity to Argentina as it has a 
surplus95 of around 580 MW (COCIER, 2016). With respect to international 
interconnections, the ENDE seeks to consolidate the interconnection with Argentina, 
Brazil, Peru and Paraguay (COCIER, 2017a)96. 
It is noteworthy that Bolivia has no connection to its neighboring countries (although it 
is in the center of the subcontinent), albeit it shows interest in becoming ‘South American 
energy heart’97. This isolation represents an opportunity for investments in international 
electrical interconnection, as well as other projects to promote regional energy 
integration. The Bolivian Government plans to invest around US$ 5,854 million in the 
2016-2020 period and generate about 4,878 MW, of which 53,1% would be earmarked 
for export, according to the Economic and Social Development Plan98. 
Figure 10 shows Bolivian energy trade in terms of both exports and imports in 2014. 
When it comes to exports, gas to Brazil (US$ 375m; 60.6%) and Argentina (US$ 244m; 
39.4%)99 stands out, as well as crude oil to Argentina (US$ 24m; 48.0%) and China (US$ 
                                                          
93 Similar to Brazilian case. 
94 See: https://www.lexivox.org/norms/BO-L-1604.xhtml.  
95 Most of this surplus is from the natural gas supply, but there is an inventoried hydroelectric potential of 
over 30 GW (RAMOS, 2016). 
96It is believed that interconnection with Argentina will be completed by 2018. 
97In different occasions, it is mentioned the interest in generating surpluses of electricity production to 
export. This decision is closely related to the diversification of the country’s own sources of income. It is 
evident in the Economic and Social Development Plan 2016 - 2020, Pillar 7 (Sovereignty over our natural 
resources). See: http://www.planificacion.gob.bo/pdes/.  
98 See: http://www.planificacion.gob.bo/pdes/.  
99 In 2015, trade movements from Bolivia to Argentina was 5.8 bcm and 10.4 bcm to Brazil. In the same 
year, Bolivia produced 20.3 bcm, while Argentine and Brazil produced 36.5 bcm and 23.1 bcm, 
respectively (BP, 2017). 
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20m; 40.0%). When it comes to imports, we can mention oil products from Brazil (US$ 
8m; 80.0%) and Peru (US$ 1m; 10.0%).  
 
 
Figure 10. Bolivian energy trade, both exports and imports (2014, in 2000 US$) 
Source: IADB Energy Database based on UN COMTRADE. 
 
 
Regarding regional integration, although the country does not have international 
interconnections, it participates in one of the most famous cases of bilateral project in the 
region: the Bolivia-Brazil Gas Pipeline (GASBOL)100. Being the central axis of the 
bilateral relations between both countries 101, Bolivia has exported nearly two thirds of its 
natural gas production since 1999, accounting for about half of the country’s tax revenues 
and generating most of its foreign currency denomination (BIATO, 2016). In addition, 
Brazilian imports of Bolivian gas corresponded to 30% of the total Brazilian market 
supply in 2015 (CNI, 2016)102. It is noteworthy that the Transportadora Brasileira 
                                                          
100 See Figure 6, where the GASBOL and Lateral-Cuiabá gas pipeline are located. The Cuiabá branch was 
built to supply the local thermoelectric plant (Mário Covas TPP) and has a separate supply contract. The 
Mato Grosso’s Gás Occidente is responsible for this pipeline transportation. 
101 As it is Itaipu Binacional, in the case of Paraguay. 
102 The volumes imported by Petrobras reached the contractual maximum, which is around 30 million 
m³/day, being 80% take or pay (24 million m³/d), of which Petrobras pays or does not use natural gas. It 
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Gasoduto Bolívia-Brasil S.A. (TBG) owns and operates the Brazilian side and Gas 
TransBoliviano S.A. (GTB) owns and operates the Bolivian side.103 See Appendix C. 
With a total length of 3,150 km, it has its origin in Bolivia (Santa Cruz de La Sierra). Its 
Bolivian extension consists of 557 km and, when entering Brazilian territory through 
Corumbá-MS, it travels 2,593 km inwards, passing through 136 Brazilian municipalities 
in five states: Mato Grosso do Sul, São Paulo, Paraná, Santa Catarina and Rio Grande do 
Sul. At a cost of US$ 2.15 billion (US$ 1.6 billion in Brazil and US$ 400 million in 
Bolivia), its transportation capacity is of 30.08 MMm³/d with a 20-year gas supply 
period.104 Project funding involved four multilateral agencies and had, in addition, 
BNDES participation (FRANÇA, 2015), being divided into three sections: Corumbá-
Paulínia (North), Paulínia-Guararema, and Paulínia-Canoas (South).  
In 2006, under the government of Evo Morales, there was the ‘nationalization’ episode 
of the Bolivian subsidiary of Petrobras105, which led Brazil to diversify its sources of 
supply, whether domestic or foreign. Such an event occurred in Bolivia as a consequence 
of three contexts: (i) in the political context, there was a perception that foreign investors 
captured too much of generated gas rent without allowing a way to improve Bolivian 
economic situation; (ii) in the economic context, especially since 2005, the international 
oil prices scenario changed drastically, lowering the price of gas in different international 
markets; (iii) in the technological context, technological improvements in the liquefied 
natural gas (LNG) chain led to a decrease in the offer prices of this product. 
As a consequence, Supreme Decree N. 28,701/2006 was issued106 by President Evo 
Morales, which reversed the privatizations that took place in the 1990s in the hydrocarbon 
sector. Despite pressures from different sectors of the Brazilian public sphere, President 
Lula da Silva opted for the negotiation process and signed new contracts that guaranteed 
the gas supply and preserved Petrobras’ main ventures in Bolivia, despite the reduction 
of its profit margins (FUSER, 2010, 2015). However, it is important to note that this 
breach of trust made it difficult and/or unfeasible for the negotiation of new gas 
                                                          
should be noted that the construction of GASBOL was one of the great developers of the natural gas market 
in Brazil. 
103 TBG is controlled by Petrobras and GTB by YPFB since May 1, 2008. 
104 See: http://www.tbg.com.br/pt_br/o-gasoduto/informacoes-tecnicas.htm.  
105 The breach of contract was euphemistically treated as ‘contract migration’, since Brazil needed imports 
of Bolivian gas, since it supplied about 50% of the national demand (BIATO, 2016). 
106 See: https://www.lexivox.org/norms/BO-DS-28701.xhtml.  
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prospecting contracts in Bolivia by international oil companies, it has shaken relations 
between Brazil and Bolivia to date too. In this sense, Bolivia’s natural gas reserves have 
been reduced, which could threaten the renewal of the Gas Agreement in 2019 (BIATO, 
2016).  
Considering this period of shaken negotiations with its neighbor, since 2006, with the 
discovery of reserves in the Brazilian Pre-salt layer, a natural gas self-sufficiency was 
projected for Brazil. However, so far, there have been major technical and economic 
difficulties in harnessing the vast resources of the pre-salt, maintaining the status quo 
where Brazil is remains dependent of natural gas imports from Bolivia (CNI, 2016). In 
any case, the pre-salt event prompted the Bolivian state-owned YPFB to have 
uncertainties regarding Brazilian intentions to renew in 2019.  
The recent dramatic reduction in Petrobras’ international performance in the region is 
already visible, for example, in the renewal of the gas agreement. Thus, Petrobras could 
stop being a player in the purchase and distribution and, therefore, in guaranteeing the 
price, so it would be up to Bolivia to negotiate directly with a number of private 
companies. The immediate result of this new scenario is the following binomial: (i) lower 
price; and (ii) short-term contracts. 
Considering recent challenges and opportunities regarding natural gas, and based on the 
2017 Yearbook Energy Statistics, the country started operating the Incahuasi Plant, in the 
Municipality of Lagunillas, Department of Santa Cruz, which will inject approximately 7 
Mm3/d of natural gas. This implies an increase of 12% in the national production of this 
type of energy; thus, the gas supply in the domestic market and the export commitments 
would be guaranteed. Government authorities informed that with the Incahuasi Plant, a 
total of 104 Mm3/d of processing capacity is reached throughout the country. The 
construction of this megafield demanded an investment of more than US$ 1,000 million.  
Additionally, the Rio Grande LNG Plant was inaugurated, aimed at supplying natural gas 
to 27 cities in the departments of Beni, La Paz, Oruro, Pando, Potosí and Santa Cruz. The 
plant will send LNG in cryogenic tanks to the Regasification Satellite Stations, where the 
energy goes back to gaseous state and is delivered to the distribution networks of homes, 
shops, industries and service stations for vehicular natural gas (VNG). The LNG project 
has the construction of the Natural Gas Liquefaction Plant, a Virtual Transport System 
(cisterns) and Satellites Regasification Stations in each of the 27 cities where gas will 
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reach. This system will contribute to the development of populations where conventional 
gas pipelines do not arrive at and will promote the use of natural gas, allowing the gradual 
substitution of LPG and gasoline consumption. The plant is expected to process 12 Mpcd 
of natural gas and produce 210 metric tons per day of liquefied natural gas. 
In addition to the expansion of natural gas production and the inauguration of the LNG 
plant, and similarly to the case of Peru, the construction of a binational hydroelectric plant 
on the Madeira River was hampered at the beginning of the last decade by the lack of a 
clearing campaign and convincing public about its benefits107 (BIATO, 2016). Similar 
resistance and mistrust prevented further attempts to resume the project in 2007. 
Nevertheless, as previously stated, the country intends to become the region’s ‘exporter 
of electricity and has dense dialogues with Brazil aimed at jointly exploiting the potential 
in the Amazon region. 
It is worth mentioning the Andean Electrical Interconnection System (SINEA)108, a 
project that arises from the desire to achieve a regional interconnection between countries 
that make up the Andean Community (Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia, as well as 
Chile as a country associated to that entity). The aim is to create a general community 
framework that allows integration in the energy market between the countries mentioned. 
However, in a first stage Bolivia will participate only as an observer country. SINEA aims 
to develop an Andean Electricity Corridor, creating an interconnected electrical system 
between 2014 and 2024. Its planning is developed by the Technical Group of Planning 
Agencies of the electricity sectors of the member countries of the Andean Community 
and Chile (GOPLAN) and its regulation is within the Working Group of Electricity 
Regulatory Organizations of the Andean Community and Chile (GTOR)109. 
Moreover, it is worth mentioning the construction of 50 MWp photovoltaic solar power 
plant Oruro, which will guarantee the supply of electricity for the National Interconnected 
System (NIS). ENDE Matriz is the executing company and the project is financed by the 
Central Bank of Bolivia (BCB), the French Development Agency (AFD) and the 
                                                          
107 Besides, there was nationalist and preservationist resistance in Bolivia, as well as reluctance of Brazilian 
investors to prioritize the construction of the Cachuela Esperanza plant, located exclusively in Bolivian 
territory. 
108 See: http://www20.iadb.org/intal/catalogo/PE/CM%202015/15821.pdf. It should be noted that the 





European Union (EU). The start date of the project was 2016, with the forecast of 
completion in December 2018110.   
It should be noted the failure of the Lliquimuni block, located in the north of the 
department of La Paz, which covers an area of 156km2. The government had reported 
since 2011 that the block contained 50 million barrels of oil (50 MMbbl) and one trillion 
cubic feet of gas (1 TCF), according to preliminary results of a seismic exploration study 
conducted by YPFB Petroandina. However, the operations of the exploratory drilling 
project culminated with the discovery of ‘non-commercial’ hydrocarbon volumes, 
although full exploration has required more than US$ 500 million. Despite the failure, 
YPFB announced that plans to drill a second hydrocarbon well in Lliquimuni.  
Another failure was the construction of the dams in the Madeira River basin. The initial 
proposal was to build four plants in the region: two in the Brazilian territory (Jirau, 3,750 
MW, and Santo Antonio, 3,568 MW), one in Bolivia (Cachuela Esperanza, 990 MW) and 
one binational (Guajará-Mirim111, 3.000 MW), all run-of-river HPP. However, the agenda 
was postponed for more than a decade, due to the erosion of bilateral relations, especially 
since the nationalization of Petrobras refineries in 2006. As a result, Brazil has built the 
two in its national territory, but plans for two others were on paper.  
It also should be highlighted that the location of these projects facilitates the incorporation 
of new energy into the Brazilian integrated grid. For Bolivia, it becomes an absolute 
priority agenda, since gas exports to Brazil (reason why there was Bolivian economic 
growth in the last decade) are threatened by the drop in gas prices and the depletion of 
Bolivian proven reserves. By the way, it should be noted that energy integration for 
Bolivia represents a vector of national development. 
 
3.3 Brazil 
The Federative Republic of Brazil is the largest country in the South American 
subcontinent, both in territorial extension (8.5 million km2) and in population (207.7 
million inhabitants). Due to its size, the country has noticeable regional differences and 
                                                          
110 See: http://www.ende.bo/NewProyectos/resena/proyecto--const.-generacion-solar-de-oruro-fase-i.  
111 It will stabilize the Jirau reservoir, adding 280 average MW. 
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has a high median income level, therefore its GDP per capita at current prices is US$ 
8,648.05.  
In Brazil, the Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME) is responsible for the electricity 
sector112. Policies and guidelines are in the hands of the Presidency of the Republic, the 
National Congress, the National Council of Energy Policy (CNPE) and the MME itself. 
The regulation and supervision are up to the National Electric Energy Agency (Aneel)113. 
State and municipal regulations are controlled by the Brazilian Association of Regulatory 
Agencies (ABAR).  
The National System Operator (ONS) manages the wholesale electrical market. 
Accession and monitoring (national and municipal governments) is the responsibility of 
the National Energy Policy Council (CNPE), the Power Sector Monitoring Committee 
(CMSE), the Energy Efficiency Management Committee (CGEE) and the Electric Energy 
Secretariat (SSE/MME). 
Regarding electricity generation, there are private and state-owned utilities, Eletrobras114 
and Itaipu Binacional (Br-Py). Regarding the transmission, there are private and state 
companies, as well as in generation. There is the National Interconnected System (SIN), 
subdivided into N, NE, S, SE/CO Subsystems (and isolated systems), Eletrobras, 
Transmission Services Agreement (CPST), Contract of Use of the Transmission Systems 
(CUST), Transmission System Connection Agreements (CCT) and Facilities Sharing 
Agreements (CCI). The Brazilian electricity generation and transmission system is a large 
hydro-thermo-eolic system, with a predominance of hydroelectric power plants and with 
multiple owners.115  
The distribution is the responsibility of the Brazilian Association of Electric Energy 
Distributors (ABRADEE), Other Transmission Facilities (DIT) and Eletrobras. The 
Electric Energy Trading Chamber (CCEE) and Eletrobras (majority shareholder’s 
                                                          
112 It is worth mentioning that, as in the case of other countries, other ministries and institutions can also 
play an important role depending on the matter. As an example, we have the Ministry of Environment 
(MMA), Ministry of Science, Technology, Innovation and Communications (MCTIC), including the 
Federal Revenue of Brazil (RFB).  
113 Depending on the matter, the National Agency for Oil, Gas and Biofuels (ANP), the Ministry of the 
Environment (MMA), the National Water Agency (ANA) and the National Environment Council 
(CONAMA) also play a fundamental role. 
114 The company’s role in the Brazilian internationalization in the region is emphasized through investments 
in neighboring countries, although the effort has translated into a slow and marginal change of scenario. 
115 See: http://www.ons.org.br/pt/paginas/sobre-o-sin/o-que-e-o-sin.  
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delegation) carry out the commercialization. There is a Regulated Contracting 
Environment (ACR), the Free Contracting Environment (ACL), as well as Energy 
Trading Contract in Regulated Environment (CCEAR). Studies and planning of the 
energy sector are the responsibility of the Energy Research Company (EPE) and the Oil, 
Natural Gas and Biofuels Secretariat (SPG/MME).  
The MME is also the responsible ministry for the hydrocarbon sector. The policies and 
guidelines of the sector are controlled by the Presidency of the Republic, the National 
Congress, the National Energy Policy Council (CNPE), as well as the MME itself. The 
regulation and supervision are in the hands of the National Agency of Petroleum, Natural 
Gas and Biofuels (ANP), environmental inspection agencies and the Federal Revenue of 
Brazil (FRB). Concerning the exploration and production (E&P), Petrobras, International 
Oil Companies (IOCs) and independent actors, supply industry to the oil sector, and 
companies of the O&G value chain are the responsible entities. Petrobras and private 
companies provide refining and transportation, while the commercialization is up to 
traders, Petrobras and Pre-Sal Petróleo S.A. (PPSA)116. 
Figure 11 presents the Brazilian summarized energy balance in 2015. Primary supply 
(285,226.90 ktoe) is composed of crude oil (104,552.00 ktoe, 36.7%), other primaries 
(90,964.46 ktoe, 31.9%), natural gas (39,028.90 ktoe, 13.7%), hydropower (30,853.72 
ktoe, 10.8%), coal (16,006.70 ktoe, 5.6%) and nuclear (3,821.18 ktoe, 1.3%). In final 
consumption (232,537.06 ktoe), transport (83,773.75 ktoe, 36.0%), industrial (81,213.58 
ktoe, 34.9%), and residential consumers (24,943.13 ktoe, 10.7%) stand out, being 18.2% 
supplied by electricity. In Mercosur, Brazil corresponds to 60.2% of total primary supply 
and 66.3% of final consumption. Regarding supply, 14.9% is of crude oil, 41.4% natural 
gas and 82.6% coal, 5.6% of electricity are imported and 0.04% are exported, 30.2% of 
crude oil production are exported. 
                                                          










As already presented, its electricity sector is characterized by being divided into four 
subsystems (North, Northeast, Southeast/Central-West and South) that interconnected 
make up the National Integrated System (NIS). There is an installed capacity of 142,003 
MW and hydroelectric power represents 64.9% of it. The important role of the thermal 
park (18.4%) and the nuclear power plants located in Angra do Reis (1.4%) are also 
highlighted. Concerning Non-Conventional Renewable Energies (NCRE), Brazil leads in 
terms of installed capacity in the region, which is 21,699 MW and is composed of 
biomass, wind, solar and wave. 
Among the main policies in the Brazilian electricity sector, the following ones can be 
mentioned: (i) energy efficiency (rational use of existing energy resources); (ii) affordable 
tariff; (iii) tariff equity (to redress the uneven concentration of the negative effects of tariff 
subsidies between regions); (iv) generation expansion (demand growth); (v) 
diversification of the electricity matrix (reduction of hydrological risk); (vi) increased 
participation of renewable sources (mitigation of emissions). It is worth mentioning that 
the first auction of alternative sources took place in 2007, with small hydroelectric power 
plants (SHPs) and biomass predominating. Since 2008, in reserve energy auctions 
biomass, SHPs, wind (since 2009) and solar (since 2014) tend to stand out.  
Among the policies that promote energy efficiency, the following draws attention: (i) 
special credit lines; (ii) Labeling Programs (Procel); and (iii) Research and Development 
(R&D) programs. Policies that promote affordable tariff are: (i) regulation by incentives 
in the distribution segment; (ii) merit-order dispatch; and (iii) tariff flags. Regarding tariff 
equity, the sectoral fund of the Energy Development Account (CDE) of the states can be 
highlighted, which has been incorporated into the policies of Brazilian electricity sector 
(BES) since 2013. 
With regard to generation expansion, it is important to mention (i) the tariff recognition 
of over-contracting by electric power distributors; (ii) centralized auctions; (iii) BNDES 
financing lines; and (iv) the Special Regime for Incentives for Infrastructure 
Development (REIDI). Regarding the diversification of the electricity matrix, it focuses 
on (i) distributed generation; (ii) increasing natural gas generation; and (ii) incentives for 
energy generation coming from domestic coal. Finally, regarding the increase in the 
participation of renewable sources, we can mention (i) the Alternative Energy Sources 
Incentive Program (PROINFA); (ii) discounts on the use tariffs of distribution and 
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transmission systems for consumers and generators that negotiate energy from the 
incentivized sources; and (iii) reserve power auctions and auctions from alternative 
sources. 
According to 2017 OLADE Energy Statistics Yearbook, in terms of electricity, Belo 
Monte hydroelectric plant was inaugurated in the municipality of Altamira (southwest of 
Pará). Built on the Xingu River, the plant is the largest HPP in the country, the third 
largest in the world (installed capacity of 11,233.1 MW)117 and its energy is already 
available for the National Interconnected System118.  
As presented in section 3.2, the Jirau HPP was also inaugurated, on the Madeira River, 
composed of 50 turbines, with an installed capacity of 3,750 MW and an assured power 
of 2,279.40 MW (currently, it is the third largest hydraulic generation plant in Brazil and 
the 17th in the world). Jirau generates under the concept of run-of-river, so it does not 
need a large reservoir to operate, which reduces environmental impacts associated to the 
project. On the other hand, Santo Antônio hydroelectric plant advances and will have a 
total of 50 turbines and an installed capacity of 3,568 MW119. 
The wind generation was the one that presented a more significant expansion, with a 
growth of 43.2% between November 2015 and the same month in 2016120. In the same 
period there was also expansion of solar (8.4%), hydraulic (6.4%) and thermal (4.0%) 
sources. The advance of renewable sources goes in the same direction of the commitment 
assumed by Brazil during COP 21, of raising at least 23% to the share of renewable 
energies in the electricity matrix until 2030. 
Still according to the 2017 Energy Statistics Yearbook, Brazil launched the RenovaBio 
initiative, aimed at expanding the participation of renewable fuels in a way compatible 
with market growth and in harmony with the international commitments assumed within 
the framework of COP 21. Likewise, the Chapada do Piauí Wind Power Complex was 
                                                          
117 With assured guarantee of 4,571 thousand average MW (MWmed), it is a run-of-river HPP. This means 
that the generation will vary according to the amount of water of the Xingu River in each period of the 
year. See: http://www2.aneel.gov.br/aplicacoes/hotsite_beloMonte/index.cfm?p=7. 
118 The commercial operation of the second generating unit with an installed capacity of more than 611.11 
MW was initiated. The liberated unit is part of the 18 generating units that will be completed and operated 




120 It is worth mentioning the generation of direct and indirect jobs related to this industry (REN 21, 2016). 
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inaugurated in Brazil, it is made up of three wind farms, with installed capacities of 205 
MW, 172.4 MW, and 59.2 MW. Consequently, as a result of the measures to stimulate 
the generation of energy by the consumers themselves (micro and mini distributed 
generation), Aneel registered 7,610 distributed generation connections, totaling an 
installed power of 73,569 kW. Among the most used renewable energies, the solar 
photovoltaic source stands out, with 7,528 connections.  
Regarding energy efficiency policies, in June 2016 the incandescent lamps left the market 
in Brazil. The rule applies to the import and commercialization of incandescent lamps for 
general use in Brazilian territory. In addition, prohibition of selling incandescent lamps 
in the country helps stimulate the adoption of efficient, more economical and durable 
options, such as LED. 
With these advances, Brazil ranked 2nd in hydraulic power capacity (behind China)121, 4th 
in wind energy capacity (behind China, EUA and Alemanha, respectively), 3rd in solar 
water heating capacity (behind China and Turquia), 2nd in biodiesel/ethanol 
production122 (behind USA in both cases). This data is presented in the Renewables 2016 
Global Status Report (REN 21, 2016). 
It is important to highlight the role of the private sector in these cases. Within Latin 
America and the Caribbean (LAC) region, the highest private participation in 
infrastructure (PPI) investment was driven by Brazil123. The top market for PPI 
investment in 2016 was Brazil, where US$14.2 billion in investment in the energy sector 
accounted for 93% of the total transaction volume of US$15.2 billion (World Bank 
Group, 2016). 
Concerning binational ventures, Brazil participates in GASBOL (see subsection 3.2) and 
in Itaipu Binacional (to be detailed in subsection 3.4). Regarding international electricity 
                                                          
121 Brazil has 8.6% of the world's hydraulic capacity in 2015, behind China (27.9%). 
122 24% of global biofuel production in 2015, begind the USA (46%). 
123 Investment in infrastructure with private participation in Emerging Markets and Developing Economies 
(EMDEs) fell sharply in 2016. US$71.5 billion committed across 242 projects in 2016 represents a 37 
percent decline in investment compared to 2015 and a 41 percent decline compared to the annual average 
of US$121.4 billion over 2011 to 2015. The number of infrastructure projects with private participation in 
EMDEs also declined substantially. The 242 projects recorded in 2016 is 27% lower than the number of 
projects in 2015, which had 334 projects reach financial closure, and 57% lower than the annual average 
of 421 projects per year over 2011–2015 (World Bank Group, 2016). 
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trade, Brazil has interconnection agreements124 with Argentina: Rincón S.M. (Ar) – 
Garabí (Br), of 2,200 MW (greater capacity and in force since the beginning of the last 
decade) and P. de los Libres (Ar) – Uruguayana (Br), of 50 MW; Paraguay: Itaipu energy 
of 14,000 MW, and Foz de Iguazú (Br) – Acaray (Py), of 50 MW; with Uruguay: 
Livramento (Br) – Rivera (Uy), 70 MW; and with Venezuela: Boa Vista (Br) – El Guri 
(Ve), of 200 MW, not integrated into the interconnected system125. In fact, the exchanges 
that take place between Brazil and its neighbors are largely due to pre-established 
binational agreements such as that of the Itaipu binational power plant (see section 2.3). 
There are also exchanges that respond to contracts between private or surplus energy, the 
latter targeting the spot market (COCIER, 2016, 2017a). 
Figure 12 shows Brazilian energy trade for both exports and imports in 2014. When it 
comes to exports, crude oil to USA (US$ 1,296 m; 28.9%), China (US$ 1,197m; 26.7%), 
India (US$ 741m; 16.5%) and Chile (US$ 648m; 14.4%) stands out, as well as biofuels 
and waste to Japan (US$ 41m; 82.0%). When it comes to imports, crude oil from Nigeria 
(US$ 1,897m; 87.4%), Algeria (US$ 168m; 7.7%) and Colombia (US$ 51m; 2.3%) stands 
out, as well as gas from Bolivia (US$ 920m; 69.9%), Spain (US$ 92m; 7.0%) and Norway 
(US$ 90m; 6.8%), coal from USA (US$ 219m; 32%) and Colombia (US$ 126m; 18.5%), 
oil products from the USA (US$ 294m; 77.4%), and electricity from Paraguay (US$ 
413m; 100.0%). 
 
                                                          
124 Regarding interconnection, the Brazilian regulation allows international interconnections to be included 
in the country’s high voltage system (SIN), which is remunerated by all generators and consumers through 
annual fixed payments, known as ‘tariffs for use of transmission system’ (TUST). 
125 In this case, it makes room for understanding the role for international interconnections in (Brazilian) 




Figure 12. Brazilian energy trade, both exports and imports (2014, in 2000 US$) 
Source: IADB Energy Database based on UN COMTRADE. 
 
Regarding the hydrocarbon sector, it is important to emphasize that for the first time in 
history the country ended a year with a surplus in the oil account, with a positive result 
of US$ 410 million in 2016. To encourage investments in the hydrocarbon sector, 
guidelines for the 14th bidding round of blocks for oil and natural gas exploitation were 
approved, for the 2nd round of pre-salt block auctions and for the 4th bidding round for 
marginal fields. Moreover, Brazil broke record production of natural gas and reached 
111.1 Mm3/day, which represents an increase of 18% in comparison with November 
2015. The total production of oil and natural gas in November was approximately 3.307 
Mbep/day. In turn, oil production totaled 2.609 Mbbl/day, an increase of 9.6% in relation 
to the same month in 2015. The Lula field, in the Santos Basin, was the largest producer 
of oil and natural gas, producing, on average, 663.2 kbbl/day of oil and 29.2 Mm3/day of 
natural gas. The volume of oil was the largest produced in a single field, surpassing the 
previous record reached in September 2016, when Lula produced 639,700 bbl/día 
(OLADE, 2017). 
Considering the recent challenges and opportunities, the Arco Norte Project, designed by 
Eletrobras, aims to build an approximately 1,800 km transmission line involving Brazil, 
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Guyana, Suriname and French Guiana126. During the Rio+20 (2012) meetings, it was 
recognized as an important contribution to the Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) 
SE4ALL initiative, whose goal is to end energy poverty in the region. In 2013, the IDB 
approved funding of US$ 1.9 million. Between 2014 and 2015, the baseline study (already 
concluded), the pre-feasibility study, and the public consultation of identified alternatives 
were carried out. It is worth highlighting the difference between the countries of the 
region in terms of average generation costs (US$/MWh), since those of Guyana and 
Suriname are higher than the long-term Brazilian marginal cost (US$ 56/MWh)127. See 
Appendix D. 
Among the challenges that lie ahead, Brazil will face difficulties concerning the 
integration of large quantities of variable generation, mainly due to the lack of storage 
capacity of new hydroelectric plants. However, in the LAC region there are very good 
examples of integration of large amounts of non-conventional renewable energy (NCRE) 
and non-manageable, like Nicaragua, Honduras, Costa Rica, Chile and Uruguay among 
others, what contributed to break some myths. Among them, four stand out: (i) NCREs 
could only have a small participation because they were of poor quality; (ii) NCREs are 
very expensive and require subsidies; (iii) sudden variations in production make NCREs 
ungovernable (this would be only true if they were concentrated in a single point); (iv) 
the NCRE require a thermal backup of the same magnitude as their power to cover them 
in case they could not produce (however, in the sites where a large percentage of NCRE 
penetration was reached, there is a drastic reduction of thermal backup needs and a large 
synergy between classical hydroelectric power station and the NCRE with regard to the 
firm power) (CIER, 2016b). 
Finally, another major challenge to the Brazilian electricity sector is the privatization of Eletrobras. 
On January 19, 2018, the Planalto Palace released a bill with rules for privatization. The 
government expects the privatization to increase the cash of the National Treasury in 2018, raising 
about R$ 12.2 billion (around US$ 4 billions). Today, the Brazilian Union holds 51% of the 
common stock (with voting rights) and a 40.99% stake in Eletrobras’ total capital. The government 
                                                          
126 The initiative needs a conversion system, since the frequency in French Guiana is 60Hz and in other 
countries it is 50Hz. The national companies participating in the project are the Guyana Energy Agency 
(GEA), company of Guyana; N. V. Energiebedrijven Suriname (EBS), company of Suriname; Electricité 
de France S.A (EDF), company of French Guiana; Brazilian Electric Power Company S.A. (Eletrobras), 
agency of Brazil. 
127 See: http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_20056-1442-5-30.pdf?160825232459.  
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also proposes a corporate restructuring to keep Eletronuclear and Itaipu Binacional, both 
subsidiaries of Eletrobras, under control of the Union, so that they remain outside the State’s 
privatization process. Currently, the company is responsible for 70,201 km of transmission lines 
(47% of the national total). 
In the case of Brazil, we concluded that new binational hydroelectric plants and/or 
international interconnections could avoid the dispatch of thermal power plants, which 
now have social (tariff increase) and environmental effects (emission increase). In 
addition, the difficulty in approving new reservoir hydroelectric plants in the country has 
led Brazil to finance and push the construction of (bi)national plants in other neighboring 
countries or to demand regional agreements submitted to the particularities of the 
Brazilian model. This behavior, to a certain extent, reinforces that regional integration 
has served national objectives, making room for questioning the country’s role in this 
process. The Peruvian Amazon dam (Inambari) and the Bolivian Amazon dam (Cachuela 
Esperanza and Guajará-Mirim) represent cases in which the Brazilian role has been 
questioned through strong popular repression. 
 
3.4 Paraguay 
Paraguay has 6.7 million inhabitants and is located in the central region of the 
subcontinent. It has a territorial extension of 406.7 thousand km2 divided into two large 
regions by the Paraguay River. They have different geology and topography. Agricultural 
products are its main exports, among which soybean stands out in first place and with 
more than 40%. The GDP per capita at current prices is US$ 4,089.55 and therefore 
Paraguay can be placed within the segment of low middle-income countries.  
In Paraguay, the Vice Ministry of Mines and Energy (VMME), within the Ministry of 
Public Works and Communications (MOPC), is the ministry responsible for the 
electricity sector. The policies and guidelines of the electricity sector are up to the 
National Energy Board, the Energy Resources Directorate of VMME and the National 
Electricity Administration (ANDE). The regulation and supervision are in the hands of 
ANDE, the National Council of Public Companies (CNEP), the National Council of the 
Environment (CONAM) and the Secretariat of the Environment (SEAM). There is no 
electricity wholesale market in the country. 
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ANDE, Itaipu (14,000 MW equally shared with Brazil), Yacyretá (3,200 MW equally 
shared with Argentina) and Acaray (210 MW) are responsible for the electricity 
generation. With regard to transmission and distribution, ANDE is the responsable actor 
in the National Interconnected System (NIS), subdivided into Eastern, Central, South, 
North, West and Metropolitan Systems. Thus, ANDE constitutes a monopoly of 
generation, transmission and distribution (excluding the case of binational plants). There 
is no commercialization of electricity; in fact, there are special conditions for some large 
consumers, included in the Decree N. 2,109/1994128, for the installation of large 
consumers connected at 220 kV and 66 kV levels, and the Decree N. 12,507/2001129, 
which establishes the supply conditions for a future cellulose processing plant in the south 
of the country. The Energy Resources Department is responsible for the studies and 
planning of the sector. 
Regarding the hydrocarbon sector, it is the responsibility of the Vice Ministry of Mines 
and Energy, within the MOPC, and the Ministry of Industry and Commerce (MIC), which 
deal with industry policies and guidelines, as well as regulation and supervision. 
Regarding exploration and production (E&P), Petróleos Paraguayos S.A. (Petropar) and 
several private companies are the responsible players. The transportation is with Petropar, 
while the commercialization is up to Petrobras, ESSO, COPETROL, Barcos y Rodado, 
PUMA, GAS CORONA, HIPASA, SUGAS, Lima Gas, Gas del Este, Yacyretá, Acaray 
Gas, COPESA, Petrogas and Norte Gas. 
Figure 13 presents the Paraguayan summarized energy balance in 2015. Primary supply 
(8,333.84 ktoe) is based on hydropower (5,297.83 ktoe, 63.5%), other primaries (3,036.01 
ktoe, 36.4%) and (imported) coal (3.47 ktoe, 0.04%). In final consumption (4.956,46 
ktoe), transport (1,892.24 ktoe, 38.2%), residential (1,336.59 ktoe, 27.0%) and industrial 
consumers (1,336.53 ktoe, 27.0%) stand out, being 18.4% supplied by electricity. In 
Mercosur, Paraguay corresponds only to 1.8% of primary supply and 1.4% of final 
consumption. 73.8% of electricity are exported and 100% of coal are imported. 
                                                          
128 See: http://www.leyes.com.py/todas_disposiciones/1994/decretos/decreto_2109_94.php.  









Its electricity sector is characterized by having an installed hydroelectric capacity of 8,810 
MW, which exceeds its energy needs by a large margin, placing Paraguay as a net 
exporter within the region.130. This capacity comes from its two binational power stations 
Itaipu and Yacyretá. In addition, there is a small thermal park that has an installed capacity 
of 24 MW.  
According to 2017 OLADE Energy Statistics Yearbook, for the first time in the history 
of the 32 years of operation of Itaipu Binacional, the production of the plant exceeded the 
43 MWh mark in the five-month period in which the binational contributed with 43,053 
GWh to the electricity sector in Paraguay and Brazil.131 Additionally, the value of the 
adjustment factor to be incorporated in the rate of repayment of the energy generated by 
the Itaipu hydroelectric plant for 2017 was defined. The value as of 2017 was US$ 
1.8836/kW, which represents a reduction of 24% in relation to the one included in the 
2016 tariff. In 2016, Itaipu Binacional produced a total of 103,098.37 GWh, a new world 
record in annual generation. 
Defeated in the Triple Alliance War, the country created a long-term strategic partnership 
with Brazil in what concerns the production of hydroelectric energy. Itaipu Binacional 
(Py-Br) was created in 1974 as an international company to exploit the Paraná River’s 
hydroelectric potential. The plant generates foreign exchange for Paraguay’s economic 
and social development while allowing Brazil to own one of the world’s most renewable 
power plants, contributing 11% to Brazil’s electricity generation (BIATO, 2016).  
The first generating unit of the project came into operation in 1984, having reached full 
operation of the 20 turbines in 2007 (14,000 MW of installed capacity). With no sluice, 
the Paraguayan side is represented by the National Electricity Administration (ANDE) 
and the Brazilian side by Eletrobras. However, it is noted that the negotiations between 
Brazil and Paraguay for the exploitation of hydroelectricity on the border come from the 
1950s132. The base document for the project was the Treaty of Itaipu 133, signed in 1973, 
                                                          
130 The country is a small consumer and a major exporter of energy, just like Bolivia. 
131 This generated energy would be enough to supply Brazil for 30 days and a city of São Paulo for a year 
and a half. 
132 The studies on the energy utilization of the region of Sete Quedas began in 1956, but during the 
presidencies of Jânio Quadros (January-August 1961) and João Goulart (1961-1964), these researches have 
grown (ESPÓSITO, 2012). 
133 See: https://www.itaipu.gov.br/sites/default/files/u13/tratadoitaipu.pdf.  
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which established the terms and regulations that are in force until the year 2022 
(RODRIGUES, 2012a).  
Half of the energy generated is generated for both countries, but Paraguay does not 
consume its whole share. Thus, in accordance with the Itaipu Treaty, the country can only 
‘sell’ (‘ceder’ under the terms of the treaty) the surplus not consumed to Brazil, what has 
been questioned several times by Paraguay134 (SANTOS et al., 2014, SANTOS et al., 
2013). According to the Itaipu Treaty, in Art. XIII, ‘energy produced by hydroelectric 
development (...) shall be divided equally between the two countries, each of which shall 
be entitled to acquire, as provided for Article XIV, of energy that is not used by the other 
country for its own consumption’. 
In 2005, compensation to Paraguay for energy destined for Brazil increased. In 2007, the 
countries signed a memorandum of understanding on the company’s debt with Eletrobras 
(OXILIA, 2009; RODRIGUES, 2009a). In 2009, the signing of the Joint Declaration 
‘Building a New Stage in Bilateral Relations’ by Presidents Lula and Lugo raises the level 
of bilateral relations, establishing a series of historical decisions: (i) multiply by three the 
value of the factor of correction paid by Brazil as compensation for the surplus of Itaipu 
energy not used by Paraguay; and (ii) determine the construction of a 500 kV electric 
transmission line of 348 km, the first of high voltage, transporting the generated energy 
to Asunción then offering basic conditions for industrial development. The understanding 
raises from US$ 120 million to US$ 360 million the amount received for the energy 
transferred to Brazil. The transmission line (Itaipu - Villa Hayes) was financed by Brazil 
through unilateral and voluntary obligatory contributions to the Mercosur Structural 
Convergence Fund (FOCEM)135 of US$ 550 millions136 (CERQUEIRA CÉSAR, 2015, 
PARLASUR, 2013).  
In fact, the project includes the 500 KV transmission line from Itaipu until the station of 
Villa Hayes (near the city of Asunción) and the extension of the station of Villa Hayes 
(500/220 KV transmission line). This additional transmission capacity allows Paraguay 
                                                          
134 When Brazil imports energy from Paraguay, there is a need to pay royalties and the amount associated 
with the energy transfer (‘cedida’). As an alternative, the inclusion of the hydrographic basin as a criterion 
for the distribution of royalties will promote more efficient water resource management, since the payment 
will be distributed throughout the basin of the plant (LORENZON et al., 2017). 
135 The FOCEM will be detailed in section 4.1.  




to increase the exchange of energy with Argentina through the 220 kV interconnection 
between the towns of Clorinda (Ar) and Guarambaré (Py). The transmission line covers 
an approximate distance of 348 km. 
With Itaipu, Brazil ensured a safe and profitable source of power to feed a production 
park in expansion, thus currently representing around 17% of the national consumption. 
On the other hand, Paraguay ensured access to financial resources with every condition 
to promote the structural transformation of its economy along with the availability of 
cheap power (BIATO et al., 2016). 
As stated before, it is worth noting that the sale of electricity to neighboring countries has 
been one of the three pillars of the Paraguayan economy over the last thirty years 
(CERQUEIRA CÉSAR, 2015). However, the construction of Itaipu was not followed by 
the expansion of the electricity distribution infrastructure, missing the opportunity to 
channel this resource for the promotion of industrialization (CODAS, 2009, MASI, 
2011). The use in the industrial sector137 of the electricity of Itaipu and Yacyreta could 
supply industries that generate up to 2 million new direct jobs, since there is the potential 
to install around 465 thousand manufacturing industries that could generate that important 
number of jobs in the country (GISE, 2017). 
In view of this scenario, that are two challenges that come up: (i) by the structure of the 
Treaty, the market for energy surplus not consumed by Paraguay has a monopsony 
characteristic; and (ii) risk of Paraguay suffering from Dutch disease138, given that no 
extra income is being invested in the country on a long-term logic (infrastructure, job 
creation, industry, health and education, for example). Two natural endpoints for the dam 
are: (i) expirantion of the Teaty in 2023; and (ii) in some decades the dam is going to be 
disassembled.  
In 2023, the treaty expires and the plant will be fully paid, that is, the debt of its 
construction will be completely paid off. This includes the Paraguayan half, so there is 
no longer the need for the country to amortize it with the sale of energy to Brazil. Paraguay 
will then be free to commercialize its energy surplus from the 50% that it owns from the 
                                                          
137 Investment in the industrial sector development is the best alternative for the hydropower surplus use 
under the analyzed conditions (BLANCO et al., 2017). 




generation of Itaipu as it sees fit. After 2023, each country will own half of the entire 
power produced at a cost of around US$ 4/MWh. 
Notwithstanding, it is unclear what will happen after 2023139. In terms of price, it will 
depend, first, on how the regional macroeconomic framework goes. In the coming years, 
due to the economic crisis, much more energy will enter the Brazilian electrical system 
than current demand requires. Secondly, it will depend on the existence of alternative 
markets that can compete with Brazil with Paraguay’s energy supply. As a way to 
pressure Brazil, Paraguay regularly (falsely) claims the right to sell primarily to third 
parties (Argentina and Uruguay), but the reality is that there is no legal possibility for this 
(according to the Treaty), neither based on transmission infrastructure nor on demand. In 
principle, one can believe that Paraguay must continue for several years to sell to Brazil, 
even though there are few alternatives as long as the Paraguayan domestic demand does 
not match its full amount. Thirdly, it will depend on the other sources of energy in the 
Brazilian market, especially the increasing entry of alternative sources of renewable 
energy (mainly wind and solar), as well as the ‘commoditization’ (and consequent 
reduction) of natural gas at world scale. Finally, it will depend on the type of contract. 
Brazil will be interested in a long-term contract, with a guarantee of supply, which will 
also impact the price. 
Still on the price issue, it could lower about 66%, a portion that goes to pay the amount 
of the loans. Undoubtedly, this is not the interest of Paraguay, which already argues that 
the current value is low and therefore need to be maintained. With respect to the 
destination of this amount, (i) it could be split equally between Paraguay and Brazil, so 
that each one could use it in the way it best suits; or (ii) create a development fund (for 
the construction of other binational or regional power plants for the 
electrical/technological development of the two countries). This fund could serve as a 
means to deal with the technological update of the plant, that will reach 50 years of 
operation in about 15 years. It is believed, however, that most will be left to both countries 
to develop their infrastructure. 
                                                          
139 In the case of Brazil, it will depend on whether the country will prioritize a cost containment policy to 
help keeping inflation under control or whether it will opt for a cash strategy for the company. On the 
Paraguayan side, a competitive pricing strategy tends to prevail in order to continue attracting electro-
intensive industries to the country, especially in Brazil. 
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Although Paraguay has already informed that it will demand the totality of its energy until 
2023, it is believed that the country should continue without consuming it for at least 10 
years. With Paraguay’s growth, Itaipu’s growing demand for electricity in recent years 
will continue. However, as already highlighted, part of the 50 Hz Itaipu energy is 
transported to a converter station, the Ibiúna substation140 (São Paulo), through a 
transmission system with capacity of 6,300 MW. In case of total consumption, the 
converter station will be idle. Then, it could serve as a communication source between 
Brazil and other countries in the region with frequency of 50Hz (for example, Argentina, 
Uruguay and Bolivia), corresponding to a very important regional communication 
channel that generates and transmits energy at 50Hz or 60Hz. 
It should be noted that Itaipu represents about 17% of the electricity in Brazil, that is, 
security in the energy supply. On the other hand, for Paraguay, hydroelectric power is a 
political (national sovereignty141) and economic (source of foreign exchange) issue, just 
like oil for Venezuela. Thus, there will be two ways to manage Itaipu post-2023: (i) the 
most remote possibility of dividing the plant into two generating units, which would 
require changes in its constituent treaty; and (ii) maintaining binational administration.  
Generally, the exchanges that take place between Paraguay and its neighbors respond 
largely to pre-established agreements such as the binational power stations of Itaipu and 
Yacyretá. To compensate for the lack of regulatory framework, all the exchanges made 
to date have been regulated by bilateral contracts (COCIER, 2016). Regarding 
international interconnections, Paraguay is interconnected with Argentina through two 
lines: El Dorado (Ar) – Carlos Lopez (Py) line, which has a capacity of 30 MW, the 
Clorinda (Ar) – Guarambaré (Py) line, which has a 90MW capacity and has been in 
existence since 1995. It is interconnected to Brazil through Foz de Iguazú (Br) – Acaray 
(Py), with capacity of 50 MW. In addition, it shares a connection through its two 
binational power plants, Yacyretá (3,200 MW) and Itaipu (14,000 MW) (COCIER, 
2017a). 
                                                          
140 The station is considered to be the world’s largest high voltage direct current converter. 
141 The environmental and social losses with the construction of Itaipu were immense. However, the greatest 
damage was moral and political, since it strengthened the dictatorship of Alfredo Stroessner and threatened 
the country’s energy sovereignty (CANESE, 2011).  
116 
 
Figure 14 shows Paraguayan energy trade, both exports and imports (2014, in 2000 US$). 
When it comes to exports, electricity to Argentina (US$ 84m; 100.0%) stands out, as well 
as biofuels and waste to Germany (US$ 4m; 80.0%) and UK (US$ 1m; 20.0%). When it 
comes to imports, oil products from Argentina (US$ 5m; 41.7%), Bolivia (US$ 4m; 
33.3%) and Brazil (US$ 2m; 16.7%) stand out.142 
 
 
Figure 14. Paraguayan energy trade, both exports and imports (2014, in 2000 US$) 
Source: IADB Energy Database based on UN COMTRADE. 
 
According to the 2017 OLADE Energy Statistics Yearbook, Paraguay implemented the 
redefinition of prices and quality of common diesel by means of Decree N. 4.562/2015143 
that establishes new technical specifications for import and commercialization of 
petroleum products in the country. With these new specifications, the quality of diesel 
marketed in the country arises, a fuel that represents 63% of the total oil derivatives 
consumed nationwide. On the other hand, it was announced the discovery of traces of 
hydrocarbons in geological witnesses (rocks) of Pozo Jaguareté I (San Pedro), samples 
                                                          
142 In Figure 14, it is worth noting that Brazil does not appear as an importer of electricity. This is probably 
due to the methodology of the IADB Energy Database and the nature of the Itaipu Treaty. 
143 See: http://www.leyes.com.py/todas_disposiciones/2015/decretos/decreto_4562_15.php.  
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taken from a depth of 2,600 meters. The government authorities suggest that with these 
new indications of hydrocarbons it can be deduced that there is a generating basin, which 
will give a closer approximation to perhaps the commercial discovery in the future. With 
these evidences, it will be possible to determine at how the generation of hydrocarbons is 
doing, so that the following perforations can be carried out in different places, but with a 
greater certainty of how the subsoil behaves. 
It is essencial to detail the briefly presented transmission line 500 kv (Itaipu – Asunción 
– Yacyretá)144, which belongs to the Integration Priority Projects Agenda (API) of IIRSA-
COSIPLAN145 in the Capricorn Axis146. This structured project is composed of two 
individual projects that are transmission lines: (i) 500 kV transmission line (Itaipu – Villa 
Hayes); and (ii) 500 kV transmission line (Yacyretá – Villa Hayes). The first one has 
already been presented and was already concluded in 2013. On the other hand, the second 
one proposes to improve the quality of the service and the reliability of the supply 
correcting the low voltage of the system, allowing to reduce the high technical losses of 
transmission (10% in peak hours). The transmission lines are currently operating at more 
than 70% capacity and the transformers are used almost to the limit of their power. The 
total amount of both projects is US$ 852 million.  
The 500 kV transmission line Yacyretá (Ayola) – Villa Hayes has 362.9 km, total cost of 
US$ 297 million and is also an IIRSA-COSIPLAN API. As stated, it aims to improve the 
quality of the service and the reliability of the supply by correcting the low voltage of the 
system. As already informed, the station of Villa Hayes already exists. The second line is 
currently in execution and is scheduled to be completed in May 2018.  
In addition to these two projects for the extension of transmission lines, there are no new 
binational power plant projects except for the expansion of Yacyretá (Ar-Py), in particular 
the Aña Cuá branch147, which will require an investment of US$ 610 millions (own 
resources). The expansion project has an installed capacity of 270 MW (9.0% increase in 
current capacity), with three Kaplan turbines of 90.2 MW unit power and will enter full 
service at 48 months from the beginning of its construction. The average annual 
                                                          
144 In this way, the two transmission lines will interconnect Itaipu with Yacyretá through the substation of 
Villa Hayes, since May 2018.  
145 See section 4.2. 
146 See: http://www.iirsa.org/proyectos/detalle_proyecto.aspx?h=317.  
147 See: http://www.yacyreta.org.ar/images/nm/licitaciones/670/PRESENTACION-COMPLETA.PDF.  
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generation is 2,000 GWh and the term of execution of the works is estimated at 50 
months, from the signing of the contract. From the social point of view, there are no 
families to resettle and the work will demand directly and indirectly occupation of around 
3,000 people.148 Also, it is worth noting that 60% of the investments needed to generate 
in the Aña Cua branch are already made (dam, landfill and access). Considering the recent 
challenges, the already mentioned dilemma about Annex III of the Treaty of Itaipu after 
2023 stands out. Besides that, it is worth mentioning that the following paradox has been 
consolidated: despite the large electricity generation and the fact that the country is the 
main exporter of hydroelectric energy in the world, (i) its energy matrix is still very 
unsustainable, since about 48% of total domestic consumption still comes from biomass, 
about 37% of oil and only about 15% of the electric power itself (CERQUEIRA CÉSAR 
and ARCE, 2014); (ii) Paraguay still has one of the lowest rates of electricity consumption 
in Latin America. (BLANCO et al., 2017); and (iii), the country suffered regular 
blackouts in Asunción, which led to the belief that Itaipu served mostly or exclusively 
Brazilian interests (BIATO, 2016). 
Due to these problems and challenges, the country can take a reactive stance on the 
promotion of regional energy integration and on its position in the negotiations of Itaipu 
post-2023, since they deal with issues that touch on national sovereignty. Therefore, and 
considering the need of sustainable development and addressing climate change, it is 
crucial that the country revises its energy matrix. As noted, although it is one of the 
leading exporters of clean and sustainable energy in the region, its domestic consumption 
is still heavily based on non-renewable energy and therefore contributing negatively to 
CO2 emissions. 
As stated, the attractiveness of Paraguay lies in its reduced production costs and the 
pragmatism of its regulatory environment. In relation to Brazil and Argentina, it has low 
electricity costs, low tax rates, a simplified tax system, availability and flexibility of labor 
regime, lower wage costs, as well as facilities for obtaining licenses and registrations. Its 
geographical proximity to the main industrial parks and consumer markets in Brazil tends 
to reduce the time and cost of transportation. 
In Paraguay, more than in other countries, energy is synonymous of national sovereignty. 
Itaipu (14,000 MW) and Yacyretá (3,200 MW) are specific examples of successful 
                                                          
148 See: http://www.eby.org.ar/images/nm/Proyecto_Aa_Cua.pdf.  
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regional energy integration, although limited to binational initiative. Regarding Itaipu, 
there is a great deal of uncertainty about its post-2023 future, but it is believed that the 
operational status quo will be maintained: Brazil will remain the only country to be able 
to consume the portion not consumed by Paraguay for at least a decade, although this 
value will fall over time. As for Yacyretá, there are several projects that aim to increase 
the installed capacity of the plant, in addition to projects in progress to connect it to Itaipu.  
 
3.5 Uruguay 
Uruguay is a country of 3.4 million inhabitants located in the southeastern region of the 
South American subcontinent. It limits to the Northeast with Brazil, to the West with 
Argentina, and has coasts both in the Atlantic Ocean and in the Río de la Plata. Its GDP 
per capita at current prices is US$ 15,411.76, which places Uruguay as one of the high-
income countries in the region according to the World Bank classification. The 
agricultural and livestock sector is of great importance in the national economy, although 
services and tourism account for a high percentage of GDP, with the latter becoming 
increasingly important.  
In Uruguay, the Ministry of Industry, Energy and Mining (MIEM) is responsible for the 
electric and hydrocarbon sectors. The National Energy Directorate (DNE-MIEM) is in 
charge of defining the policies and guidelines of the energy sector, as well as promoting 
studies and planning. Regulation and supervision are up to the Regulatory Unit of 
Services of Energy and Water (URSEA). There are no State or municipal regulatory 
agents and the Electric Market Administration (ADME) manages the wholesale electric 
market.  
With regard to electricity generation, there are private and state-owned companies, such 
as UTE (state-owned company) and private power generators, in particular wind power 
and thermal power generation with industrial waste biomass. Transmission and 
distribution are also in the hands of the UTE, and public and private companies operate 
in the commercialization. During IntegraCIER149, UTE affirmed that the Uruguayan 
energy policy established the vision of energy independence in a context of regional 
integration, with environmental sustainability and in response to economic development, 
                                                          
149 Ibero-American Energy Congress, held in November 2014. 
120 
 
towards a productive country with social justice (CIER, 2016b). Focusing on regional 
energy integration, the question is how far it is possible to reconcile energy independence 
with regional energy integration, since the latter leads to greater interdependence with 
neighboring countries. 
In hydrocarbon sector, policies, guidelines and regulation are the responsibility of 
URSEA. Regarding exploration and production (E&P), the National Administration of 
Fuels, Alcohols and Portland Cement (ANCAP) in association with international private 
companies (Total, BP, BG, TULLOW Oil, Petrel-Schuepbach, YPF, for example) are the 
responsible companies. Refining and transportation are left to Petrobras Uruguay (NG 
distribution, lubricants, production and commercialization of fuels), in association with 
ANCAP, while the commercialization is controlled by ANCAP DUCSA. 
Figure 15 presents the Uruguayan summarized energy balance in 2015. Primary supply 
(5,046.11 ktoe) is composed of other primaries (2,263.80 ktoe, 44.9%), (imported) crude 
oil (1,920.10 ktoe, 38.1%), hydropower (814.11 ktoe, 16.1%), (imported) natural gas 
(45.80 ktoe, 0.9%) and (imported) coal (2.30 ktoe, 0.05%). In final consumption 
(4.479,32 ktoe), industrial (1,852.94 ktoe, 41.4%), transport (1,235.20 ktoe, 27.6%) and 
residential consumers (796.35 ktoe, 17.8%) stand out, being 20.2% supplied by 
electricity. In Mercosur, Uruguay corresponds only to 1.1% of primary supply and 1.3% 
of final consumption. 100.0% of crude oil, natural gas and coal are imported. Besides, 










Its electricity sector has an installed capacity of 3,723 MW, the largest percentage coming 
from hydroelectric sources (41.3%), followed by conventional thermal (31.6%) and then 
renewable energy (27.1%). Although there has been a notable development in the 
generation from wind and biomass sources during the last years, the production of 
electricity is strongly correlated with the hydrological conditions of the year. 
According to 2017 OLADE Energy Statistics Yearbook, the country launched a benefit 
that will allow electrointensive industrial companies that maintain or increase their 
production to obtain a discount of up to 30% in the monthly invoicing of the electric 
power charge (without VAT). Additionally, in the First Electric Mobility Exhibition 
(MUEVE), the existing opportunities to acquire taxis and electric vehicles were 
presented. The plan also includes financial and infrastructure support for the first vehicles 
of this type. Besides, the Electric Vehicle Power Systems Network (SAVE) was launched, 
which will be extended in its first phase from Colonia to Chuy, passing through 
Montevideo, while in its second phase it will cover all routes. 
It should be noted that the country completed four consecutive years (since October 2012) 
without commercial electricity imports, although Uruguay used to be dependent on 
imports from neighboring countries (Argentina and Brazil). This is a consequence of the 
“guidelines” implemented by the Uruguayan Government since 2005 with the objective 
of arriving at an “energy independence with diversification of the matrix with renewable 
and indigenous sources”, according to MIEM. In fact, between 2014 and 2016, 28 wind 
farms have been inaugurated with an installed capacity of 1,212 MW. The biomass 
exceeded in 2016 for the first time the oil and its derivatives in the participation of the 
energy matrix, breaking a historical series of 52 years. Since 2008 biomass began to have 
greater participation in the generation of electricity and biofuels, being able to triple its 
value in 8 years. 
2015 was the first year in which Uruguay exported energy significantly through UTE. Of 
the 11.5 TWh generated in the country, 1 TWh (8.7%) was exported by UTE. In 2016, 
for the first time, a private company sold energy abroad. 
Uruguay launched a stimulus tool to strengthen public policy guidelines focused on the 
promotion of renewable energies through the participation of private investors. The 
Areaflin S.A., currently owned by UTE, opened its capital to the market by issuing shares 
to small savers who can be co-owners in the society of Valentines wind farm.  
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Participation to those who wish to invest larger amounts was also allowed. In this way, 
UTE has participated in the development of 34% of the wind farms in Uruguay (OLADE, 
2017). 
In recent years, Uruguay has incorporated renewable energy150 to its energy matrix and 
recently agreed with Argentina on the sale of its shedding wind. Thanks to the growth in 
the exchange between both countries, this agreement has been achieved that benefits both 
nations to market the surpluses of their wind production (CIER, 2017c). In addition, the 
country signed two memorandum of understanding with China, in the areas of renewable 
energy and industrial cooperation. The goals are focused on the development of issues of 
common interest for both countries, which support the diversification of energy sources 
tending to promote economic development socially and environmentally sustainable 
(OLADE, 2017). 
With regard to binational projects, the country is the joint owner of Salto Grande with 
Argentina, whose installed capacity is 1,890 MW151. In terms of international electricity 
trade, Uruguay has interconnections with Argentina through an occasional trade 
agreement with two 500 kV cross-border transmission lines and the Salto Grande 
binational dam. With Brazil, since 2001 there is the Rivera (Uy) – Livramento (Br) 
interconnection and there is an agreement for the use of the frequency converter signed 
by UTE and Eletrobras. UTE has developed an interconnection project with Brazil, 
Presidente Médici (Br) – San Carlos (Uy), of 500 MW power operating since mid-2017 
(COCIER, 2016, 2017a). 
Figure 16 shows Uruguayan energy trade, both exports and imports (2014, in 2000 US$). 
When it comes to exports, biofuels and waste to Portugal (US$ 14m; 77.8%) and Spain 
(US$ 4m; 22.2%) stand out, as well as electricity to Argentina (US$ 9m; 100.0%). When 
it comes to imports, crude oil from Brazil (US$ 364m; 71.7%) and Nigeria (US$ 144m; 
28.3%) stands out, as well as gas from Argentina (US$ 14m; 100.0%), and oil products 
from Brazil (US$ 5m; 41.7%), Argentina (US$ 4m; 33.3%), USA (US$ 2m; 16.7%) and 
Chile (US$ 1m; 8.3%). 
                                                          
150 Uruguay was in 3rd place in the investment in electricity and renewable fuels per unit of GDP, behind 
Mauritania and Honduras, respectively (REN 21, 2016). 





Figure 16. Uruguayan energy trade, both exports and imports (2014, in 2000 US$) 
Source: IADB Energy Database based on UN COMTRADE. 
 
According to 2017 OLADE Energy Statistics Yearbook, regarding the hydrocarbon 
sector, Uruguay signed an agreement from which, with the consent of ANCAP, the 
company British Gas (BG) made a partial transfer of their rights (50%) in block 13 
offshore, in favor of Total, Exxon and Statoil.152 Government authorities define this act 
as a new step in the path of offshore exploitation. Additionally, a contract was signed 
whereby Total ExxonMobil, operator of block 14 of hydrocarbons exploitation in the 
Uruguayan maritime platform, gives 15% of the contract it has with Uruguay to 
Norwegian company Statoil.  
From the geographical point of view, the country is isolated regionally, having borders 
only with Argentina and Brazil. It is precisely with these only two countries that Uruguay 
already has both international interconnections and binational HPP. The country has 
shown signs of focusing on the export of wind energy to Argentina. 
                                                          
152 In this way, the hydrocarbon exploitation continues in block 13, with BG as operator and the other three 




Venezuela has 31.6 million inhabitants and is located in the northern region of the South 
American subcontinent. The country borders Colombia, Brazil and Guyana, besides being 
close to the Caribbean Sea. Its economy is heavily dependent on the exploitation and 
export of oil, as well as the export of ores. Venezuela has in the USA, China, Colombia 
and Brazil its main trading partners in both exports and imports 
Although Venezuela is one of the countries with the highest degree of electrification in 
Latin America, the electrification of isolated, indigenous and border communities has 
represented a challenge for the Venezuelan State due to the remoteness of these places. 
Bolivia and Brazil, for example, face the same problem, once both countries have isolated 
systems (IS). 
In Venezuela, the Ministry of Popular Power for Electric Energy (MPPEE) is responsible 
for the electricicty sector and its regulation/supervision. The National Development Plan 
(Plan de la Patria) Law, Second Socialist Plan of Economic and Social Development of 
the Nation 2013-2019 is in charge of defining the policies and guidelines for the energy 
sector, as well as promoting studies and planning.  Regarding municipalities, in the 
Organic Law on the Public Service of Electricity (LOSSEL, 2010), chapter III Art. 32, it 
is stated that among the attributions of the municipalities it is to support the Ministry of 
Popular Power with competence in matters of electricity, in the control of the quality of 
the electric service in the territories that correspond to its jurisdiction. In the country, there 
is no wholesale electricity market given the monopoly of the public National Electricity 
Corporation S. A. (Corpoelec)153 in the generation, transmission, distribution and 
commercialization of electricity. The MPPEE, through the current Institutional Strategic 
Plan of the Ministry of Popular Power for Electric Power (2013-2019), is responsible for 
the studies and planning of the electric sector. 
Considering private investments in LAC electricity sector between 1984 and 2011, 
Venezuela was the country where this amount was the lowest (US$ 142 million), being 
92.9% in generation. The transmission sector did not have any private investment, as in 
most other countries in the region154. In 2010, the country had neither any private 
participation in the electricity sector nor in generation, transmission or distribution. This 
                                                          
153 Corpoelec was created in 2007, when the sector was nationalized. 
154 Except Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile and Peru. 
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is due to the fact that Venezuela experienced a process of re-nationalizations in 2007 
(BALZA et al., 2013).  
Ministry of the Popular Power of Petroleum and Mining (MPetroMin) is responsible for 
hydrocarbons sector and its policies and guidelines are controlled by the current Plan de 
la Patria 2013-2017. Regulation is the responsibility of MPetroMin and the National Gas 
Entity (ENAGAS). Regarding exploration and production (&P), the role of Petróleos de 
Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA) and other operators with a concession agreement stands out in 
the natural gas sector; concerning the oil sector, the PDVSA monopoly plays an important 
role, either autonomously or in association with other operators (mixed companies). 
Refining, transportation and commercialization are also up to PDVSA155. 
Figure 17 presents the Venezuelan summarized energy balance in 2015. Primary supply 
(82,045.26 ktoe) is based on natural gas (39,019.20 ktoe, 47.6%), crude oil (35,775.57 
ktoe, 43.6%), hydropower (6,311.16 ktoe, 7.7%), coal (622.12 ktoe, 0.8%) and other 
primaries (317.21 ktoe, 0.4%). In final consumption (43,359.35 ktoe), industrial 
(17,593.51 ktoe, 40.6%), transport (17,223.52 ktoe, 39.7%) and residential consumers 
(5,429.17 ktoe, 12.5%) stand out, being 16.5% supplied by electricity. In Mercosur, 
Venezuela corresponds to 17.3% of primary supply and 12.4% of final consumption. 
74.4% of crude oil production are exported, 0.2% of natural gas is imported and 0.8% of 
eletricity is exported. 
 
                                                          
155 It is worth mentioning that according to the law, the activities of exploitation, production, storage 
and commercialization of natural gas can be made by the State or by private entities, whether national 
or foreign. Therefore, there is no legal imposition to have a monopoly on these activities in the O&G 
sector. In the case of petroleum, the law of 2001 allows the State to carry on the operations of the 
industry, allowing the participation of private persons through an association agreement, in which the 
State must keep more than 50% of the share capital. Despite this, in practice PDVSA is the monopoly 









Its electricity sector has an installed capacity of 31,037 MW, of which the highest 
percentage comes from non-renewable thermal (51.1%), followed by hydronergy156 
(48,8%) and then wind (1.6%). In terms of generation, 59.3% is hydro, 40.6% is non-
renewable thermal, 0.06% is wind, and there has been an increase in the generation 
capacity of the National Electric System (SEN) in 489 MW, as : (i) entry into operation 
of unit 2 of the Fabricio Ojeda HPP - La Vueltosa (257 MW); (ii) Alfredo Salazar Plant 
(60 MW); (iii) entry into service of unit 2 of the Juan Bautista Arismendi gas plant (71 
MW); and (iv) Táchira Plant (40 MW). 
It is important to note that based on sieLAC-OLADE data, the electricity tariff in 
Venezuela (US$ 0.03/kWh) in 2015 is the lowest among Mercosur countries. Venezuela 
is followed by Argentina (US$ 0.04/kWh), Paraguay (US$ 0.07/kWh), Bolivia (US$ 
0.11/kWh), Uruguay (US$ 0.17/kWh) and Brazil (US$ 0.17/kWh). 
Regarding the Rational Use of Electric Power (UREE) in 2014, there was (i) installation 
of 10,410,195 energy saving light lamps, which allowed reducing demand by 251 MW, 
and benefiting 7,600,771 people in the 24 states of the country; (ii) launch of the Plan 
Banda Verde for residential users, as a measure of savings to reduce demand and cultivate 
the rational and efficient use of energy; (iii) completion of 24,122 information and 
awareness activities in communities and educational centers, in order to strengthen the 
energy saving campaign; and (iv) replacement of 13,448 air conditioning units with more 
efficient technologies. Since July 2016, Operation Cambalache began157, which consists 
of the replacement of high-consumption air conditioners with new ones to contribute to 
rational and efficient use of electricity. 
According to the official Corpoelec website158, we can mention the following projects in 
operation: (i) wind measuring towers in El Anís and Chacopata; (ii) photovoltaic systems 
in isolated communities in Alta Guajira, Puerto Viejo, Cúpira and Guaruchar, Corioco 
and Chuao; (iii) hybrid systems in isolated communities in Los Roques; (iv) wind farms 
in La Guarija; (v) mini-hydroelectric plants in Piñango, Cuao, Wonken, Arautamerú, La 
Ciudadela, Kavabayén and Canaima; and (vi) solar heaters in Los Roques and La Orchila. 
                                                          
156 One of these hydroelectric power plants, called Simón Bolivar (Guri), has 10,235 MW of installed 
capacity, representing more than 60% of all the hydroenergy used in the country. Besides, it is one of the 
largest HPP in the world. 
157 See: http://www.corpoelec.gob.ve/sites/default/files/informacion-cambalache.jpg.  
158 See: http://www.corpoelec.gob.ve/procesos-medulares.  
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In terms of international electricity trade, Venezuela has interconnections with Colombia: 
Cuestecita (Co) – Cuatricentenario (Ve), of 150 MW, Tibú (Co) – La Fría (Ve), of 80 
MW, and San Mateo (Co) – El Corozo (Ve), of 150 MW. In addition, the country has an 
interconnection with Brazil, Boa Vista (Br) – El Guri (Ve), of 200 MW. 
In the Second Socialist Plan for Economic and Social Development of the Nation 2013-
2019159, published in 2013, we can highlight the following targets: (i) build three Thermal 
Power Plant (TPP) with a total generation capacity of 2,100 MW, which will use 
petroleum coke generated by the process to improve crude oil in the Orinoco Oil Belt; (ii) 
strengthen the self-sufficiency electricity system in the operational fields, ensuring 
national elecitricity autonomy and flexible schemes for the generation of 1,260 MW; and 
(iii) expand and adapt the electric system in the western region, in the electric system in 
the central region, and in the eastern electric system. Among the electricity sector 
programs, we can emphasize: (i) the use of coke, gas, coal and liquids for thermal power 
generation; (ii) permanent monitoring structure, through operations centers and inter-
institutional situational room; and (iii) the electricity sector’s development and 
industrialization program. Among the policies of the hydrocarbon sector, the following 
stand out: (i) E&P of oil and gas; (ii) oil sovereignty; (iii) hydrocarbon transformation 
centers; (iv) energy matrix diversification; (v) industrialization of hydrocarbons; and (vi) 
conservation of the environment. 
It is worth mentioning that in the Development Plan for the National Electric System 
2013-2019 (PDSEN 2013-2019)160 the goal of the installation of 149 hybrid wind-
photovoltaic systems (including Apiapá) is established, however, since these 
competences were transferred to the Alternative Sources Management of Corpoelec, it 
was not further developed, being the last one installed by Fundelec in 2013.161 The plan 
aims to develop 613MW of renewable energy for isolated and rural communities, of 
which 500 MW are wind-based. Other potential renewable resources include solar, small 
hydro, bagasse cogeneration and biogas. In addition, the plan seeks to electrify 2,512 off 
grid communities through solar PV and hybrid systems equivalent to 63MW. 
                                                          
159 See: http://www.mppp.gob.ve/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/ley_plan_patria.pdf.  





Figure 18 shows Venezuelan energy trade, both exports and imports (2014, in 2000 US$). 
When it comes to exports, crude oil to USA (US$ 11,007m; 49.1%), India (US$ 5,443m; 
24.3%), China (US$ 3,477m; 15.5%) and Spain (US$ 683m; 3.0%) stands out, as well as 
oil products to USA (US$ 74m; 33.2%), Brazil (US$ 59m; 26.5%) and Turkey (US$ 35m; 
15.7%). When it comes to imports, crude oil from Algeria (US$ 45m; 100.0%) stands 
out, as well as oil products from USA (US$ 35m; 92.1%), Belgium (US$ 2m; 5.3%) and 
China (US$ 1m; 2.6%), gas from Colombia (US$ 102m; 100.0%), coal from Spain (US$ 




Figure 18. Venezuelan energy trade, both exports and imports (2014, in 2000 US$) 
Source: IADB Energy Database based on UN COMTRADE. 
 
Due to geographic proximity to the Brazilian isolated system, it is possible to think of 
strategies, international interconnections or perhaps binational projects between both 
countries. Despite the obstacles related to the Amazon region, it should be noted that 
some of these possibilities have already been considered by the Brazilian government. 
Albeit in nominal terms, Venezuela has the largest gas reserves in LAC, but it is known 
that most of them correspond to associated gas. According to the Gas Regulatory Entity 
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in Venezuela (ENAGAS), 70% of gas production is consumed by the oil activity itself, 
mainly for its re-injection into the oil fields. The lack of natural gas in the western part of 
Venezuela is one of the causes of the decline in oil production observed in that area. This 
has been one of the main reasons for the construction of the gas pipeline from Colombia 
(KOZULJ, 2008). Indeed, Venezeula has signed a memorandum for gas 
integration/interconnection with Colombia (July 2004), Colombia and Panama (July 
2006), Colombia and Ecuador (October 2007)162. 
In terms of regional energy integration, the agreement that establishes the fundamental 
terms and conditions for the implementation and execution of the Natural Gas Supply 
Project from Venezuela to Trinidad and Tobago was signed in 2017, through a gas 
interconnection from the Field Dragon, in the northeast of Venezuela, to the Hibiscus 
Field, in Trinidad and Tobago163.  
It is important to note that Petrosur, Petrocaribe, Petroandina and Petroamerica initiatives 
are all Venezuelan-led organizations. Here, the relationship between foreign policy, 
diplomacy and energy played by the Venezuelan state company PDVSA is clear, what 
was already highlighted in this thesis (see subsection 2.1.3). 
Petrosur is a political and commercial enabler promoted by the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela and, with the support of Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay, establishes 
cooperation and integration mechanisms based on the complementarity of energy 
resources. Petrosur seeks to minimize the negative effects of the countries of the region 
in terms of energy payments, by reducing transaction costs (eliminating intermediation), 
access to preferential financing and taking advantage of commercial synergies to solve 
economic and social asymmetries. It was born in 1988 and it is a political platform for 
alignment with Mercosur (already in the context of the Venezuela separation from CAN). 
Venezuela’s stated goal with the Petrocaribe Agreement is to foster regional solidarity 
and alleviate financial hardship endured by countries in the Latin America-Caribbean 








region in face of rising oil prices. Signed in 2005164, the Agreement vouches for the direct 
sale of petroleum products, but there are no price concessions, since Venezuela, as a 
member of OPEC, is obliged to sell its oil at market price.165 Rather, Petrocaribe allows 
governments to pay for petroleum over time, so countries have up to 25 years to pay off 
oil bills or can provide goods and services in exchange for oil since President Hugo 
Chávez’s administration.166 However, the context of Venezuela’s crisis has turned the 
numbers down significantly. The countries’s quota has dropped dramatically and the 
Petrocaribe cutback is largely affecting Caribbean economies. In a scenario without 
Petrocaribe financing, the region will continue to require cooperation from other oil 
producers to face the rising challenges concerning energy security, since the cost of 
energy in the region is one of the biggest in the world with a high dependence on fossil 
fuels and a more limited access to alternative sources of electricity than most countries of 
Latin America (CANUTO, 2015). Therefore, it is clear that the initiative was strongly 
shaken by domestic factors within Venezuela, which corresponds to a relevant 
institutional barrier (see subsection 2.3.1). 
The energy integration initiative Petroandina came to terms in 2005 in Lima (Peru), as 
a common platform or ‘strategic alliance’ of state oil and energy entities among Bolivia, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela, in order to promote electricity and gas 
interconnection, mutual provision of energy resources and joint investment in projects. In 
2006, Bolivia and Venezuela announced the Petroandina creation, rising in 2007 as a 
mixed binational oil company.167 
Venezuela also promotes the Petroamérica initiative in 2005, a proposal for energy 
integration of the peoples of the continent. Its roots come from the Bolivarian Alternative 
for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA) and are based on the principles of solidarity and 
complementarity between countries, as well as the fair and democratic use of resources 
for the development of their peoples. In another level of integration, the agreements 
framed in Petroamerica propose the integration of the state energy companies of Latin 
America and the Caribbean (LAC) to operationalize the agreements and make joint 
                                                          
164 There are now 18 members of Petrocaribe: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Belize, Cuba, Dominica, 
Dominican Republic, Granada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Saint Kitts and 
Nevis, Saint Vincent and Grenadines, Saint Lucia, Suriname, and Venezuela. 
165 See: http://www.petrocaribe.bz/services-view/key-agreements/.  
166 See: https://www.as-coa.org/articles/explainer-what-petrocaribe.  
167 See: http://www.ilumina.org.br/criada-a-petroandina/.  
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investments in the exploitation and commercialization of oil and natural gas. The idea of 
Petroamerica is to consolidate the three previous initiatives (Petrocaribe, Petroandina and 
Petrosur). One of its chief project is the proposed Southern Gas Pipeline. 
According to the 2017 OLADE Energy Statistics Yearbook, in terms of the hydrocarbon 
sector and in order to contribute to the balance of the global oil industry, the country 
announced the implementation of a cut of 95 kbbl/day, without undermining its 
international contractual commitments. The measure is framed, in compliance with the 
agreement of reduction of production reached between member nations and non-members 
of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), in 2016. The 
production of crude oil in September 2016 reached a positive variation close to 2,534 
Mbbl/day, due to the growth of 17 Mbbl/day of the Orinoco Oil Belt. The increase in 
PDVSA’s installed processing capacity in the Orinoco Oil Belt was also announced, 
through the start-up of oil treatment plants in the joint ventures Petrolera Sinovensa and 
Petrocarabobo. On the other hand, the increase in gas prices was officially announced in 
February 2016. The reduction of the subsidy of gasoline in Venezuela, in addition to 
honest fuel prices, seeks that users actually consume the octane required by their vehicles. 
Through PDVSA Gas, Venezuela executed a natural gas conversion project for two 
turbogenerator units (TGU) of the Josefa Joaquina Sánchez Bastidas Complex, in the 
Vargas state. This project focus on advancing the change of the energy matrix for 
consumption of liquid fuels (diesel) by natural gas in the electricity sector and thereby 
stabilizing the national electricity system hit by the El Niño weather phenomenon, with 
clean and safe energy. Additionally, these actions allow the release of 14,620 barrels of 
liquid fuel per day, which, due to its high profitability in the international market, 
represents a significant foreign exchange income for the nation. Besides, with the 
activation of a new compression train at the ‘Copa Macoya’ plant, PDVSA added an 
additional 80 Mpc of gas to the domestic market, destined for thermogeneration and 
petrochemicals; thus allowing the replacement of diesel by gas in thermoelectric plants 
in the center of the country (OLADE, 2017). 
Considering recent challenges and opportunities, it is worth noting that (i) the country has 
never fulfilled its promise to invest in the Abreu e Lima Refinery (RNEST); (ii) it did not 
go ahead with the famous ‘Southern Gas Pipeline’; and (iii) although it has led the 
proposal for the creation of the Bank of the South, it has not advanced. In addition, the 
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already presented Petrocaribe, Petroandina, Petrosur and Petroamerica did not advance 
fully in their objectives. 
The RNEST168 started operations in 2014 with the first set of units (Train I) and is located 
at the Suape Port Industrial Complex, 45 km from Recife, in Pernambuco (Brazil). It has 
a processing capacity of 230,000 bpd and its main objective is to produce diesel oil (70%) 
and to enable the demand for derivatives from the North and Northeast region to be met, 
with a reduction in imports. A pre-agreement with Venezuela foreseeing the guarantee of 
supply for this refinery has been closed but has not been implemented. 
The Great Southern Gas Pipeline, also known as Venezuela-Argentina Gas Pipeline, 
would correspond to a major work of South American physical energy integration. The 
project would link Venezuelan reserves to the consuming centers of Brazil and Argentina 
(with possible branches to Bolivia and Uruguay), creating demand for Venezuelan gas 
and, in the medium term, solving the Argentine energy problem, which focus on gas and 
has reserves only for another ten years (PAZ and NUNES, 2011). Launched in December 
2005 at the 29th Mercosur Summit in Montevideo (Uruguay), its construction was 
reaffirmed as the main work of the South American Energy Ring in April 2007, at the 
First South American Energy Summit held on the island of Margarita (Venezuela). With 
estimated costs of around US$ 20 billion, it should be the largest infrastructure integration 
project in South America, it was planned to start working in 2009 and then it would 
inaugurate the first stretches as early as 2013. However, the Great Gas Pipeline not even 
reached the initial operations (JAEGER, 2016). 
The Bank of the South was proposed at the end of the last decade and presents a 
challenge in terms of regional financial integration. In 2014, the UNASUR foreign 
ministers decided to implement the Banco do Sul with an initial capital of US$ 7 billion, 
which would finance integration projects in South America169. The charter of Bank of the 
South was signed in 2009 by the Presidents of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, 
Paraguay, Uruguay and, Venezuela. Five countries have approved the document in their 
parliaments, but Brazil and Paraguay are still processing its approval (BARROS, 2016).  
                                                          





In the Venezuelan case, it is perceived that the macronomic problems of domestic and 
international natures strongly affected the daring plans to advance as an important player 
in the regional energy integration process. With initiatives involving countries throughout 
Latin America and the Caribbean, Venezuela’s current scenario is that there are no 
concrete integration projects. Ergo, diesel gasoline is being imported and the national gas 
production is going down, without new investments. 
Venezuela (as well as Uruguay) play(s) a marginal role in current regional electricity 
integration. Uruguay is somewhat geographically isolated between Argentina and Brazil, 
countries with which Uruguay already has binational (Salto Grande, with Argentina) and 
international interconnections such as Livramento - Rivera and Presidente Médici - San 
Carlos (both TL with Brazil). On the other hand, Venezuela is a politically and 
economically unstable country170 due to its domestic vulnerability to the international 
crude oil price. In this way, crude oil is also protagonist in its regional insertion, playing 
an important role in successful initiatives (Petrosur, Petrocaribe, Petroandina and 
Petroamerica) and unsuccessful projects (RNEST, Southern Gas Pipeline and Bank of the 
South). We concluded that neither country is involved in major regional projects, being 
outside any energy integration scenarios. 
 
In general, this chapter showed that regional energy integration projects have been at the 
mercy of the dichotomy between government policy and State policy, the macroeconomic 
(inter)national context, and the asymmetric weight that projects play for the different 
countries involved. Besides, institutional, regulatory and resource allocation structure 
between these countries is extremely diverse and, once again, asymmetric. Finally, it is 
also possible to realize the relative loss of participation of regional financing mechanisms, 
such as the IDB, CAF, FONPLATA, FOCEM and BNDES, in favor of China. From a 
geopolitical and geo-strategic point of view, this movement demands a prompt response 
from the countries of the region, either by the resumption of regional autonomy or by 
those who historically seek to represent regional leadership, as is the case of Brazil. 
                                                          
170 It is worth recalling the already mentioned political context in which Venezuela enters Mercosur in the 
mid-2012. Since its accession, the country has been involved in political dilemmas and conflicts. In turn, 
this led to the temporary and definitive suspension of the Mercosur. Therefore, it becomes clear the 
relevance of political factors in this process, ratifying that regional energy integration is not an exclusively 
physical and technical matter, but has a multifaceted nature. 
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Despite the diversity of issues analyzed in each of the six countries, it is also important 
to consider (i) the difference between relative prices within and between countries; (ii) 
the nature of tax structures; (iii) the profile of macroeconomic policies; (iv) the dynamics 
of regulatory policies (energy and environmental sector); and (v) the lack of energy sector 
planning in most countries in the region. In addition, the need to deepen these issues in 




4. Regional perspective 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to add regional perspectives into the already presented 
national perspectives of the Mercosur countries. Here, we use regional qualitative primary 
sources such as norms, laws, international treaties, agreements, memorandum of 
understanding, regulatory frameworks, decisions, recommendations, decree, resolutions, 
framework agreements, declarations, programs and planning are emphasized. 
The structure of the chapter is again divided into two main sections, which international 
organizations that cope with energy integration in the region: Mercosur (section 4.1) and 
UNASUR (section 4.2). Generally, the history, normative framework, legal and 
institutional bases of the region’s energy integration will be presented, focusing on 
Mercosur and UNASUR cases. 
 
4.1 Mercosur 
Section 2.2 presented and analyzed Mercosur. Here, the focus is precisely the energy 
sector, highlighting (i) the institutional evolution of the matter within Mercosur; and (ii) 
the role of the Working Subgroup (SGT-9). In addition, there is a brief comparative 
analysis of recent energy policies with regard to policies to ensure energy security based 
on the six previous sections. 
As already presented in section 2.3, it is important to point out that there are huge projects 
related to regional energy integration in the Mercosur region prior to the very creation of 
the same171, especially in the 1970s and 1980s. The 1990s are characterized by the 
creation of international electrical interconnections, although the first one (Br-Uy) dates 
back to the 1960s. 
Table 13 depicted the evolution of the energy institutional design within Mercosur. For 
this purpose, the official Mercosur database was used, considering 25 official regulations 
                                                          








Table 13. Evolution of Mercosur’s official energy institutional design (1993-2012) 
Year Document Subject 
1993 MERCOSUR/GMC/RES N. 57/93172 Defines guidelines of Energy Policies in Mercosur 
1996 MERCOSUR/GMC/RES N. 150/96173 Deliberates on the negotiating guidelines for Sub-Working Group N. 9 ‘Energy’ 
1998 
MERCOSUR/CMC/DEC N. 10/98174 Regulates electric exchanges and electrical integration in Mercosur 
MERCOSUR/GMC/RES N. 32/98175 Takes the project related to electrical interchanges and electrical integration to CMC 
1999 MERCOSUR/CMC/DEC N. 10/99176 Promotes gas integration in Mercosur 
2000 
MERCOSUR/CMC/DEC N. 59/00177 Creates the Mining and Energy Sub-Working Group 
MERCOSUR/CMC/DEC N. 60/00178 Institutes the high government officials forum responsible for mining and energy issues in Mercosur 
2001 MERCOSUR/GMC/RES N. 33/01179 Decides on the negotiating guidelines for Sub-Working Group N. 9 ‘Energy’ 



















2002 MERCOSUR/GMC/RES N. 32/2002180 Mercosur Technical Regulation of reference diesel specifications for exhaust emissions test 
2005 
FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT ON 
ENERGY COOPERATION N. 19181 
Proposes regional energy complementation between Mercosur States Parties and Associated States 
MERCOSUR/CMC/DEC N. 07/05182 Division of the Sub-Working Group of ‘Energy and Mining’ into two subgroups 
2006 
MERCOSUR/CMC/RES N. 02/06183 Unique scheme for the control of natural gas use as a vehicular fuel in Mercosur 
MERCOSUR/CMC/DEC N. 36/06184 Memorandum of understanding to establish a special Sub-Working Group on biofuels 
2007 MERCOSUR/CMC/DEC N. 49/07185 Mercosur action plan for cooperation on biofuels and creation of Ad Hoc Group on Biofuels 
2008 MERCOSUR/GMC/RES N. 36/08186 
Mercosur technical regulation on minimum safety and energy efficiency requirements for household appliances that use gas 
as fuel 
2009 
MERCOSUR/GMC/REC N. 01/2009187 General guidelines for energy efficiency in the field of Mercosur 
MERCOSUR/GMC/REC N. 02/2009188 Guidelines for renewable energy sources in the Mercosur  



















MERCOSUR/GMC/RES N. 04/2009189 Mercosur technical regulation on low voltage electrical cables and conductors 
2010 
MERCOSUR/GMC/RES N. 04/2010190 Mercosur technical regulation on switches for fixed electrical installations 
MERCOSUR/CMC/DEC N. 02/2010191 FOCEM project: 500 MW electric interconnection betweem Uruguay-Brazil 
MERCOSUR/CMC/DEC N. 03/2010192 FOCEM project: interconnection link in 132 kV between Iberá – Paso de los Libres Norte 
MERCOSUR/CMC/DEC N. 07/2010193 FOCEM project: implementation of the 500 kv system in Paraguay between Villa Hayes – Itaipu  
MERCOSUR/CMC/DEC N. 11/10194 FOCEM project: proposes the mapping of Mercosur’s oil and gas production chain 
2012 MERCOSUR/CMC/DEC N. 01/2012195 FOCEM project: interconnection link in 132 kV between Iberá – Paso de los Libres Norte 
Source: Own elaboration based on Mercosur database; CMC = Common Market Council; GMC = Common Market Group; DEC = Decision; REC = Recommendation; RES 
= Resolution. 
















As shown, Mercosur member countries have reached agreements and memorandum on 
energy issues throughout the organization’s existence, especially since the late 1990s. 
Five points will be highlighted below.  
In the first Mercosur document that discusses the energy issue (Resolution N. 57/1993), 
Energy Policies in Mercosur are drawn. The document highlights: (i) favoring integration 
between the energy markets of the States Parties, with freedom of purchase and sale of 
energy companies and free transit of energy, respecting the laws in force in each country; 
(ii) promotion of rational use of energy and conservation; (iii) the admission of the 
possibility of binational or multilateral energy agreements within or outside the region; 
and (iv) the preparation of regional integrated energy planning studies in accordance with 
national macroeconomic planning. It is clear that already in the first document the 
binational character that will be present in the different agreements stands out. 
The second point to be highlighted is that Decision N. 10/1998 is a memorandum of 
understanding regarding electrical exchanges and electrical integration in Mercosur. 
There is therefore no forecast for the execution of energy transmission line projects and 
the construction of gas pipelines; that would require more action and investments from 
the Member States. Then, it is understood that the document, while pioneering the 
integration of electricity in Mercosur, aims to remove legal and political barriers to energy 
exchanges between members, not assuming the role of infrastructure expansion for the 
transport of energy, which is still precarious among Mercosur countries. The third point 
is that Decision N. 10/1999 bears many similarities to Decision N. 10/1998, since the text 
itself appears to have been built upon it. The difference between them is that Decision N. 
10/1998 addresses integration based on electricity while N. 10/1999 deals with gas 
exchanges and gas integration between Mercosur States Parties (PERGHER, 2016)196.  
The fourth point highlighted can be found in the Framework Agreement on Energy 
Cooperation (2005). In the document, there is an interest in ‘advancing the integration 
of production and transportation’, which would necessarily promote the expansion of 
energy transport infrastructure, as well as joint production among Mercosur countries 
(interactions already highlighted in section 2.2). However, the rest of Mercosur legislation 
                                                          
196 Neither Decision N. 10/1998 nor Decision N. 10/1999 became positive law and were not incorporated 
into the domestic law of the respective countries. This is largely due to the intergovernmental nature of 




does not appear to be a normative basis for such interest, and there are only regulations 
on reducing national barriers to energy exchanges. In addition, as already emphasized in 
this thesis, the agreement points out great asymmetries in the sector between the Member 
States of the Agreement. In its Art. 6, it is highlighted the possibility of concluding 
regional, subregional or bilateral agreements in the areas of (i) commercial exchange of 
hydrocarbons; (ii) interconnection of the electric transmission networks; (iii) 
interconnection of pipeline networks and other hydrocarbon pipelines; (iv) cooperation 
in the exploration, exploitation, and industrialization of hydrocarbons; and (v) renewable 
energy sources and alternative energy sources. 
The last point emphasized is that since 2012 there are no recommendations, directives, 
resolutions and/or decisions on the official Mercosur website. This will be presented with 
details in Figure 19. 
With regard to the issue of the different projects to be developed within Mercosur, the 
Fund for the Structural Convergence of Mercosur (FOCEM), which is the first solidarity 
financing mechanism for the bloc countries and it aims to reduce the existing asymmetries 
within them. The creation of FOCEM took place with Decision CMC N. 45/2004197. In 
turn, Decision CMC N. 18/2005198 established standards for its integration and operation, 
and CMC Decision N. 01/2010199 defines its current regulation. More recently, Decision 
CMC N. 22/2015200 gives continuity to the Fund.  
Created at the end of 2004 and operating since 2006, the FOCEM is based on a system of 
contributions and distribution of resources in an inverse manner, which means that 
countries with greater relative economic development make greater contributions and, at 
the same time, countries with less relative economic development receive the greatest 
resources in order to finance their projects. The funds are intended for countries and 















delivered as a non-refundable donation to finance up to 85% of the eligible value of the 
projects presented. Contributions to FOCEM began in 2006, considering a total annual 
amount up to 2012 of US$ 100 million. With the entry of Venezuela into Mercosur, and 
until 2015, the Fund reaches US$ 127 million annually. These resources are allocated to 
projects submitted by Mercosur States Parties with the criterion of benefiting the smaller 
and less developed economies.201 Therefore, it is considered the central point of any 
regional integration process that is to reduce regional asymmetries. This logic of 
contributions and distribution of resources is presented in Table 14. 
Table 14. Annual contributions and resources received in FOCEM 
Country 
Annual contributions  
(US$ millions) 
% 
Annual resources received 
(US$ millions) 
% 
Br 70 55.12 11.55 9.09 
Ar 27 21.26 11.15 9.09 
Ve 27 21.26 11.50 9.06 
Uy 2 1.57 36.96 29.10 
Py 1 0.79 55.44 43.65 
Total 127 100.00 127.00 100.00 
Source: MERCOSUR (2015). 
 
Based on Table 14, it can be seen that Brazil is the country that contributes most to 
FOCEM (55.12%), while Paraguay has the least capital (0.79%). The contributions 
provided by Argentina (21.26%) and Venezuela (21.26%) are quite similar. As already 
explained, this logic is related to the GDP size of each country. Conversely, the annual 
resources received go mainly to Paraguay (44.65%) and Uruguay (29.10%). In addition, 
taking into account the distribution of funds by programs, it is noteworthy that 43% goes 
to the infrastructure sector.  
It is also interesting to note the existence of a Sub-Working Group within Mercosur that 
specializes in energy issues (SGT-9). As presented in Table 13, it was created by 
Decision N. 07/2005, which divided the then subgroup of ‘Energy and Mining’ into two 
new ones. The motivations that led to this separation, according to the document, was the 
distinct nature of the issues presented in both themes. Besides, some of the most relevant 
documents signed in Mercosur were consequence of the SGT-9, such as those already 
                                                          
201 See: http://focem.mercosur.int/es/que-es-focem/.  
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discussed (Decisions N. 10/1998 and Decision N.10/1999). The existence of an Ad Hoc 
Group on Biofuels (GAHB) was established by Decision N. 49/2007.  
In this sense, energy integration issues are a major topic at the Meeting of Ministers of 
Mines and Energy (RMME), part of the Common Market Council (CMC), as well as of 
the Sub-Working Group (SGT-9)202 and Mercosur Ad Hoc Group on Biofuels (AHBG), 
both subordinate to the Common Market Group (CMG). On the other hand, 
environmental issues are undertaken by SGT-6, which works close to a preparatory 
technical commission for the Meeting of the Environment Ministers (RMMA), having a 
more political tone. 
Since 2011, SGT-6 has focused on: (i) non-tariff measures related to environmental 
aspects; (ii) economic competitiveness; (iii) incorporation of an environmental 
component to governmental sectorial policies; (iv) mechanisms to improve 
environmental management; (v) operationalization and streghtening of Mercosur 
Environmental Information System; (vi) environmental sustainability, production, 
substances and waste management; and (vii) keeping up-to-date with the global 
environmental agenda. Figure 19 presents the evolution of SGT-6 and SGT-9 meeting 
frequencies, being 66 of SGT-6 (1996-2015) and only 16 of SGT-9 (2005-2011). What it 
is possible to perceive beforehand is that SGT-6 meetings have become even less frequent 
and that, regarding SGT-9 meetings, there is no public information pre-2005 and post-
2011. 
 
                                                          
202 The SGT-9 was created during the period of restructuring of the energy sectors of the different countries 




Figure 19. Evolution of SGT-6 and SGT-9 meeting frequencies (1996-2015)  
Source: Own elaboration based on the website of Mercosur  
 
Based on the meeting minutes from 2005 to 2010 and the majority referring to the years 
2000 to 2005, it can be said that the vast majority of the delegated actions were fulfilled, 
but it should be noted that many were postponed or obtained partial compliance status 
(MENEGHINI and VOIGT, 2011). Internal factors, such as distinct political interests 
among the countries as well as the change of representatives at meetings; and external 
factors, such as the involvement of other players in the energy sector (private sector, other 
international institutions) and the complexity of the sector can be seen as influencing the 
results. Thus, it can be concluded that SGT-9 did not act to structure and coordinate 
concrete policies or projects on regional energy integration. In the analyzed period, it only 
worked on (i) the harmonization of energy regulation in order to facilitate exchanges; (ii) 
the elaboration of inventories on the electric sector; (iii) feeding databases to foster 
decisions in other instances; and (iv) the analysis of financial, legal and tax aspects of the 




In this sense, it is perceived that the SGT-9 lost some of its relevance and ceased meeting 
after the creation of UNASUR Energy Council203, the corresponding technical forum, and 
the negotiations of the UNASUR energy integration treaty. This is due to the nature of 
Latin American regional integration processes characterized by the overlap of initiatives, 
which often deal with the same theme. 
Bringing this discussion to the present scenario, it is worth noting that the political-
economic fragility of some countries increases the risk of insecurity and mistrust between 
countries when we talk about advancing in regional energy integration. Therefore, as 
highlighted in section 2.3, it is important that there is a legal-institutional framework for 
project and initiatives coordination and control in the energy sector. However, it was not 
up to member countries to prioritize energy integration within Mercosur, nor did 
Mercosur institutional bodies in charge of this agenda move forward. Consequently, 
Mercosur countries ended up choosing to open markets to free competition and to foment 
simple international interconnections and few binational plants as the grounds for energy 
strategies valid for the bloc. 
Jointly, there was inability of national governments and Mercosur to advance the regional 
energy integration agenda. Previous sections of this chapter focused on how each of the 
States Parties presented physical, market and institutional asymmetries. Thus, Table 15 
and Table 16, respectively, sum up how the electric and hydrocarbon sectors vary in 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
                                                          
203 UNASUR will be presented and discussed in section 4.2. 
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ANDE, Itaipu, 
Acaray, Yacyretá  

















MPPEE - - Corpoelec Corpoelec Corpoelec Corpoelec Corpoelec MPPEE 
Source: Own elaboration; 1 = but the electrical regulation is provincial (there are 24 regulators); 2 = national and municipal governments.
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Ar MINEM MINEM 
ENARGAS (gas), 
MINEM (oil) 
YPF and private companies (Petrobras 
Argentina, Pan American Energy 
Sucursal Argentina, LLC, Total Austral) 
MINEM and private 
comapnies 
MINEM 
Bo MH - ANH 
Petrobras Bolivia, YPFB, YPFB Andina 
S.A., YPFB Chaco S.A., YPFB 
Petroandina S.A. 
Petrobras Bolivia, YPFB 
Refinación S.A., YPFB 
Transporte S.A., YPBF 
Transierra S.A., YPFB 
Logistica S.A. 
YPBF Aviación, Flamagas S.A 
Br MME 







Petrobras, IOCs, independent actors, 
supply industry to the oil sector, 
companies of the O&G  
Petrobras and private 
companies 





VMME-MOPC, MIC VMME-MOPC, MIC Petropar and private companies Petropar  
Petrobras, ESSO, COPETROL, 
Barcos y Rodado, PUMA, GAS 
CORONA, HIPASA, SUGAS, 
Lima Gas, Gas del Este, 
Yacyretá, Acaray Gas, 
COPESA, Petrogas, Norte Gas 
Uy MIEM DNE URSEA 
ANCAP in association with international 
private companies (Total, BP, BG, 
TULLOW Oil, Petrel-Schuepbach, YPF) 
Petrobras Uruguay (GN 
distribution), in 




Development Plan  
MPetroMin (oil), 
ENAGAS (gas) 
PDVSA or other concession holders 






Identifying the asymmetries that exist between the Mercosur countries, which imply 
different energy policies, is fundamental to understand that the concept of energy security 
is not capable of dealing with or incorporating such particularities. Thus, the following 
section proposes a new concept, suggesting the adoption of different indicators to 
consider new issues that are now incorporated into the energy issue, particularly when it 
comes to developing countries. 
Thus, although there are advances in institutional and legal matters within Mercosur 
concerning regional energy integration, it can be seen that in practice little progress has 
been made. More recently, it can be argued that the ongoing attempts to revive Mercosur 
are concentrated in the commercial sphere, in view of efforts to negotiate a trade 
agremeent with the European Union (EU). Regarding the energy policies of the Mercosur 
countries, they do not follow a pattern, each country being responsible for defining its 
agendas without a common regional plan. However, the recent Mercosur Social Summit 
in Brazil can be seen as a positive example in this field, where dynamism is still to be 
found. Thus, in the area of infrastructure, which requires medium/long-term planning and 




As already discussed, Latin America is characterized by an overlap of regional integration 
processes, which often deal with similar issues. In terms of energy, this occurs between 
Mercosur, the Initiative for Regional Infrastructure Integration South America (IIRSA), 
the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), Regional Energy Integration 
Commission (CIER)204 and the Latin American Energy Organization (OLADE).  
The CIER was founded in 1964, during the first Regional Congress of Electrical 
Integration (Montevideo, Uruguay). It is defined as a non-governmental organization that 
                                                          
204 CIER is composed of different national support committees. In the case of Brazil, the committee in 
charge is the Brazilian Committee of CIER (BRACIER), created in 1966. BRACIER is a non-profit, 
nongovernmental entity that currently comprises 41 companies/entities in the Brazilian electricity sector, 




gathers 198 companies and organizations of the electricity sector in the ten South 
American countries. True to its primary purpose, it promotes and leads the integration of 
electricity sectors as one of the means to boost regional development and prosperity205. 
The Latin American Energy Organization (OLADE) was created in the context of the 
international energy crisis of 1973, it is made of 16 member countries of Latin America 
and the Caribbean. It is represented in each country by the coordinators in the ministries 
or energetic entities.  
Both CIER and OLADE are responsible for the systematization and elaboration of energy 
data and reports for LAC countries. However, they do not constitute regional integration 
initiatives, although they do contribute to this in some way. In this sense, even if they 
touch on energy infrastructure in some way, the focus of this section will be on the 
Initiative for Regional Infrastructure Integration South America (IIRSA)206, because it is 
the broadest one in the subcontinent, and consequently UNASUR. The initiative includes 
coordination mechanisms among governments, multilateral financial institutions and the 
private sector, and aims to coordinate investment plans and programs, as well as to 
prioritize Integration and Development Hubs (EID). 
The IIRSA was created during the First Meeting of South American Presidents (Brasília, 
Brazil) in 2000, and the twelve countries of South America (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela) 
take part of it. It has three main areas of activity, that is, energy, transport and 
communications. Among the guiding principles of IIRSA, we can highlight: (i) open 
regionalism: in line with the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC) concept of guaranteeing liberalization policies in relation to third parties, while 
favoring the accession of new members to the agreements; (ii) Integration and 
Development Hubs (EIDs); (iii) economic, social, environmental and political-
institutional sustainability; (iv) increase in the production value added; (v) information 
                                                          
205 It is worth noting that in the new strategic framework of the CIER, approved in the Central Committee 
of Lima (April 2015), the following new concepts are defined. It defends that in 2020 CIER will be a global 
reference organization recognized for its contribution to the integration and development of the Latin 
American energy sector. The mission seeks to promote the integration of the regional energy sector with 
emphasis on the interconnection of systems, the integration of markets, mutual cooperation between its 
members, knowledge management and the promotion of sustainable businesses (CIER, 2016b). 
206 IIRSA represents a multinational, multisectoral and multidisciplinary initiative that includes 
coordination mechanisms between governments, multilateral financial institutions and the private sector 
(BIATO, 2016). It is financed by Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES), Inter-American Development 
Bank (IDB), Andean Development Corporation (CAF), and Financial Fund for the Development of the 
Plata Basin (FONPLATA). 
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technology; (vi) normative convergence; and (vii) public-private coordination. By the 
way, there is a strong relationship between these principles and the main criticisms of 
IIRSA itself. 
It is worth highlighting the relevance of the Sectoral Integration Processes (PSIs), which 
aim to identify regulatory and institutional obstacles that prevent the development of basic 
infrastructure in the region and propose actions to overcome them. Typically, these PSIs 
seek to harmonize regulatory frameworks. Through the analysis of Table 18, we will see 
the nonexistent weight of the projects associated specifically with harmonization of 
regulatory frameworks within the IIRSA-COSIPLAN project portfolio 2016. 
Since 2011, IIRSA was incorporated into the South American Council of Infrastructure 
and Planning (COSIPLAN), which is a forum for political and strategic discussion 
through consultation, evaluation, cooperation, planning and coordination of efforts and 
articulation of programs and projects in order to foster regional infrastructure integration 
among UNASUR207 member countries. In the same year, IIRSA creates two instruments 
to guide its work for the next ten years: (i) the Strategic Action Plan 2012-2022 (PAE); 
and (ii) the Integration Priority Project Agenda (APIs). 
In turn, UNASUR was created on May 23 2008, when the Constitutive Treaty of the 
Union of South American Nations was approved208, in which Quito (Ecuador) was the 
permanent city designated to General Secretariat and Cochabamba (Bolivia) was the 
permanent city designated to the Parliament. However, it is important to stress that 
UNASUR is the result of a series of discussions and meetings. 
In 2004, at the Meeting of Presidents of South America, held in Cuzco (Peru), the South 
American Community of Nations (CSN)209 was created. The CSN was born to integrate 
regional processes developed by Mercosur and the Andean Community (to avoid the 
aforementioned reproduction of overlaps in regional initiatives). In 2005, in Brasília 
(Brazil), and 2006, in Cochabamba (Bolivia), the heads of state of member countries 
established a strategic plan to consolidate a common agenda in the region. However, it is 
only in 2007, during the South American Energy Summit, on Isla Margarita (Venezuela), 
                                                          




209 The role of regional energy integration is already highlighted in this Meeting. 
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that the heads of states changed the name of the South American Community of Nations 
(CSN) to the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). 
It is noteworthy that from the very beginning energy was a priority in the UNASUR 
agenda. Among the general documents, declarations, agreements, communiqués and 
protocols, UNASUR signed 46 documents related to energy. The following important 
energy integration frameworks will be analyzed: (i) Declaration of Caracas (2005); (ii) 
Declaration of Cochabamba (2006); (iii) Declaration of Margarita (2007); (iv) 
Alignments of the South American Energy Strategy (2008); and (v) structure of the South 
American Energy Treaty (approved in 2010).  
The Declaration of Caracas (2005), signed in Venezuela, is the first meeting of energy 
ministers of the South American Community of Nations (CASA). The priority of energy 
integration was defended, referring to the Consensus of Guayaquil210 (2002), in Ecuador, 
when integration in the energy sector was considered essencial to success of regional 
integration as a whole. Therefore, the importance of regional infrastructure for energy 
transport is emphasized, as is the strategic role that energy has in the economic and social 
development of South America. 
The Declaration of Cochabamba211 (2006), signed in Bolivia, is often remembered as 
the ‘cornerstone of the South American integration process’. The main objective was to 
stimulate energy integration in order to reduce the region’s socio-economic asymmetries. 
Since then, there has been concern about sustainable development. The ‘Presidential 
Declaration on South American Energy Integration’ is accomplished, which is the first of 
its kind, at the South American level, within the framework of developing the 
institutionalization of this sector. It also represents a more far-reaching view, identifying 
the principles that will guide the process of political and normative convergence in terms 
of regional energy integration, as well as the dimensions that it should take into account 
(CAF, 2013e).  
The eight principles are the following: (i) cooperation and complementation; (ii) 
sovereign right to the use of natural resources and to manage exploitation rates; (iii) 
respect for the regulation of each country and the modes of ownership used by each State 
for the development of its energy resources; (iv) solidarity and reciprocity; (v) purpose of 
                                                          
210 See: http://www20.iadb.org/intal/catalogo/PE/2010/05282.pdf.  
211 See: http://www.isags-unasur.org/uploads/biblioteca/1/bb[611]ling[1]anx[1825].pdf.  
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eliminating the asymmetries between the States; (vi) respect for the sovereignty and self-
determination of peoples; (vii) territorial integrity; and (viii) common legal framework 
for energy integration. 
The Declaration of Margarita212 (2007) was signed at the II Meeting of Energy 
Ministers of the South American Community of Nations (CSN), in Isla Margarita, and it 
created UNASUR, as well as the South American Energy Council (CES)213. In addition, 
based on the principles outlined in this declaration, it is suggested to prepare a proposal 
for alignments of the South American Energy Strategy, the Action Plan and the Energy 
Treaty of South America, documents that originally should have been discussed during 
the course of the III South American Summit of Nations. As mentioned, the relationship 
between UNASUR and energy is very close, even because the organization was born 
during the First South American Energy Summit. 
The Alignments of the South American Energy Strategy214 (2008) focus on the five 
South American energy integration advices (i) emphasizing the need to increase national 
and regional coordination; (ii) to extend and deepen the processes of sector integration; 
(iii) to boost the search for new energy sources; (iv) to establish regional mechanisms that 
help countries of the region in crisis; and (v) to establish legal and technical frameworks 
to support such exchanges. 
These meetings resulted in the creation of twelve guiding principles of the energy 
integration strategy of UNASUR, which model the activities of the Energy Council, 
namely: (i) cooperation and complementation; (ii) solidarity among peoples; (iii) respect 
for the sovereignty and self-determination of peoples; (iv) sovereign right to establish 
criteria for sustainable development and the use of renewable and non-renewable natural 
resources, as well as to manage the rate of exploitation of these resources; (v) regional 
integration in search of the complementarity of countries in the balanced use of resources 
for the development of their peoples; (vi) respect for the modes of ownership that each 
State uses for the development of its energy resources; (vii) energy integration as an 
                                                          
212 See: http://www.isags-unasur.org/uploads/biblioteca/1/bb[613]ling[2]anx[1830].pdf.  
213 CES is born and it creates guidelines for the energy integration of the region. It is also worth noting that 
CES is one of the oldest and most active councils of UNASUR, demonstrating again that energy integration 







important tool to promote social, economic and poverty eradication; (viii) universal 
access to energy as a citizen’s right (as stressed in subsection 2.1.1); (ix) sustainable and 
efficient use of the region’s resources and energy potential; (x) articulation of energy 
complementarities to reduce existing asymmetries in the region; and (xii) recognition of 
States, society and industry as key players in the integration process. It is then clear that 
some of them are based on the eight principles of ‘Presidential Declaration on South 
American Energy Integration’, created by the Declaration of Cochabamba (2006). 
Based on these principles, during the same meeting that created the alignments of 
UNASUR’s energy strategy, an Action Plan based on fifteen strategic action points were 
proposed to be developed with the goal of expanding integration: (i) to promote security 
in the energy supply of the region; (ii) to promote regional energy exchange; (iii) to 
strengthen regional energy infrastructure; (iv) to implement complementation 
mechanisms between national state hydrocarbon companies and other types of energy; 
(v) to provide the exchange and transfer of technology, as well as the training of human 
resources; (vi) to encourage regional energy development in order to provide a rational 
consumption model capable of preserving the environment; (vii) to promote 
industrialization and energy development and its regional complementation; (viii) to 
promote harmonization of regulatory and trade processes associated with energy 
integration; (ix) to incorporate the regional energy integration component into national 
energy planning; (x) to promote the efficient use of energy and the exchange of 
experience in this field; (xi) to boost the development of renewable and alternative 
energies, such as biofuels, wind, solar, nuclear, tidal, geothermal, hydro, hydrogen, 
among others; (xii) to stimulate the association between the public and private sectors; 
(xiii) to support the maintenance of existing bilateral, regional and subregional 
agreements, as well as to facilitate the negotiation of future agreements; (xiv) to promote 
a balanced relationship between producing and consuming countries; and (xv) to advance 
proposals for the convergence of national energy policies considering the legal 
framework in force in each country. Noteworthy is the amount of action verbs in the 
Action Plan.  
Finally, the approval of the structure of the South American Energy Treaty (2010), 
signed at the Declaration of Los Cardales (Argentina), should be mentioned. In fact, there 
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is an outline, not a full text on the Treaty. However, it is believed that it could represent 
a milestone in South American energy integration.215 See Appendix F. 
Recently, at the IV Meeting of the South American Energy Council of UNASUR (2015) 
a 2015-2016 working plan was established, whose focus is to promote regional energy 
and gas interconnection networks and reach regional agreements that benefit the region 
in terms of energy.216 The V Meeting of the South America Energy Council of 
UNASUR217 was held in (Quito) Ecuador, July 2016. In 2017, there was no CES meeting.  
Although the UNASUR Energy Council is responsible for formulating general policies 
that should lead to energy integration of South America, the South American Council of 
Infrastructure and Planning (COSIPLAN) has been directly playing a crutial role. As 
already presented, COSIPLAN belonged to the South American Regional Infrastructure 
Integration Initiative (IIRSA), and it is currently part of UNASUR. It is important to 
mention that the COSIPLAN Project Portfolio is a set of works with a strong impact for 
regional integration and socio-economic development.  
Based on official data from UNASUR-COSIPLAN (2016), the investment portfolio 
estimated in 2016 is of US$ 191,420.10 million and has 581 projects. Considering this 
amount, 5 (0.9%) are multinational, 94 (16.1%) are binational and 482 (83%) are 
nationals. Analyzing the projects by type of financing, we note that 475 (US$ 117,691 
million) are financed with pure public funding, 71 (US$ 35,926 million) with pure private 
funding and 35 (US$ 37,803.1 million) with public-private or shared funding. Table 17 
presents the asymmetry that exists in terms of project numbers and estimated investment 





                                                          
215 The only similar experience in the world is the Energy Charter of the European Union, whose elaboration 
took more than ten years (SIMÕES, 2011). 
216 See: http://www.iri.edu.ar/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/bo-alatina57-unasur-consejoenergetico.pdf.  







Table 17. UNASUR-COSIPLAN 2016 Project Portfolio, by EID 
EID 
Number of projects 
Estimated investment 
(US$ million) 
Amount % Amount % 
AMA Amazonia 72 12.4 27,022.80 14.1 
AND The Andes 66 11.3 27,995.30 14.6 
CAP Capricorn 81 13.9 16,691.20 8.7 
GUY Guyana Shied 20 3.4 4,581.30 2.4 
HPP Paraguay-Parana Waterway 89 15.3 6,325.10 3.3 
IOC Central Interoceanic 63 10.8 11,498.50 6.0 
MCC Mercosur-Chile 120 20.6 60,971.20 31.8 
PBB Peru-Brazil-Bolivia 24 4.1 32,008.40 16.7 
DES South 47 8.1 4,506.70 2.4 
Total 582 100.0 191,600.50 100.0 
Source: Own elaboration based on UNASUR-COSIPLAN (2016). 
 
Table 18 analyzes the number of projects by country. There is a huge asymmetry. 
Argentina is the country with the most projects (178 projects, US$ 48,565.9 million), 
followed by Brazil (94, US$ 82,413.8 million), Chile (73, US$ 16,105 million) and Peru 
(73, US$ 11,801.7 million). On the other hand, the countries with the fewest projects in 
terms of quantity and financial volume are Guyana (8, US$ 911.9 million) and Suriname 











Table 18. UNASUR-COSIPLAN 2016 Project Portfolio, by country and type of project 
Country 
Number of projects Estimated investment 
(US$ million) National Binational Multinational 
Ar 144 34 - 48,565.9 
Bo 32 19 1 10,578.7 
Br 67 24 3 82,413.8 
Cl 57 17 - 16,105.0 
Co 19 13 1 4,743.6 
Ec 20 19 1 19,609.1 
Gu 3 2 3 911.9 
Py 43 22 1 18,002.6 
Pe 50 21 1 11,801.7 
Su 3 1 3 3,831.9 
Uy 33 9 - 5,445.2 
Ve 11 7 2 2,109.5 
Source: Own elaboration based on UNASUR-COSIPLAN (2016). 
 
Table 19 shows that 518 projects (89.2%) come from the transport sector (US$ 
133,958.90 billion), 56 projects (9.6%) energy sector (US$ 57,419.70 billion), and 7 
projects (1.2%) communication sector (US$ 41.50 million). Howsoever, it is worth 
mentioning that the total amount of projects in the portfolio has evolved considerably 
over time. In 2003-04, for example, they were 335 projects (US$ 37,425.0 million), while 
in 2010 there were 524 (US$ 96,119.2 million). As already presented, in 2016 they were 
581 projects (US$ 191,420.1 million). During the whole period, projects totaled up US$ 




Table 19. UNASUR-COSIPLAN 2016 Project Portfolio, by sector and type of project 
Sector and Subsector 


































Air 24 7,530.40 5.6 3.9         
Road 258 63,476.50 47.4 33.2         
Railway 61 47,921.40 35.8 25.0         
River 76 2,892.90 2.2 1.5         
Maritime 38 10,493.70 7.8 5.5         
Multimodal 14 679.30 0.5 0.4         
Border crossings 47 964.70 0.7 0.5         
Energy generation     25 46,859.50 81.6 24.5     
Interconnection of energy     31 10,560.20 18.4 5.5     
Interconnection of 
communications 
        7 41.5 100.0 0.02 
Total 518 133,958.9 100.0  56 57,419.7 100.0  7 41.5 100.0  





In terms of funding sources, there are pure public, pure private and public/private 
investment. For the transportation sector, 65% of the investments are public, 26% are 
private and 9% are public/private. In the energy sector, 53% of investments are public, 
3% are private and 44% are public/private, while in the transportation sector, 100% of 
investments are public (UNASUR-COSIPLAN, 2016). We noticed again that in terms of 
investments the profile changes a lot for each sector, highlighting the share of public 
investments in the guarantee of investments in physical infrastructure in South America. 
If we specifically analyze the API 2016 agenda, 89.2% of the individual API projects 
correspond to the transport sector and represent 70% of the total estimated investment. 
The remaining 9.6% belongs to the energy sector, with an estimated investment of 30%. 
Regarding the sub-sectoral composition of the individual projects, it is observed that road 
projects account for 44.4% of the API and demand about 33.2% of the total investment 
(UNASUR-COSIPLAN, 2016). 
Table 20 and Figure 20 show the evolution of the UNASUR-COSIPLAN total and 
energy projects, in number, in value (millions US$) and share (%) during 2003-2017. 
Although the total investment increased 71.3% in the period 2011 to 2017, the share of 






Table 20. Evolution of the UNASUR-COSIPLAN total and energy projects (2003-2017) 
Projects and 
Investment 
2003-04 2005-06 2007 2008-09 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Number of projects 335 349 504 510 524 531 544 583 579 593 581 562 
  Energy projects      61 60 59 54 56 56 54 
  % energy projects      11.5 11.0 10.1 9.3 9.4 9.6 9.6 
Investment (Millions 
US$) 37,425.0 37,880.0 68,271.4 74,542.0 96,119.2 116,120.6 130,139.1 157,730.5 163,324.5 182,435.7 191,420.1 198,901.4 
  Energy investments      50,931.3 49,482.2 50,830.2 54,670.1 52,715.7 57,419.7 54,926.7 
  % energy 
investments      43.9 38.0 32.2 33.5 28.9 30.0 27.6 






Figure 20. Evolution of the UNASUR-COSIPLAN total projects (2003-2017) 
Source: Own elaboration based on UNASUR-COSIPLAN (2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017). 
 
Due to the intergovernmental nature of both Mercosur and UNASUR218, both institutions, 
although dealing with energy issues in the regional level, end up presenting limitations to 
their performance. Consequently, the main institutions that should promote regional 
energy integration actually play a secondary role in proposing regional policies without 
any binding enforcement mechanisms. Mercosur, through FOCEM, and UNASUR, 
through UNASUR-COSIPLAN projects, provide funds for projects in infrastructure to 
promote the structural convergence of the countries of the region, reducing the asymmetry 
between them. Nevertheless, in spite of the number of regulations, plans, principles and 
strategic alignments, the data presented in sections 3.7 and 3.8 show that energy projects 
carried out by both institutions (i) are spatially concentrated in certain regions; (ii) are 
few (if compared to the total available value); and (iii) have been falling over time.  
                                                          
218 In the intergovernmental model of Mercosur and UNASUR, National States through their respective 




Moreover, there are recent challenges for UNASUR. The first one is that some countries 
in South America, such as Peru, Mexico and Colombia, are focused on the Pacific 
Alliance. Another challenge arises from the political-economic conjuncture of certain 
countries of the region, with particular emphasis on Brazil and especially on Venezuela. 
Both countries play a key role in regional energy supply and demand, the first in terms of 
regional imports of electricity and natural gas (from South America), and the second as 
an exporter of oil and gas (for Latin America and Caribbean).  
Concerning the South American Energy Treaty, it seems very ambitious and therefore 
hard to move forward. So far, there is only the index. Albeit being an intergovernmental 
institution, decisions in UNASUR have to be by consensus, which makes the approval of 
new agendas and projects still more difficult.  
Regionally, one cannot ignore the region of the Andes Mountains Range219, the Amazon 
Forest, the Atacama Desert and Patagonia Glaciers since all of them represent 
geographical barriers to the effective regional energy integration. Indeed, they impose 
technical difficulties incurring higher costs. In addition, overlapping regional integration 
initiatives make the energy integration process even more difficult, since there is no 
alignment between the different institutions. These institutions sometimes have different 
positions on the same issue, as occurred with regard to the existence or not of coup d’état 
in Brazil between Mercosur and UNASUR. 
 
  
                                                          
219 Colombia seems to be the case where the Andes Mountains was overcome by interconnected electrical 
systems. Albeit in a national context (rather than regional one), this experience may serve as an example 




5. Energy index and modeling 
 
This chapter, as well as the previous two, is also divided into two main sections: SEES 
index (section 5.1) and OSeMOSYS-SAMBA modeling (section 5.2). In the first section, 
a new hybrid index called socio-environmental-energy security (SEES) is created, whose 
main objective is to analyze the evolution of the energy policies of Mercosur (countries) 
in the past (1990-2010). Then, the second section proposes energy scenarios using the 
Open Source Energy Modelling System - South America Model Base (OSeMOSYS 
SAMBA), a model for planning for the expansion of long-term energy systems, whose 
objective is to analyze present and possible integration scenarios in the future (2013-
2050). Four scenarios are modeled: reference integration scenario (RIS), weak integration 
scenario (WIS), moderate integration scenario (MIS) and otimistic integration scenario 
(OIS), considering expansion and new international interconnection lines, new binational 
hydroelectric plants as well as new contractual arrangements (swaps). 
Undoubtedly, we consider here the possible (inherent) limitations of quantitative 
analytical tools. Because they assume a diversity of parameters, axioms and assumptions, 
they aim to simulate and predict future scenarios and possibilities that, once the inputs of 
the model are true or reasonable, are particularly useful in developing policies and 
strategies that contribute to the anticipation and planning of decision makers, whether 
public or private.  
Scenarios methodology (i) can expand the way reseachers and policy-marks think, once 
it provides a range of possible outcomes; (ii) uncover inevitable or near-inevitable futures, 
considering social, political and economic trends, as well as scheduled events; and (iii) 
allow people to challenge conventional wisdom thinking outside the box, mainly because 
sometimes there is a very strong status quo bias (ROXBURGH, 2009). When it comes 
specifically to energy scenarios, it is necessary to consider some recent challenges that 
need to be added to the analysis, incorporating for example new low-carbon goals (in line 
with section 2.1.2 and SEES index). This relatively new dimension of the scenarios means 
that in addition to the traditional factors like technology development, demographic, 
economic, political and institutional considerations, there is another aspect of the modern 
energy projections related to the coverage, timing, and stringency of policies to mitigate 




In order to avoid incurring these potential errors and traps inherent to this methodology, 
the two sections are based on a large literature review. The first one deals with existing 
and published data, so its risk is reduced. The second section, in addition to literature data, 
incorporates information from the expansion plans of the countries considered.  
 
5.1 SEES Index220 
As shown in section 2.1, the concept of energy security has raised controversies over its 
definition, scope and approaches for decades. Studies on energy security have been 
criticized for a number of reasons, including that they employ a narrow interpretation of 
this concept and rarely use a systematic approach. Significant differences between studies 
are observed in how energy security is evaluated qualitatively and/or quantitatively. The 
latter usually considers the assembly and use of indicators, like in KANCHANA and 
UNESAKI (2014), IEA (2013), MARTCHAMADOL and KUMAR (2013), 
SOVACOOL et al. (2011), LÖSCHEL et al. (2010), KEMMLER et al. (2009), VERA 
and LANGLOIS (2007), Department of Energy and Climate Change (2006) and IAEA 
(2005). Indicators may facilitate orientation in a complex world, condensing large 
amounts of information into a recognizable pattern.  
As ANG et al. (2015) highlight, the weight of social and environmental effects on energy 
security definitions has grown significantly, particularly post 2010 – even though they 
are only about 40% of the cases analyzed. They evaluate that in recent studies the 
environmental dimension occupies the second area most addressed, only behind the 
economic one; in turn, the social aspects occupy only the fifth position, behind 4As and 
energy supply. 
Moreover, the authors perceive that the weight of both themes varies greatly between 
official reports, journals and other publications; the environmental theme is cited in about 
40% of journals and only about 15% of official reports; in turn, the percentage of social 
agenda is 30% and 40%, respectively. Ergo, it is noteworthy to reinforce how the different 
sources attribute different weights to the same variables, which once again ratifies the 
lack of consensus on the concept of energy security. 
                                                          




Subsection 2.1.1 and subsection 2.1.2 showed the relevance to take into account social 
and environmental dimensions when it comes to energy security, particularly when 
analyzing developing countries. DEVINE-WRIGHT et al. (2017), SILVAST (2017) and 
BATEL et al. (2013) reinforce the need to consider social variables and social studies in 
the understanding of energy markets. KISSEL et al. (2009) highlight the relevance of the 
environmental variable, analyzing renewable energy law for emerging markets in South 
America. 
Therefore, after (i) evaluating the concept of energy security (Chapter 2); (ii) analyzing 
national energy markets structures (Chapter 3); and (iii) knowing regional mechanisms 
of Mercosur and UNASUR related to the energy issue as well as perceiving their 
differences (Chapter 4), it is important to evaluate how they are translated into ‘energy 
security’. To this end, this section proposes to create a hybrid approach called socio-
environmental-energy security (SEES) index in order to assess the evolution of energy 
policies results in the region as well as within countries. In fact, there has been a tendency 
in energy security studies to quantify energy security using indicators and indexes (ANG 
et al., 2015), either to compare performances across countries (space studies) or to 
evaluate them over time (time studies). Our objective here is to do both analyses 
simultaneously, without doing a forecast analysis (scenario projection studies), but evaluating 
the performance of the Mercosur+2 SEES during 23 years (1990–2013).  
This index is fully committed to the assessment and measurement of energy security, 
which should not be only understood as a mismatch between supply and demand of 
energy; rather, it must also consider social and environmental factors (in a regional 
dimension)221.  
To guarantee sustainability, we must provide equal weight to economic, social, and 
environmental aspects (KISEL et al., 2016). Consequently, the weight given to social, 
energy and environmental indicators will be exactly the same due to the equal importance 
they have: (i) promotion of universal access to energy services (especially due to national 
and regional asymmetries); (ii) the guarantee of demand (due to increasing demand, 
                                                          
221 Note that SEES index is 100% in line with discussions carried out Chapter 2, subsection 2.1.1, 




particularly as they are developing countries); and (iii) the environmentally sustainable 
management of natural resources (renewable and non-renewable).  
The data used are publicly accessible from international databases, such as World 
DataBank, OECD Statistics, ECLAC Data and IEA Statistics. After defining the 
indicators, data selection, normalization, weight assignment and aggregation, the SEES 
composite index is generated.  
The evaluation was conducted based on 15 indicators gathered from the review of 
previous studies. The total of indicators is in line with the methodology performed in most 
studies, since about 75% of them employ less than 20 indicators in the analysis (ANG, 
CHOONG and NG, 2015). These indicators, as anticipated, were divided into three 
dimensions222: social (S), energy (E) and environmental (A). Each one of them is based on 
the literature on energy security, energy policy, environmental studies and international 
relations. For each indicator, data ranging from 1990 to 2013 was collected for each of the 
6 Mercosur+2 countries.  
Due to the recent enlargements of the bloc, with the effective accession of Venezuela in 
mid-2012 and Bolivia, whose ratification process has been taking place since 2015, the 
former was considered in the analysis only in 2013; because of the lack of public data 
from 2015, Bolivia was not considered in the SEES data analysis. In addition, although 
Mercosur was formed in 1991, we use data from 1990, since some indicators were only 
available for decades.  
As is clear from Table 21, the energy dimension incorporates indicators relating to 
(geo)political (E1 and E2) and technological (E4) matters. It is completely in line with 
regional integration needs, once must take into account technical, regulatory and 




                                                          
222 SEES index is related to the famous pillars of sustainability (social, economic, and environmental), as 




Table 21. Socio-environmental-energy security (SEES) index. 








S1 Access to electricity, rural % of rural population 
S2 Access to electricity, urban % of urban population 
S3 Electricity consumption per capita kWh per capita 
S4 Total final consumption (TFC) per capita toe per capita 









E1 Fuel exports % of merchandise exports 
E2 Net oil imports/GDP toe per thousand 2005 US$ 
E3 Total natural resources rents % of GDP 
E4 
Electric power transmission and 
distribution losses 
% of output 
E5 















A1 CO2 emission per capita tCO2/capita 
A2 CO2 intensity kgCO2/2005 US$ 
A3 Energy related methane emissions % of total 
A4 Nitrous oxide emissions in energy sector 
thousand metric tons of CO2 
equivalent 
A5 Renewable energy consumption 
% of total final energy 
consumption 
Source: SANTOS et al. (2017a, 2017b) based on data from ECLAC Statistics, IEA Statistics and 
World DataBank. It should be noted that selected indicators did not show available data for 2013 
(S1, S2, E3, E5, A3, A4 and A5). 
 
Since the indicators usually have different units and scales, it is necessary to make a 
transformation before aggregating them in order to generate the composite index (ANG 
et al., 2015). The min-max normalization, the most popular method used in different 
relevant and famous studies (TONGSOPIT et al., 2016, KHATIB, 2016, 
KAMSAMRONG and SORAPIPATANA, 2014, ZHANG et al., 2013, ANGELIS-
DIMAKIS et al., 2012, EDIGER and BERK, 2011, SOVACOOL et al., 2011, CABALU, 
2010, LEFÈVRE, 2010, GNANSOUNOU, 2008, GUPTA, 2008), was performed to 
allow a linear transformation of the original data. Thus, a new scale, ranging from 1 to 




𝑋′ = 1 +  (
𝑋 −  𝑀𝑖𝑛𝐴
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝐴 − 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝐴
) 𝑥 (10 − 1) (1) 
where: X’ = normalized value based on 1–10 scale; X = value map; MinA = minimum 
value of the data range A (1); MaxA = maximum value of the data range A (10). 
It is worth mentioning that there are indicators that are inversely proportional to the scale, 
that is, larger values correspond to a lower value for the socio-environmental-energy 
security, therefore the maximum value has to be considered as minimum, reversing 
function 1 (it is the case of S4, S5, E2, E3, E4, A1, A2, A3 e A4). Regardless of the case, 
the SEES should not be understood based on the value per se, but on the relative change 
of ordinal values over time. 
From now on, we will briefly analyze and discuss the results of the SEES analysis in 
Mercosur. Note that, unlike previous analysis considering Bolivia and Venezuela, the 
previous data analysis does not include them because data and indicators for both 
countries were not available from 2010 on. In addition, as already reported for 1990, 
certain data are not available. Ergo, to avoid analytical bias after standardization, we 
present a graphical analysis only for the period from 1990 to 2010, at five-year intervals. 
Figure 21 highlights the evolution of SEES in Mercosur for the entire period under 
analysis. The aggregate index varied little for the years presented, indicating a slight 
downward trend. The understanding of this phenomenon comes from the detailed and 
disaggregated analysis of the dimensions, since, particularly from 2005 to 2010, the 
environmental dimension fell from 6.5 to 4.2, respectively. This was particularly affected 
by the lack of data for indicators A3 and A4 for the year 2010223. 
                                                          
223 Indeed, the lack of data influences the results, affecting the graphical analysis of the SEES index. 






Figure 21. Evolution of SEES in Mercosur (1990–2010) 
Source: SANTOS et al. (2017b). 
 
The social dimension fluctuated significantly in the period, with significant declines in 
1995 and 2005. This, again, was due to the lack of data in those years for indicators S1 
and S2. However, it is worth noting that the trend for the social dimension is falling from 
1990 to 2010, from 6.4 to 6.2 – although it grows from 1990 to 2000. Even though the 
decrease is small, it is due to the reduction of S2 in Brazil (data from 2000 seem 
overestimated, as in the case of Paraguay), S4 in Paraguay (which may not necessarily be 
bad), and S5 in Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay (increase the intensity of the primary 
energy supply per unit of GDP).  
It is important to stress that the decrease of total final consumption per capita (S4) is not 
a problem itself for these countries. In fact, S4 is not included in the selection of indicators 
that count negatively for SEES, since, because they are developing countries, the increase 
in per capita consumption seems to be positive for this country profile. However, there 
may have been a change in the final aggregate consumption pattern (more rational and/or 
efficient) leading to these results. 
The energy dimension, in turn, sustains a growth trend throughout the period analyzed. 
Indicators E2 and E3 are mainly inverse dynamics, since if net oil exports (E2) are 




with the exploitation of resources (E3), or that countries are importing less. In addition, 
E4 falls for Brazil and Paraguay in the period analyzed due to transmission losses and 
losses in distribution, whether they are technical losses (inherent to the transmission of 
electricity in the network) or non-technical (energy theft, measurement errors, etc). In 
both countries, there have been a number of policies aimed at reducing transmission and 
distribution losses, regardless of the reasons. It should also be noted that there is no data 
for E5 in the case of Paraguay (1990-2010) and Uruguay (2005 and 2010). 
Considering the SEES index for the period from 1990 to 2010, it is perceived that it falls 
0.5pp or 8.9%. This suggests that the absence of joint planning and policies among 
Mercosur countries in the period under analysis did not contribute to the improvement of 
the index, given the selected indicators. 
Moreover, we must address some limitations associated with the quantitative analysis of 
the data that need to be taken into account. The first one is the sensitivity of the index to 
the lack of indicator data, what is actually expected from a normalization method. Second, 
the selection of indicators does not take into account electricity tariffs (US$/kWh), which 
could be considered in the social dimension, basically because there was no available data 
to allow comparison during the whole time series. Thirdly, it should be noted that 
weighing countries and indicators in the SEES index may also have an implicit bias, but 
in order to avoid overestimating or underestimating certain countries’ results, we 
maintained the same relative weight of each of them in the index calculation. Fourth, it 
should be noted that considering private participation in investment (current dollars) may 
not adequately reproduce the amount invested in the sector, especially in countries where 
public participation is considerable. Fifth, the environmental dimension heavily focuses 
on indicators that measures the impacts on climate change. In addition, a more detailed 
analysis of the transformation of the energy matrices for this period would allow a better 
understanding of the results presented by each one of the 15 indicators. Besides, the 
choice of selected indicators affects the results. 
Taking into account the social, environmental and regional dimensions in the formulation 
of policies (link between subsection 2.1.1, subsection 2.1.2 and subsection 2.1.3 with 




Regarding the social dimension, it is important to consider the trade-off between 
access/use of energy and development of countries. At the same time that developing 
countries still have regions without access to energy resources, as they develop tend to 
mimic the patterns of production and consumption in developed countries (FURTADO, 
1974), what greatly increases per capita energy consumption. According to IRENA 
(2017b), a deep transformation of the way we produce and use energy is needed to achieve 
alternative scenarios of low-carbon emissions. 
Thus, it is necessary to promote a significant change in the development path of these 
countries so that it becomes sustainable and responsible (ROMÁN et al., 2012). However, 
it is known that many developing countries often resort to the ‘late development’ 
argument, giving developed countries the largest share of efforts to meet the challenges 
they face – principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR). 
It is worth mentioning that eradicating poverty has been a central agenda for the UN since 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). Access to energy is already assumed 
as a basic right (UN, 2012, UEC, 2014) and a public good (KARLSSON-VINKHUYEN 
et al., 2012) for many. In this context, and in referring specifically to the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs), SANWAL (2014: 94) makes a critical analysis that ‘the 
MDGs stressed meeting basic human needs, and ignored other preconditions for raising 
living standards, for example, energy as a basic human need’. In addition, he argues that 
the definition of development cooperation was narrowly defined as an aid-driven 
relationship, disregarding other policies (trade, investment and technology transfer).  
When updating the discussion of the MDGs for the Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs) debate, it is known that energy gained relevance in the 2030 Agenda, 
corresponding to SDG 7. Its goals include: (i) ensure universal access to affordable, 
reliable and modern energy services; (ii) increase substantially the share of 
renewable energy in the global energy mix; (iii) double the global rate of 
improvement in energy efficiency; (iv) enhance international cooperation to 
facilitate access to clean energy research and technology; and (v) expand 
infrastructure and upgrade technology for supplying modern and sustainable 
energy services for all in developing countries.   
As is clear from the SDG 7 targets, there is a central concern about universal access to 




well as increased international cooperation and infrastructure. Therefore, limiting the 
global mean temperature rise to below 2°C would require an energy transition of 
exceptional scope, depth and speed (IRENA, 2017b). 
With regard to the environmental dimension, it is necessary to consider the trade-off 
between developing countries’ economic growth and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. 
ANG et al. (2015) argue that such a relationship will have distinct effects in the short-
term and in the long-term, so it is fundamental to take into account its irregular movement. 
At times it is contrary to the trend of indicators such as energy intensity and total 
emissions. Good proxies to evaluate this trend are efficiency and productivity in the 
production of energy.  
However, when considering environmental variables, it is necessary to take into account 
another potential trade-off. By promoting the substitution of renewable alternatives to 
conventional energy, it is possible to add risks and threats to the system, such as 
intermittency and high operating costs. According to IRENA (2017a), amid this 
accelerating transition, the variability of solar and wind energy – two key sources for 
renewable power generation – presents new challenges. 
When considering that these alternative energies still do not scale in certain markets, in 
fact, costs remain high for many regional contexts. However, it is worth noting that 
although renewables provided (only) 23% of power generation worldwide by 2014, this 
share could reach 45% by 2030 with the rapid adoption of more ambitious plans and 
policies (IRENA, 2016). 
The regional approach perhaps presents the biggest trade-off for analysts, policy makers 
and stakeholders in the world of energy. COETZEE and WINKLER (2014) and 
GARIBALDI et al. (2014) show how climate policies are very strongly linked to the idea 
of sovereign states (state-centered policies) in light of the concept of nationally 
appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) that arose in the context of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations.  
SANWAL (2010) and SCHÜLLER (2012) not only highlight the need to promote 
international cooperation, but also advocate that it should be rethought and based on 
institutions of supporting technology development and transfer. Thus, thinking about 




accustomed to doing so at the national level – although the gains associated with the 
implementation of such policies at the regional level are well-known (SANTOS, 2014, 
2015, 2016, 2017). 
Nonetheless, as well as the trade-off of renewable energies, cross-border pipelines and 
strategic transport channels, among other factors of increased complexity, can increase 
the risks and uncertainties of supply disruption due to (geo)political issues, wars, 
technical failures, accidents, geographic and geological catastrophes, extreme weather 
events and turbulence in financial markets (BIROL, 2006, CHESTER, 2010; 
KUCHARSKI and UNESAKI, 2015, UNDP, 2004, YERGIN, 2006). Precisely because 
of this, energy integration should be more than a simple arrangement of integrated energy 
markets and systems, but a political project with full participation of the involved parties 
in order to mitigate such risks and threats. 
 
5.2 OSeMOSYS-SAMBA model 
After analyzing the results of Mercosur (countries)’s energy policies during the period 
1990-2010, this section aims to model and analyze possible scenarios of energy 
integration in the region, using the case of the power sector to illustrate its potential. The 
power sector was considered as a case study of energy modeling, given the social 
relevance of ensuring access to electricity at affordable prices, particularly when it comes 
to developing countries224. In addition, as already highlighted, considering the regional 
energy integration, the power sector stands out, either by the possibility of improving the 
quality of life of the population, or by the previous expertise of most countries in the 
region in the matter.  
Unlike the previous section, Bolivia and Venezuela are considered here. Both countries 
had to be removed from the previous section due to the absence of data for Venezuela 
(2013 onwards) and Bolivia (which only took place in 2015, after the SEES index). 
The scenarios were modeled in the Open Source energy Modelling System – OSeMOSYS 
(2011) – using a new framework named South America Model Base – SAMBA (2015). 
OSeMOSYS-SAMBA provides long-term cost-optimization of the power expansion 
                                                          
224 To access studies that consider other sectors, such as gas pipelines and oil, see CHÁVEZ-RODRÍGUEZ 
(2016), GARAFFA (2016), SABBATELLA (2015), SENA (2013), RODRIGUES (2012b), CUNHA 




planning of South America countries. It is an open source, dynamic, bottom-up and multi-
year power sector framework that allows us to deal with large-scale linear programming 
problems225. According to MOURA (2017), there was the following additions to 
OSeMOSYS to create SAMBA: ‘(1) storage constraints (WELSCH et al., 2015); (2) 
reserve margins for each country (CERVIGNI et al., 2015); and (3) annual constraints for 
production inflexibility applied to generation technologies, which was developed 
specifically for the implementation of SAMBA’. 
As previously reported, data on existing regional infrastructure were used and the 
expansion plans of the countries. The base-year is 2013226, with four scenarios built for 
the period 2013–2058. Features related to population growth, electricity demand, costs, 
hydro reservoirs, technological performance, reserve margin time zones and carbon 
emissions were considered. 
2013 is a strategic base-year for the model not only because of the relationship with SEES 
index data, but because from that date we have to consider that the United Nations 
General Assembly unanimously declared the decade 2014-2024227 as the Decade of 
Sustainable Energy for All (SE4ALL). This stresses the relevance of energy issues for 
sustainable development and for the elaboration of the post-2015 development agenda.  
Figure 22 shows how the model is structured into separate functions (blocks). 
                                                          
225 The framework assumes an exogenously price-inelastic demand, perfect competition and perfect 
foresight (MOURA, 2017, MOURA et al., 2015). 
226It gives full continuity to the analysis of section 5.1, although due to the lack of data for Venezuela the 
graphical analysis has only gone until 2010. 





Figure 22. OSeMOSYS blocks structure 
Source: HOWELLS et al. (2011). 
The following features are key assumptions of the model: (i) technological changes are 
provided by exogenous learning curves based on IEA ETP reports; (ii) time resolution is 
12 months, divided into 4 intra-day periods and time horizon is 2013-2058, yearly steps; 
(iii) reserve margin is 15% (only dispatchable technologies are able to meet it); (iv) real 
discount rate is 8% and monetary values is 2013 US$; (v) there are also three time zones: 
1st: Argentina, Brazil (NE, S and SE) and Uruguay; 2nd: Bolivia, Brazil (N), Chile, 
Paraguay and Venezuela; and 3rd: Colombia, Ecuador and Peru; (vi) carbon electricity 
intensity to be reduced in 34% by 2058 (IEA, 2014); (vii) subsidies in national fuel prices 
are eliminated in the long-term, allowing convergence to international prices; (viii) 
regarding losses in T&D systems, it is considered both reduction costs and increasing 
efficiency of generating technologies228; and (ix) existing oil refining capacity and 
international pipelines limit countries’ national supply. 
Besides, and according to MOURA (2017: 22): 
‘For all scenarios, the total electricity demand for each country is 
assumed to increase at an annual rate compatible to reach a per capita 
consumption of 5,500 kWh per year by 2058, which is comparable to 
the 2012 consumption level of developed countries such as Spain (5,530 
                                                          




kWh), Italy (5,515 kWh) and Greece (5,380 kWh) (WORLD BANK, 
2015). This assumption aims at considering the social welfare gain 
arising from higher electricity consumption, given the disparities in 
electricity consumption in the continent.’ 
The availability of natural gas for electricity generation was restricted for SAMBA 
scenarios, then, producing and importing countries cannot use more than 50% of the 
extracted/imported resource in the power sector. Besides, Argentina and Brazil are the 
only countries expected to develop shale gas production (due to their large reserves and 
land availability) and new nuclear plants.  
A 34% reduction, by 2058, in the overall electricity’s carbon intensity was imposed when 
structuring the SAMBA scenarios, following results achieved by IEA WEO (2014) for 
non-developed countries.  For Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile and Peru a maximum 
installed capacity investment of large-scale electricity production using Concentrated 
Solar Power (CSP) plants per year is up to 1 GW, while it is 100 MW for Colombia and 
Venezuela. The same assumptions were applied to investments in large-scale solar 
photovoltaic plants. 
Appendix G shows national and international inputs for all 10 countries (Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela)229 
considered in OSeMOSYS-SAMBA scenarios.  
As indicated in section 2.3.2, the profile of Latin American energy integration can be 
segmented into three blocks with particular characteristics. Generally, in the Central 
American region, there is an integrated dispatch, integrating several countries with low 
electric consumption in order to obtain an adequate scale, focusing basically on electrical 
integration. In the Andean Community, there is an international electricity transaction 
(EIT) dispatch, with countries having abundant energy resources. In the Southern Cone, 
energy transactions are contract-based, countries have high electricity consumption and 
                                                          
229 Although the focus of the thesis and modeling are the Mercosur countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela), it is important to highlight that it was necessary to analyze South 
America as a whole. This is because some Mercosur countries already have international interconnections 
and transactions with extra-bloc countries, as well as the fact that in the strong integration scenario (SIS), 




there is abundance of energy resources (water and natural gas) and many international 
interconnections. 
Thus, the few studies that have quantitative modeling in the Latin/South America region 
tend to focus on only one of these regional ‘blocks’230. An exponent in this theme is the 
publishing of the CIER 15 Project (Study of Electricity Transactions between Andean, 
Central American and Mercosur Markets: feasibility of their integration)231, which was 
carried out in two parts. The participating countries were Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay (Venezuela was not included). CIER carried out 
the project in consortium with PSR (Brazil), Mercados Energéticos (Argentina) and 
SYNEX (Chile), being funded by own resources, CAF and the World Bank. 
The first part encompassed: (i) the elaboration of the historical and critical analysis of the 
existing interconnections (gas and electric power) and their evolution; (ii) the analysis of 
the regulatory and institutional evolution of the electricity and gas markets in each region; 
and (iii) the definition of scenarios for the development of secont part studies. The second 
part englobed: (i) the preparation of demand and supply energy studies for the Andean 
regions, in Central America and Mercosur, including gas and electric power over the 10-
year horizon; (ii) the analysis and evolution of benefits and costs of the integrations and 
criteria and establishment for their proper attribution; and (iii) analysis of adequate 
regulatory and/or commercial schemes applicable to the Andean, Central American and 
Mercosur regions. 
In its second part, the CIER 15 Project evaluated 12 projects, which involved the 
construction of approximately 10,000 km of transmission lines and 6,500 MW of installed 
generation capacity, requiring investments of US$ 5 billion. Its implementation resulted 
in a reduction of operating costs of US$ 1.5 billion per year, as well as avoiding the annual 
emission of 8 million tons of carbon into the atmosphere and increasing the security of 
the supply of the countries involved (CIER, 2011). 
Based on the current energy infrastructure of the region, on some projects suggested by 
the CIER 15 Project (because many were not implemented), on the national expansion 
                                                          
230 However, as has been pointed out a few times in this thesis, there is no pattern with respect to the 
countries participating in each of these 'blocs'. In some cases, it is considered Venezuela and/or Chile in 
Mercosur. IIRSA itself considers Chile in its Mercosur axis. 




plans of the countries, and on official data and in academic analyzes, four scenarios were 
proposed: reference integration scenario (RIS), weak integration scenario (WIS), 
moderate integration scenario (MIS) and strong integration scenario (SIS). It is important 
to make clear that all scenarios are prepared by the author and are created based on official 
energy expansion plans of the countries analyzed. All the measures of the four scenarios 
will be presented in detail and justified in subsection 5.2.1. 
5.2.1 Assumptions 
Similarly to selected projects by CIER Project 15232, changes in alternative scenarios can 
be classified as: (i) type I interconnection (operational security and opportunity 
exchanges); (ii) type II interconnection (operational security and energy export); (iii) use 
of infrastructure (‘swaps’); (iv) hydroelectric with export contracts (economies of scale); 
and (v) binational plants. Regarding the nature of the alternative policies for each of the 
alternative scenarios, they can be divided into the following goals: (i) diversification of 
the power generation mix; (ii) consideration of socio-environmental vulnerability; (iii) 
increasing in international transactions; and (iv) harmonization of regulatory frameworks. 
The diversification of the power generation mix is fundamental for the improvement 
of SEES index, mainly because it reduces the excessive dependence of fossil fuels, taking 
into account the environmental impacts. The rationale is to diversify into other domestic 
fuel types to stabilize prices at the pumps and at the same time meet carbon dioxide 
emissions limits (UNCTAD, 2010) (CIER, 2017c). 
It is worth mentioning that the region of South America, and Latin America in general, 
has one of the cleanest power supply in the world. Therefore, the region’s renewable 
energies enter the system based on their competitiveness rather than due to the need to 
make it cleaner (as in most countries). This reality distances the countries of the region 
from most IEA and OECD countries, for example.  
Socio-environmental vulnerability will be considered in adopting physical limits, with 
the inclusion of maximum emissions quotas per period, as in MOURA (2017) and 
                                                          
232 As well as the definition of the SEES index methodology, the presence of few quantitative studies on 
the region’s energy policies suggests that the common bases are the same or similar. This allows, for 
example, comparisons between the results of these scarce studies. The choice of the OSeMOSYS-SAMBA 





CONDE (2013). Besides, it is included in the costs (model inputs), rather fixed 
(investment), variables or fuels, as well as the emission factors associated with each 
technology. This may have effects, for example, on the expansion of large hydroelectric 
dams, due to socio-environmental impact of their reservoirs, leading to an increase in the 
cost of new large hydro plants, postponement of the beginning of the operation or even 
unfeasibility.  
The increase of international transactions in the elaboration of alternative scenarios 
will be considered, either by increasing power and/or new international interconnections, 
or by building new binational power plants. AALTO (2014), VON HIPPEL et al. (2011) 
and ECLAC (2007) highlight the relevance of interconnection infrastructure in regional 
integration, reinforcing the role of the regional institution/bloc in the supervision and 
promotion of this objective. 
Focusing on the Latin American case, AHMED et al. (2017) and SAUMA et al. (2011) 
assessing ASEAN and CAN, respectively, highlight the need to enhance cross-border 
trade, arguing that the electric interconnection allows reducing the need for generation 
capacity reserves and, at the same time, providing a higher security level of supply. 
Moreover, an important benefit of electric interconnections is the potential contribution 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, given the better use of the resources of each country. 
In line with the criticisms of this thesis regarding state-centric energy policies, PUKA and 
SZULECKI (2014) propose an alternative approach to the discipline of energy economics 
to better understand the cross-border electricity infrastructure, defending the relevance of 
governance mechanisms, as well as political issues and discourses. 
Specifically on the harmonization of regulatory frameworks, it was shown that it is 
fundamental to reduce the uncertainties and risks of governments and private investors in 
new regional ventures233. For this reason, it was necessary to analyze not only national 
policies and projects (Chapter 3), but also the general guidelines of Mercosur and 
UNASUR (Chapter 4) on the energy regulatory framework. Legal frameworks must be 
accompanied by dynamic regulatory frameworks capable of adapting to technological 
developments and market conditions (CAF, 2013b). 
                                                          
233 It is worth highlighting the recent publication by PARLAMENTO ANDINO (2015), which highlights 





Table 22 below presents general information for each of the scenarios modeled in 
OSeMOSYS-SAMBA. 
 
Table 22. OSeMOSYS-SAMBA integration scenarios general data 
Scenario Focus Measures 
RIS National BAU 
WIS National 





Ar-Br: Garabí (1.152 MW) + Panambí (1.048 MW) 
Ar-Py: Aña Cuá (2.000 MW) + 1st and 2nd Yacyretá expansion (1.550 MW) + Itacorá-
Itatí (1.660 MW) + Corpus (3.500 MW) 
Bo: El Bala 1 e 2 (3.676 MW) + Rositas (400 MW) 
Bo-Ar: TL Yaguacua - Pichanal - San Juancito (1,200 MW) 
Bo-Pe: 2 TLs (1,150 MW) 




Bo-Br: Cachuela Esperanza (990 MW) 
Ar-Py-Br: TL (2,000 MW) 
Py-Ar-Cl: ‘Swap’ of energy (200 MW) 
Co-Ec-Pe-Cl-Bo: SINEA (3,120 MW) 
Source: ENDE (2017), IPPSE (2017), MS (2017), LARREA et al. (2017), IMF (2016), YÉPEZ et al. 
(2016), COES-SINAC (2016), SOL.bo (2017), CIER (2017c), BERTERO (2015), KOUTOUDJIAN 
(2015), OLADE (2013), DAR (2011), National Expansion Plans, IIRSA, BN Americas, BID, FOCEM-
Mercosur, ENDE, ENDE Andina, Hydro Review, Consulado de Bolivia, Siemens and BN Americas. 
 
Reference integrate scenario (RIS) corresponds to business as usual (BAU) scenario, 
being the baseline scenario. It considers national expansion plans projected by Mercosur 
governments (short, medium and long-term)234, in addition to 23 existing international 
interconnections (see first part of Chapter 3). As it can be seen, in the reference 
integration scenario (RIS), there are several policies and energy investments in (and 
among) Mercosur countries, with particular emphasis on Bolivia. As highlighted in 
                                                          
234 Despite RIS and WIS consider only Mercosur countries, in both MIS and SIS there are transactions 
between these countries and their neighbors (not only Mercosur States Parties, but also Associated States). 
Thus, it was necessary to consider national expansion plans projected by all South American countries 




section 3.2, the country does not currently have energy interconnections with its 
neighbors, despite being in the center of the South American subcontinent. 
In the last Bolivian national strategic plan 2017-2021, the international electrical 
integration has a weight of 15% (being only below the expansion and strengthening of 
the transmission network, 25%). The country highlights that of these 15%, the share for 
each country would be as follows: Argentina (80%), Paraguay (8%), Peru (7%) and Brazil 
(5%). 









Technology Installed capacity Year 
Ar 
Vaca Muerta (Neuquén) 40,000 Shale gas 55 MMm3/day; 135 MMm3/day; 270 MMm3/day 2020; 2025; 2030 
Electricity Losses in T&D - T&D losses 15% 2013 
Bo 
Miguillas 1 – Palillada (La Paz) 
448 
Hydro 118 MW 2019 
Miguillas 2 – Umapalca (La Paz) Hydro 85 MW 2022 
Misicuni (Cochabamba) 142 Hydro 120 MW 2018 
Ivirizu (Cochabamba) 550 Hydro 280 MW 2022 
San José 1 (Cochabamba) 
245 
Hydro 55 MW 2018 
San José 2 (Cochabamba) Hydro 69 MW 2019 
Solar Uyuni (Potosí) 94 Solar PV 60 MW 2018 
Solar Yunchará (Tarija) 9.4 Solar PV 5 MW 2018 
CC Entre Ríos  (Cochabamba)  463 Thermal 380 MW (currently owns 100 MW) 2020 
CC de Warnes (Santa Cruz de la Sierra) 406 Thermal  320 MW (currently owns 160 MW) 2020 
CC Del Sur (Tarija) 463 Thermal 320 MW (currently owns 160 MW) 2020 
Incahuasi Field (Santa Cruz) 1,200 Natural gas 7 Mm3/d (currently owns 4.7 Mm3/d) 2017 
Electricity Losses in T&D - T&D losses 14% 2013 
Br Electricity Losses in T&D - T&D losses 15% 2013 
Py 
TL Itaipu - Villa Hayes  555 TL 1,200 MW 2014 
Rios interiores 1,140 Hydro 500 MW 2025 
Electricity Losses in T&D - T&D losses 27% 2013 
Uy Electricity Losses in T&D - T&D losses 19% 2013 
Ve Electricity Losses in T&D - T&D losses 33% 2013 
Ar-Br ‘Swap’ entre Brasil-Argentina - TL 2,000 MW 2017 
Br-Uy Pte. Médici (Br) - San Carlos (Uy) 349 TL 500 MW 2017 
Source: Own elaboration based on MS (2017), IMF (2016), YÉPEZ et al. (2016), BERTERO (2015), BID, FOCEM-Mercosur, ENDE, ENDE Andina, Hydro Review, 




Regarding Argentina, the growth production of Vaca Muerta is considered, mainly 
located in the province of Neuquén, but also including the provinces of Río Negro, La 
Pampa and Mendoza. The cumulative investment in the period 2012-2020 will be US$ 
40,000 million and the projected growth of shale gas production is 55 MMm3/day (2020), 
135 MMm3/day (2025) and 270 MMm3/day (2030), according to BERTERO (2015). 
Approximately 10% of this production is aimed at generating electricity.  
It is worth mentioning that already in the reference scenario the possibility of energy swap 
between Argentina and Brazil is considered, using existing transmission lines at 500 kV 
of up to 2,000 MW. Electricity losses in transmission and distribution (T&D) are 
considered 15% (YÉPEZ et al., 2016). 
In the case of Bolivia, new hydroelectric, thermal and solar PV plants are considered for 
domestic and export purposes. Among the hydropower projects, Miguillas, Misicuni, 
Ivirizu and San José stand out, most of them located in the Cochabamba department. The 
Miguillas hydroelectric power plant project is divided into hydroelectric power plants in 
cascade, located in the department of La Paz, has a total investment of US$ 448 million 
and a power of 203 MW. The first one, Miguillas 1 - Palillada, has an installed capacity 
of 118 MW and starts operating in 2019. The second one, Miguillas 2 - Umapalca, has an 
installed capacity of 85 MW and starts operating in 2022. The plant is in the Optimal 
Expansion Plan of the Bolivian National Interconnected System 2022 and has financing 
of the BCB (IMF, 2016). 
The Misicuni hydroelectric plant is located in the department of Cochabamba and has a 
total investment of US$ 142 million. The financing of the plant came from the IDB and 
(Bolivian) National Treasury (TGN) (IMF, 2016). The dam has an installed capacity of 
120 MW and starts operating in 2018. The Ivirizu hydroelectric plant is also located in 
the Cochabamba department and has a total investment of US$ 550 million. It has an 
installed capacity of 280 MW and it will start operating as early as 2022. 
Like Miguillas, the San José hydroelectric project is also divided into two stages, totaling 
US$ 245 million and 124 MW of power. Project funding came from the IDB and CAF 
(IMF, 2016). It is also located in the Cochabamba department, the first phase has an 
installed capacity of 55 MW and starts operation in 2018, while the second has installed 




With regard to solar PV projects in progress in Bolivia, Solar Uyuni and Solar Yunchará 
stand out. The first one is located in the province of Potosí, has a total investment of US$ 
94 million and a power of 60 MW. The financing of the plant came from BCB (IMF, 
2016). The second PV plant is located in the province of Tarija, with a total investment 
of US$ 9.4 million (ten times lower) and a power of 5 MW (twelve times lower). Both 
projects go into operation in 2018. 
Regarding thermal power plants, it should be noted that Siemens and ENDE Andina 
signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in November 2015. It will promote the 
expansion of the already existing Entre Ríos, Warnes and Del Sur thermal plants, all 
starting operating in 2020, totaling 480 MW each and with BCB financing (IMF, 2016). 
Entre Ríos thermal plant is located in Cochabamba department, has an investment of US$ 
463 million and will have its installed capacity increased by 380 MW. Warnes thermal 
plant is located in Santa Cruz de la Sierra department, has an investment of US$ 406 
million and will have its installed capacity increased by 320 MW. In addition, the Warnes 
thermal plant will have conversion from single cycle to combined cycle. Finally, Del Sur 
thermal plant is located in Tarija department, has an investment of US$ 463 million and 
will also have its installed capacity increased by 320 MW.  
With regard to natural gas, Incahuasi Field is located in the municipality of Lagunillas, in 
Santa Cruz de la Sierra department, and has an investment of US$ 1,200 million, and 
reached a production capacity of 7 Mm3/d (currently owns 4.7 Mm3/d) in 2017. It is 
noteworthy that 90% of this production is aimed at exports to Argentina. Besides, 
electricity losses in T&D in Bolivia are 14% (YÉPEZ et al., 2016). 
As for Brazil, we stress the construction of the international interconnection Presidente 
Médici (Br) - San Carlos (Uy), 420 km long and 500 kV HVDC back-to-back, due to the 
difference in frequency between both countries. The transmission line costs US$ 349 
million, has a transmission capacity of 500 MW and has been operating since 2017. 
Electricity losses in T&D in Brazil are considered as 15%, same as Argentina (YÉPEZ et 
al., 2016). 
In Paraguay, there will be two transmission lines Itaipu - Villa Hayes and Yacyretá - Villa 
Hayes, being only the first one considered in the RIS. The line is 348 km long, costs US$ 
555 million, operates at 500kV, has a maximum transmission capacity of 1,200 MW and 




considered to be 27%, reaching 19% and 33% in Uruguay and Venezuela, respectively 
(YÉPEZ et al., 2016). 
Weak integration scenario (WIS) is based on the reference integration scenario (RIS). 
As with RIS, its focus is also national, precisely because it does not include advances of 
new regional integration projects. As its name suggests, there will be no progress of any 
project under study. In addition to what is considered in RIS, it considered lower hydro 
expansion capacity and reduced investment costs of biogas (from second generation) 
power plants and addition of distributed photovoltaic (PV) in Brazil235. Considering the 
already presented nature of alternative policies, it is perceived that WIS presents 
diversification of the power generation mix and considers socio-environmental 
vulnerability, without having any projects that increase international transactions and/or 
contribute to the harmonization of regulatory frameworks. 
The maximum capacity expansion in hydro plants in Brazil was set at a lower level of up 
to 200 MW per year in the Northern subsystem, 100 MW in the subsystems of the South 
and Southeast and no hydro expansion in Brazil’s Northeast. Besides, distributed PV was 
considered only in the electricity supply mix of Brazil to assess the impact of the 
penetration of this technology in 10% of households total, due to recent new regulations. 
Regarding the third measure, it was assumed that the long-term investment cost of new 
biogas power plants (US$ 2.449/kW) will converge to the investment cost of bagasse 
incineration plants in 2013 (US$ 1.905/kW) in Brazil (MOURA, 2017).  
Moderate integration scenario (MIS), as well as the weak integration scenario (WIS), 
is based on the reference integration scenario (RIS). The focus is on the moderate 
expansion of Mercosur region energy integration projects, considering national hydro 
projects in Bolivia and international interconnections between the countries analyzed.236 
Considering the already presented nature of the alternative policies, we note that the 
moderate scenario presents diversification of power generation mix, socio-environmental 
vulnerability, and has (bi)national projects that increase international transactions, 
without any conection to the desired harmonization of regional regulatory frameworks. 
                                                          
235 Although they come from different reference scenarios, the measures implemented in the Weak 
Integration Scenario (WIS) are the same as the Alternative Trade Scenario (ATS) present in MOURA 
(2017). 
236 Thus, just like in the RIS, it is necessary to consider neighbors involved in these projects, taking the 
analysis to the countries of the Southern Cone. It is indirectly considered Chile and Peru (Mercosur 









Technology Installed capacity Year 
Bo 
El Bala 1 Component 1 (Angosto Chepete 400) 
6,912 
Hydro 3,251 MW 2030 
El Bala 2 Component 2 (Angosto El Bala 220) Hydro 425 MW 2043 
Rositas 1,000 Hydro 400 MW 2024 
Bo TL with Ar, Br, Pe and Py 622 TL 8,000 MW (Br) + 700 MW (Ar) 2020* 
Bo-Ar Yaguacua (Bo) - Tartagal (Ar) - San Juancito (Ar) 60 TL 1,200 MW 2019 
Bo-Cl Punutuma (Bo) - Radomiro Pomic (Cl)  30,5 TL 180 MW 2021 
Bo-Pe 
Azángaro (Pe) - Juliaca - Puno (Bo) 81,3 TL 1,000 MW 2021 
La Paz (Bo) - Puno (Pe) 65 TL 150 MW 2022 
Py TL Yacyretá - Villa Hayes  297 TL 300 MW 2019 
Ar-Br 
Garabí (quota 89) 2,728 Hydro 1,152 MW 2026 
Panambí (quota 130) 2,474 Hydro 1,048 MW 2026 
Ar-Py 
Yacyretá - Aña Cuá 610 Hydro 270 MW 2022 
Yacyretá – 1st expansion (Yacyretá 3) 100 Hydro 465 MW 2023 
Yacyretá – 2nd expansion (Yacyretá 7) 2,300 Hydro 1,085 MW 2027 
Yacyretá - Itacorá-Itatí 6,000 Hydro 1,660 MW 2029 
Corpus Christi (Pindoí) 9,000 Hydro 3,500 MW 2030 




The only countries that have strictly national projects are Bolivia and Paraguay (although 
with export purposes). As previously reported in WIS and section 3.3, Bolivia is not 
interconnected with any neighboring country, despite its five international borders (with 
Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Paraguay and Peru). In this sense, it is the country that has the 
greatest remaining potential to promote these regional initiatives, ratifying the national 
objective of making the country the regional export heart. 
In Bolivia, the implementation of the El Bala hydroelectric plant, located on the Beni 
River, is considered. The construction of the plant will be divided into two stages, totaling 
3,676 MW of power with a total cost of approximately US$ 6,920 million (total 
generation of 18,048 GWh/year). El Bala Componente 1 (Angosto Chepete 400) has 
3,251 MW of installed capacity with reservoir, which at its peak extraordinary level 
would have an area of 680 km2. Component 2 (Angosto El Bala 220), is run-of-river, with 
a capacity of 425 MW and is located 2.5 km downstream. This component will take 
advantage of the regulated and overflow waters of Component 1. The executing company 
of the project is ENDE, with its own resources (IMF, 2016). It is worth mentioning that 
the production of electricity will be mainly destined to be exported to the Brazilian 
market. Component 1 will start operating in 2030 and component 2 in 2043237. 
Finally, the last Bolivian hydroelectric plant considered in MIS is Rositas, whose 
investment will be approximately US$ 1 billion and installed capacity of 400 MW. The 
plant aims at supplying domestic demand, as well as exporting electricity to Brazil and 
Chile (through TL of 100 MW for each country), and starts operating in 2024. As it can 
be seen, Bolivia plays a fundamental role in this scenario, already having a series of 
projects and initiatives considered in the reference integration scenario (RIS). The 
country’s goal is to create international interconnections with Argentina, Brazil, Peru and 
Paraguay totaling 1,359 km of extension. The total investment would reach US$ 622 
million and the goal would be to export 8,000 MW to Brazil and 700 MW to Argentina238. 
Bolivia will also create international interconnections with Argentina, Peru and Chile. 
With Argentina, the interconnection will have 110 km to 500 kV, it will have a total cost 
of US$ 60 million and it will link the Yaguacua (Bo) - Tartagal (Ar) - San Juancito (Ar) 
                                                          
237 Ende is studying a 615 km direct current transmission line from El Bala (Bo) to Montalvo (Pe), with an 
exchange of up to 1,000 MW. As they are only plans without major advances, this possibility was not 
incorporated in the scenario. 




regions. It has a maximum transmission capacity of 1,200 MW and it will start operating 
in 2019.  
With Chile, the interconnection will have 150 km at 230 kV, total cost will be around 
US$ 60 million and it will connect the regions Punutuma (Bo) - San Cristóbal (Bo) - 
Laguna Colorada (Bo) - Radomiro Pomic (Cl). It has a maximum transmission capacity 
of 180 MW and it will start operating in 2021. We must consider the diplomatic problems 
between Bolivia and Chile due to the dispute over the exit to the sea. Anyway, even the 
CIER 15 Project affirmed that the project is broadly attractive for the interconnected 
system.   
With Peru, two international interconnections are considered between the two 
countries239. The first of these links Azángaro (Pe) - Juliaca - Puno (Bo), has 114 km at 
220 kV, with a capacity of 1,000 MW. The estimated cost of the project is US$ 81.3 
million and will come into operation in 2021. The second links La Paz (Bo) - Puno (Pe), 
has 150 km at 230 kV, with a capacity of 150 MW. The estimated cost of the project is 
US$ 65 million and it enters into operation in 2022. In both cases it is necessary to have 
a back-to-back substation with converters, due to the difference in frequency between 
both systems. 
As presented in RIS, Paraguay already has Itaipu - Villa Hayes line, but now the country 
will also create a Yacyretá - Villa Hayes interconnection. The transmission line has a 
length of 362.9 km, costs US$ 297 million, operates at 500kV, has a maximum 
transmission capacity of 300 MW and operates from 2019.  
Argentina and Brazil will finally carry out the Garabí-Panambí binational hydroelectric 
complex, which totals 2,200 MW of installed capacity and starts operating in 2026. 
Garabí (quota 89) has a total investment of US$ 2,728 million, with 1,152 MW of power. 
Panambí (quota 130) has a total investment of US$ 2,474 million, with 1,048 MW. The 
construction of the plant is based on the Brazil-Argentina Treaty and its additional 
protocol, which make it possible to carry out hydroelectric studies in the Uruguay River 
region240. Both dams will be funded by the public sector of both countries, being part of 
                                                          
239 It should be noted that in order to carry out the operational studies between Bolivia and Peru, there are 
difficulties in determining the price of gas that vary widely between both countries (CIER, 2013). 




the Growth Acceleration Program 2 (PAC 2) being financed by BNDES (UDAETA et 
al., 2016). 
Yacyretá binational plant (Ar-Py) has four modifications to its initial project, which will 
increase its installed capacity by 3,480 MW. The first is the Aña Cuá branch, with an 
investment of US$ 610 million, contributing 270 MW and entering into operation in 2022. 
The second is the first expansion (Yacyretá 3), with an investment of US$ 100 million, 
contributing 465 MW and entering into operation in 2023. The third is the second 
expansion (Yacyretá 7), with an investment of US$ 2,300 million, contributing with 1,085 
MW and entering into operation in 2027. The fourth change is Itacorá-Itatí, with an 
investment of US$ 6 billion, contributing with 1,660 MW and entering operation only in 
2030 
Argentina and Paraguay also have the entry of Corpus Christi, whose total investment 
will be US$ 9 billion and installed capacity of 3,500 MW (although there would be a 
viability of 3,400 MW). The Pindoí location alternative (km 1,658) rises with more 
possibilities due to less flooded territory and lower environmental effects (IPPSE, 2017). 
As its name suggests, strong integration scenario (SIS) is the most audacious scenario. To 
be viable, there must be a series of changes, highlighted in section 2.3.1, such as: (i) 
political will; (ii) diplomatic engineering; (iii) institutional development; (iv) 
adaptation/harmonization of regulation related to cross-border trade; and (v) 
advancement of transmission and interconnection infrastructure. Precisely because of 
this, it was modeled on the moderate integration scenario (MIS), which already considers 
some of these prerequisites. 
Regarding this scenario, more than focusing on the expansion of installed capacity, we 
seek to optimize the use of existing infrastructure in the region. It is not limited to 
Mercosur countries (and their neighbors, to the extent that there are joint projects), but 
the analysis is extended to all of South America. Therefore, countries such as Ecuador 
and Colombia are considered, comprising almost all the States Parties and Associated 
States of Mercosur, making up almost the whole of South America. 
Considering the already presented nature of the alternative policies, we can see that the 
SIS presents a diversification of the power generation mix, considers socio-environmental 




presupposes the desired harmonization of regional regulatory frameworks. In this sense, 
this is the only scenario that acknowledges all the different natures of the alternative 
policies considered in the model. 
In this scenario, there are only projects involving two or more countries. Only one extra 
dam is considered, although facing popular resistance to advance (Cachuela Esperanza), 
given their socio-environmental impacts. At the same time, swaps are considered between 
Paraguay, Argentina and Chile241. Finally, the scenario considers new international 
interconnections, with Chile, Ecuador and Peru. 
 
                                                          
241 It should be noted that the reference integration scenario (RIS) already considers the possibility of 
electricity (or natural gas) swaps between Argentina and Chile, as well as between Argentina and Brazil. 
In the case of Chile, this mechanism occurred for the first time in October 2017, when Argentina sent 2 
MMm3 of natural gas to Chile, a volume that returned to the country in the same week. In December 2017, 
the ministers of energy of the two countries signed a bilateral agreement in Buenos Aires that will increase 










Technology Installed capacity Year 
Bo-Br Cachuela Esperanza (Beni) 2,460 Hydro 990 MW 2030 
Ar-Py-Br (500 kV, 321 km) - TL 2,000 MW 2030 
Py-Ar-Cl Swap de energía Paraguay - Argentina - Chile - TL 200 MW 2025 
Co-Ec* Alférez (Co) - Jamondino (Co) - Inga (Ec)  - TL 800 MW 2020 
Cl-Bo* Chuquicamata (Cl) - Laguna Colorada (Bo) 30 TL 120 MW 2020 
Pe-Ec* La Niña (Pe) - Daule (Ec)   522.25 TL 1,000 MW 2022 
Pe-Cl* 
Los Héroes (Pe) - Arica (Cl)  131.5 TL 200 MW 2020 
HVDC Montalvo (Pe) - Crucero (Cl) 989 TL 1,000 MW 2024 




Cachuela Esperanza dam (Bo-Br interconnection) will cost US$ 2,460 million, will have 
990 MW of installed capacity and will start operating in 2030. The plant will be located 
in the department of Beni, downstream of the Inambari project and its economic viability 
depends strongly on the construction of Cachuela Esperanza. Meanwhile, Cachuela 
Esperanza is located upstream of the Santo Antonio and Jirau plants in Brazil. 
It is worth noting that Cachuela Esperanza is in the National Development Plan of Bolivia 
(PND), with the purpose of providing electrical power to the populations located in the 
far north of the country and at the same time promoting the development of the Bolivian 
Amazon. As the size of the plant is very large for the Bolivian system, much of its 
generation will be exported to Brazil.  
However, Bolivia operates with frequency of 50 Hz and Brazil with 60 Hz, which requires 
converters in the project (increases its final cost). Therefore, there are two transmission 
lines between Bolivia and Brazil. One between Cachuela Esperanza (Bo) - Abuna (Br), 
of 105 km and with a transmission capacity of up to 200 MW. The other line from 
Cachuela Esperanza (Bo) - Porto Velho (Br), of 284 km through a double circuit of 500 
kV, with an investment of US$ 792 million. The commercial and regulatory aspects 
between both countries must still be agreed, but being Cachuela Esperanza a run-of-river 
project, the operative agreements would be simpler (OLADE, 2013). 
In the case of Cachuela Esperanza, public awareness of the importance of preserving the 
environment and respecting the rights and prerogatives of local communities, especially 
indigenous communities, is fundamental. An alternative to reservoirs would be to change 
the project into run-of-river, as they significantly reduce the flooded area, as well as socio-
environmental impacts. This is particularly important for Brazil, since (i) the remaining 
hydroelectric potential of the country is concentrated mainly in the Amazon region, whose 
flat topography imposes a relation of flooded area/unfavorable energy generation; and (ii) 
the country generates more than two-thirds of its energy from hydroelectricity (BIATO, 
2016). However, it is necessary to consider the side effect of the absence of reservoirs on 
the guarantee and stability of energy supply, especially if there is an impact and/or 
pressure on the construction of plants with reservoirs in neighboring countries in the 
border regions.  
The Argentina-Paraguay-Brazil interconnection consists of constructing a 321 km long 




link would allow optimizing the systems of the three countries besides Uruguay, which 
is interconnected with Argentina. Likewise, the probability of deficits in Brazil and 
Argentina would be reduced with a reduction in GHG emissions. This project is only in 
SIS because it would have to handle trade barriers linked to the Treaty of Itaipu (Br-Py), 
which did not allow the sale of energy to third countries (CAF, 2012). Therefore, it was 
considered that the project would only be carried out in 2030, since the discussions 
regarding Itaipu will only be clarified post-2023. It should be added that the problems of 
gas supply in Argentina are seasonal, due to the increased consumption for heating in 
winter (May to September), while in the same period the reservoirs in Brazil are full with 
some excess capacity for the system (OLADE, 2013). Here, there will be increased 
capacity for connections with Villa Hayes, which is considered in both reference 
integration scenario (RIS) and moderate integration scenario (MIS). 
The energy swap between Paraguay, Argentina and Chile would allow the most efficient 
use of energy among the countries. The purpose of this interconnection is to send 
hydroelectric power from Paraguay to the northern region of Chile (SING)242, where there 
is thermoelectric predominance. Given that Paraguay and Chile have no borders, the idea 
is that Paraguay would increase its energy dispatch by 200 MW for Argentina, through 
the binational Yacyretá plant, and Argentina in turn would send the same amount of 200 
MW to Chile. It is worth adding that the Paraguay-Argentina swap does not require 
investments in new transport capacity.  
The transmission lines would be as as follows: Yacyretá (Py) - Resistance (Ar) - Roque 
Sáenz Peña (Ar) - Monte Quemado (Ar) - Lumbreras/Cobos (Ar) - Atacama (Cl). The 
swap project between Paraguay, Argentina and Chile was one of the most attractive 
projects evaluated in CIER 15 Project, and it is a good example of the innovative use of 
optimizing the use of existing infrastructure (CIER, 2011). In order to implement this 
measure, a transmission line from Argentina to Chile with a capacity of 200 MW will be 
created in 2025. 
                                                          
242 When it comes to Chile, it is important to stress that its reforms were implemented in the aftermath of 
the protracted reduction of the gas supply from Argentina (from 2004) and the 2010 earthquake, which 
disrupted energy supplies and electricity transmission. Between 2006 and 2008, gas imports fell by 88% as 
a result of a curtailment of gas supply from Argentina (IEA, 2018). In fact, the gas disruption from 




The five interconnections below are part of the Andean Electric Interconnection System 
(SINEA)243, which involves the CAN countries. It is necessary to consider this project in 
the SIS, even considering that on April 24, 2017, Decision N. 816 was published with the 
‘Regulatory framework for sub-regional interconnection of electrical systems and 
electricity exchange’ among CAN countries. As such, they can be categorized in the 
following manner: (i) strengthening of existing interconnections; (ii) convenient 
interconnections to be developed in a bilateral scope; and (iii) convenient 
interconnections to be developed in a regional scope. SINEA gathers Chile, Colômbia, 
Equador e Peru, besides Bolivia as an observer (see section 3.2 and Appendix E).  
Within the bilateral scope, previous studies evaluate that the following interconnection 
alternatives are economically feasible: Equador - Peru, Peru - Chile (both) and Chile - 
Bolivia. Ecuador - Peru and Ecuador - Colombia projects are not feasible bilaterally 
because the benefits of Ecuador would not be enough to offset the investment costs of 
this country (COES-SINAC, 2016). Anyway, in the strong integration scenario (SIS), all 
interconnections will be considered. 
Colombia-Ecuador Interconnection is another project considered in the SIS. This 
interconnection is necessary to Ecuador, since the lack of investment in new generation 
capacity forced the country to use thermal power plants with high operating costs, which 
increased the marginal cost of the system, in addition to increasing the probability 
shortage. Colombia244, for its part, has a greater diversity of generation sources 
(hydroelectricity, natural gas, coal and petroleum derivatives), so its marginal costs of the 
system were much lower than in Ecuador, thus creating favorable conditions for the 
exchange of energy between both countries (OLADE, 2013). The suggested 
interconnection links Alférez (Co) - Jamondino (Co) - Inga (Ec), has 505 km of extension 
                                                          
243 In 2011, the Galapagos Declaration created the Council of Ministers of SINEA. The project seeks a 
feasible gradual advance with bilateral ties and has the proposed development of the Regional Electricity 
Market of SINEA countries (which would require changes/adjustments of regulations between countries). 
For this purpose, it suggests the following steps: (i) advance the regional electricity integration process with 
the Roadmap; (ii) advance bi-national electricity interconnections to achieve regional integration; and (iii) 
analyze and adopt regulatory harmonization agreement to confirm a regional electricity market in a gradual 
manner. 
244 Colombia signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with Australia that will allow the two nations 
to achieve greater cooperation between their respective hydrocarbon sectors. Additionally, the country 
signed a MoU with South Korea, which aims to implement a quality management system for liquid fuels 
in Colombia, as well as a tracking system for fuel performance and distribution of liquefied petroleum gas 
(LPG) (OLADE, 2017). It is then clear that Colombia has not been limited to the regional initiative to 





at 500 kV and maximum transmission capacity of 800 MW. It is scheduled to start 
operating in 2020. 
Chile-Bolivia interconnection links Chuquicamata (Cl) - Laguna Colorada (Bo), having 
140 km of extension to 220 kV. It has a maximum transmission capacity of 120 MW and 
is scheduled to start operating in 2020 (CIER, 2017c). Regarding the Peru-Ecuador 
interconnection, it should be noted that there is already an electricity interconnection 
between both countries of 100 MW, but it has not been able to be used due to regulatory 
problems and limitations of the transport systems. In addition, there is also an 
interconnection between Colombia and Ecuador, which is why operational studies must 
take into account the three systems together (OLADE, 2013). The proposed line connects 
La Niña (Pe) - Daule (Ec), has a length of 634.9 km at 500 kV. Its total cost will be US$ 
522.25 million, with a maximum transmission capacity of 1,000 MW and an expected 
start-up in 2022. 
There are two Peru-Chile interconnections. The first one interconnects Los Heroes (Pe) - 
Arica (Cl), it is a back-to-back connection of 220 kV and 70 km long. With a total 
investment of US$ 131.5 million, it has a maximum transmission capacity of 200 MW 
and is expected to start operating by 2020. The second interconnection links HVDC 
Montalvo (Pe) - Crucero (Cl) HVDC 500 kV, has 650 km in length and a total cost of 
US$ 989 million. Having a maximum transmission capacity of 1,000 MW, it is expected 
to start operating only in 2024.  
It is important to consider that the modeling of the scenarios in OSeMOSYS-SAMBA 
presents some limitations. For energy modeling, there was difficulty in accessing certain 
data, particularly in the case of Venezuela. In addition, some countries did not have 
energy expansion plans.  
Forecasts of all sorts are usually bad at predicting sudden changes (PALTSEV, 2016), 
and also difficult to make in the context of sudden changes. Consequently, it is worth 
highlighting the greater uncertainty regarding the scenarios due to the political-economic 
conjuncture that some countries face, particularly Brazil and Venezuela, as well as the 
possible change of political orientation in some countries of South America, with new 
presidential elections between 2018 and 2020.  
From a modeling perspective, the ‘commoditization’ of international oil and liquid natural 




policy. The advance of LNG, in particular, may lead to a reduced need to build new gas 
pipelines in the region, which is the reason why they were neither considered in any of 
the scenarios, nor in the strong integration scenario (SIS). Another recent change in the 
energy market is the possibility of distributed generation, which is considered in the 
different scenarios mainly by the entry of solar photovoltaic generation in some countries. 
However, smart grids are not considered in the model.  
Furthermore, due to modeling limitations, energy integration becomes an alternative to 
the need of having a complementary wind-solar-hydro energy matrix, as well as energy 
storage such as reversible hydropower, batteries, generators/fast-start engines, 
concentrated solar power (CSP) that accredits for the next 20 years (CIER, 2017b). 
Besides, to avoid discussions related to the food-water-energy nexus, it was assumed that 
only sugarcane was used for electricity generation, just like in MOURA (2017). 
It is worth highlighting the methodological and operational challenge of increasing 
renewable energies, such as wind and PV, in energy systems, due to the great variability 
in the short and medium term. In addition, the large-scale location of the projects 
considered in the scenarios is far from the main demand centers, which would require 
extra reinforcements and investments in the transmission system (with the exception of 
distributed PV). Thus, seasonal wind-solar-hydric complementarity, storage, batteries 
and increased participation of intermittent renewables constitute technical-operational 
and regulatory difficulties that increase the need for adequate energy planning, demand 
management, as well as regulatory framework. 
As for the scenarios themselves, it is necessary to consider some particularities. Due to 
the inability to predict what will happen with the renewal of GASBOL (2019) and the 
renegotiation of the Itaipu Treaty (2023), the reference integration scenario (RIS) has 
assumed that the relationship between the countries involved will remain partially the 
same, although Paraguay is bound to export less energy to Brazil at higher cost. It is 
assumed that, regarding GASBOL, prices will converge to international prices by 2058. 
Itaipu, in turn, will have its price increased until 2032, when it will converge to 
international prices. 
The weak integration scenario (WIS) already considers the development of some LT and 
power plants in the region, since it is based on the reference integration scenario (RIS). 




integration scenario (MIS) can be considered reasonably optimistic, since it already 
considers certain projects whose popular resistance is significant, mainly due to socio-
environmental impacts.  
On the other hand, the strong integration scenario (SIS), as its name suggests, considers 
projects that seem unlikely to happen in the next 10-15 years. Precisely for this reason, 
SIS is the scenario that has fewer measures. Nevertheless, not even the SIS considers 
some plants that although announced, their negotiations seem to be paused as it is the case 
of certain plants in Bolivia and Peru (both for export to Brazil).  
The binational Guajará-Mirim (Bo-Br) dam is one of the plants that were not considered. 
The project has 3,000 MW of installed capacity and costs about US$ 5 billion. It would 
also create a waterway network of 4,200 km navigable and stabilize the Jirau reservoir, 
adding 280 MW average generation. If the project were to advance, the objective of the 
Brazilian government would be to produce an agreement in accordance with the Itaipu 
Treaty. In 2016, Eletrobras and the Sustainable Consortium of Brazil (ESBR), which 
operates Jirau dam, signed memorandums of studies of the plant at the border with 
Bolivia. However, the only certainty of this venture up to date is its location. See 
Appendix H. 
However, the region potentially affected by the project has low population density, both 
in Bolivia and Brazil, lacking in terms of basic services. In this context, such large 
infrastructure project could be conceived as the anchor project for the implementation of 
social and development policies in the region (CASTRO et al., 2017). 
The potential for bilateral integration between Peru and Brazil is immense, even though 
there are socio-environmental, geopolitical and institutional challenges (MOREIRA, 
2016). However, Inambari dam was not considered even in the most optimistic scenario. 
The Inambari Dam (Pe-Br interconnection245) has an installed capacity of 2,200 MW, is 
located in the Peruvian Amazon (Cusco, Puno and Madre de Dios) and total cost of US$ 
4,847 million246. Of that amount, around US$ 800 million corresponds to the transmission 
line with Brazil. It is located on the eastern slope of the Peruvian Andes, just 260 km 
                                                          
245 The Agreement between Peru and Brazil with regard to the export of energy surpluses to Brazil, signed 
in June 2010, should be highlighted. See: 
http://www.minem.gob.pe/minem/archivos/file/Electricidad/acuerdo%20peru%20brasil%2016%20julio%
202010.pdf.  
246  Both Brazil and Peru have a frequency of 60 Hz. The back-to-back converter is required for stability 




away from the border with Brazil and therefore allows for the export of electricity to the 
country. 
The plant would have a multiannual regulatory capacity reservoir and is located upstream 
of the Brazilian power stations of Santo Antonio and Jirau. Due to environmental 
restrictions, these two plants are run-of-river and the Inambari dam, when it is completed, 
would allow regulating the flows of the two plants mentioned on the Brazilian side of the 
basin, adding 90 MW of firm power to the system (DAR, 2011). Two alternatives are 
being studied to connect Inambari to the Brazilian electric system (SIN) but we rely rather 
on the possibility of constructing a 500 kV transmission line of 810 km that would connect 
it with the Madeira river plants in Brazil247. In modeling, it is planned to start operating 
in 2025.  
It should be noted that Inambari would be the largest hydro in Peru and the fifth in Latin 
America. Notwithstanding, Peru has canceled the provisional license of the Inambari 
consortium (UDAETA et al., 2016) due to: (i) massive rejection of the population; (ii) 
rejection by institutions such as the College of Engineers, Regional Government of Puno; 
(iii) rejection by the indigenous organizations and defense fronts that were constituted; 
and (iv) legislation that was not yet as aggressive as today’s.248 It is estimated that about 
8,000 people will be affected by the project, which has a wetland area of 377.66 km2, a 
reservoir with 319 km2 of area. 
Besides, the following hydroelectric plants with Peru were not considered: Sumabeni 
(1,740 MW), Tambo 40 (1,286 MW), Tambo 60 (580 MW), Paquitzapango (2,000 MW), 
Urubamba (940 MW), Vizcatán Mainique I (607 MW) and Cuquipampa (800 MW). 
Together, these plants would add approximately 9,000 MW of installed capacity 
(UDAETA et al., 2016, DAR, 2011). The dams would be located in the Peruvian 
                                                          
247 The proximity of Inambari to Brazilian cities such as Rio Branco and Porto Velho does not necessarily 
mean that interconnection costs with Brazil are going to be reduced, since the consumption of these cities 
is not enough to absorb the injected energy from Peru. Therefore, it would be necessary to transport the 
difference to the southeast region of Brazil, where the large cargo centers are located. One possibility will 
be to take advantage of the transmission infrastructure (HVDC lines with 2,500 km) that is being built to 
evacuate the energy produced by Santo Antônio and Jirau to the Southeast (CIER, 2012). 




Amazon, a region that already has a deficient electrical infrastructure, marked by the 
existence of national parks, indigenous societies and socio-environmental conflicts249.   
As regards the northern region of the South American subcontinent, it is noted that the 
Arco Norte famous project was not considered (see section 3.3 and Appendix D). In 
2012, under Rio+20, it was defined that the project would contribute to LAC SE4ALL. 
In 2013, agencies, electricity companies, IDB and AFD formalized a MoU to study 
collaboration possibilities for electrical interconnection. Among the expected benefits of 
the initiative are: (i) increase energy security and reliability in electricity supply; (ii) 
reduce generation costs (enable large generating plants and reduce investments in reserve 
capacity); (iii) reduce dependence on oil (diversify the energy matrix of each country); 
and (iv) guarantee economic benefits (optimize electricity supply systems and provide 
lower rates to the final consumer).  
With Brazil, there would be two international interconnections. The first one links Brazil 
(Roraima) - Guyana, which is expected to start operating in 2025. The second one would 
link (Brazil) Amapá - French Guiana and would be expected to start operations only in 
2032. Both interconnections have capacity of a maximum transmission of 1,500 MW 
(LARREA et al., 2017). However, the logistical challenge of this project stands out given 
its geographical location. In addition, the OSeMOSYS-SAMBA model does not consider 
Guyana or French Guiana, which made it impossible to consider the Arco Norte Project 
in the scenario of more optimistic efforts towards integration.  
 
5.2.2 Results 
Moving on from the graphical analysis of section 5.1, which considered the period 
between 1990 and 2010 interspersed every five years, this subsection will provide an 
analysis with a planning horizon between 2015 and 2050250, also following the same time 
                                                          
249 It is important to consider other actors in this process, so as not to provide a naive analysis of the local 
reality. Therefore, more than just highlighting indigenous resistance, it is crucial to understand the weight 
of local economic groups that see these new projects as threatening competition for their plans and gains. 
There are even those who accuse such groups of financially supporting social groups and NGOs to create 
barriers to the advancement of these projects. 
250 The analyzes consider different 2050 pathways, as it has been done in different reports and scenarios, 
such as KPMG (2016), Europeam Comission (2016, 2011), Siemens (2014), UNCSD (2013), HONG et al. 
(2013), WEC (2016, 2013, 2007), IEA (2010, 2003) and Shell (2008), mainly when it comes to 




interval of five years. In this way, this section will analyze each one of the four scenarios 
presented, carrying out a comparative analysis whenever it is possible and relevant. Table 
26 shows the evolution of installed capacity (GW) and generation (TWh) for each 
Mercosur country during the period 2015-2050. 
 
Table 26. Evolution of RIS installed capacity and generation, by country (2015-2050) 
Countries 
Installed capacity (GW) Generation (TWh) 
2015 2025 2035 2045 2050 2015 2025 2035 2045 2050 
Ar 15.8% 14.3% 18.4% 19.6% 20.5% 14.3% 15.2% 15.7% 16.1% 16.2% 
Bo 1.0% 1.4% 2.2% 4.0% 4.4% 0.9% 1.4% 2.1% 3.1% 3.8% 
Br 62.2% 65.1% 63.2% 62.4% 61.5% 62.4% 63.0% 63.3% 63.4% 63.3% 
Py 4.2% 3.8% 3.0% 2.5% 2.7% 6.3% 4.8% 4.2% 3.6% 3.7% 
Uy 1.5% 1.6% 1.3% 1.0% 0.9% 1.1% 1.2% 1.1% 1.0% 0.9% 
Ve 15.2% 13.9% 12.0% 10.5% 9.9% 14.9% 14.4% 13.6% 12.7% 12.2% 
Mercosur 209.1 244.2 307.5 405.5 460.0 911.7 1,094.4 1,347.0 1,691.9 1,894.3 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
In the reference integration scenario (RIS), the participation of Brazil in terms of installed 
capacity, going from 130.1 GW (62.2%) in 2015 to 283.1 GW (61.5%) in 2050, is 
overwhelming (growth of 117.6%)251. Despite relative stability, Argentina (186.6%) and 
Bolivia (866.7%) expand their installed capacity further, while Paraguay, Uruguay and 
Venezuela lose relative weight.  
In Argentina, installed capacity is growing mainly due to wind onshore (from 2027 on) 
and NGOC (from 2023 on, with Vaca Muerta), replacing the relevance of NGCC, which 
falls significantly. Also, less intense falls in the participation of heavy fuel oil (diesel and 
fuel oil) and large hydro take place.  
                                                          
the United Nations Sustainable Development Solutions Network (UNDSN) has already stated that SDG 13 
(Climate Action) will need the development of deeper decarbonization pathways to 2050. Moreover, 
modeling framework is extended to 2058 in order to avoid so called ‘edge-effect’ considerations from 
affecting the reported results. 
251Although this participation shows a slight tendency to fall in the other scenarios, it is possible to affirm 




Bolivia has increased installed capacity between 2015 (2.1 GW, 1.0%) and 2050 (20.3 
GW, 4.4%) due to the expansion/creation of hydroelectric plants (Miguillas 1 and 2, 
Misicuni, Ivirizu, San José 1 and 2), solar plants (Solar Uyuni and Solar Yunchará) and 
thermal to combined cycle plants (CC Entre Ríos, CC de Warnes and CC Del Sur). This 
pressured the decline of NGOP and NGCC participation in the country, leading Bolivia 
to surpass Paraguay’s installed capacity as early as 2039, reflecting national plans to make 
the country the region's energy exporter. 
In Brazil, installed capacity is pressured by the increase in the share of wind onshore 
(from 2024 on), NGCC (from 2027 on), pulverized coal and the high (although with more 
stable growth) large hydro participation. By the way, large hydro has its proportion in 
national installed capacity reduced from 68.1% (2015) to 42.3% (2050).  
Due to the significant weight of Itaipu in the installed capacity of Paraguay and Yacyretá 
(albeit to a lesser extent), Paraguayan installed capacity changed marginally in the 
analyzed period. There is participation of wind onshore (from 2044 on) and open cycle 
NG (only from 2047 on). There is an increase of 43.6% of national installed capacity 
between 2015 (8.8 GW, 4.2%) and 2050 (12.6 GW, 2.7%). 
Similar to the Paraguayan case, Uruguay has a significant installed capacity based on 
Salto Grande (with Argentina) binational plants. A significant drop in the share of heavy 
fuel (from 2018) is compensated by increased biomass installed capacity (from 2020 on), 
wind onshore (from 2025 on), coal (from 2026 on) and small hydro252 (from 2031 on). 
There is a 33.0% increase in national installed capacity between 2015 (3.2 GW, 1.5%) 
and 2050 (4.2 GW, 0.9%). 
Venezuela also counts on the Guri dam installed capacity and sustained large hydro 
growth, especially after 2026, which replaces heavy fuel and NGOC. There was a 43.4% 
increase in national installed capacity between 2015 (31.9 GW, 15.2%) and 2050 (45.7 
GW, 9.9%), 
Indeed, the generation of each Mercosur country is in some way related to its installed 
capacity, as well as to the level of international insertion in terms of energy integration 
(number of international interconnections and binational plants). However, it is worth 
mentioning the small increase accumulated in installed capacity in Uruguay (33.0%) for 
                                                          




the period 2015-2050, which leads to an increase in the capacity factor of the country’s 
plants (the same is true for Venezuela, because neither is involved in new projects in any 
of the four scenarios). 
In Argentina, the generation from NGCC stands out, which falls in 2025 (although it 
remains significant until 2040). Wind onshore (from 2034 on) and large hydro (in a 
continuous way, with greater weight also from 2034 on) have significant and growing 
weight in Bolivia’s electricity generation; this increase in generation replaces NGOC, 
small hydro and NGCC, falling to 7.0% (2050), 0.7% (2050) and 0.8% (2050) 
respectively. 
In the case of Brazil, the weight of large hydro (including Belo Monte, Itaipu, Madeira 
and Tapajós) remains huge, despite its fall; it decreases to 47.4% (2050). The wind 
generation onshore, NGCC and coal generation grow to 15.2% (2050), 10.2% (2050) and 
9.2% (2050), respectively. In Paraguay, the generation of Itaipu and Yacyretá 
hydroelectric plants accounts for 98.3% (2015) and 81.7% (2050), maintaining the 
country’s generating matrix profile relatively stable (it loses prominency to wind onshore, 
especially as of 2045). 
In Uruguay, generation from large hydro (including Salto Grande) is responsible for 
63.3% (2015) and 38.3% (2050), being replaced by wind onshore, coal and biomass (in 
addition to wind offshore, from 2049 on). Finally, the generation of Venezuela is 
progressively replaced by large hydro, which surpasses 50% of the total generation as 
early as 2035. This hydro generation largely replaces generation from the NGOC. 
In general, Mercosur’s installed capacity increases by 120.0% between 2015 (209.1 GW) 
and 2050 (460.0 GW). The generation of Mercosur, in turn, increases 107.8% between 
2015 (911.7 GW) and 2050 (1,894.3 GW). 
Figure 23 shows the evolution of Mercosur’s installed capacity by country in the period 
2015-2050, in TWh. It can be seen that it falls in relation to the installed capacity of South 





Figure 23. Evolution of RIS installed capacity (GW), by country (2015-2050) 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
With the expansion of RIS installed capacity, an accumulated fall of 50.6% of the 
transactions through the TL between 2015 (43.2 TWh) and 2050 (21.3 TWh) is observed, 
leading to a fall in the capacity factor of TL between 2015 (4.7%) and 2050 (1.1%). This 
was due to the drop in transmission of energy from Paraguay to Brazil (by Itaipu). These 
results together confirm that making plans to expand installed capacity in the countries in 
a disjointed and disintegrated way leads not only to the need of greater investments in 
new plants, but also to the greater idleness of existing plants and TLs.    
In the installed capacity shown by the weak integration scenario (WIS), similar to RIS, 
Brazil also stands out. Between 2015 and 2050, Argentina’s installed capacity ranges 
from 33.1 GW (15.8%) to 94.9 GW (20.4%); of Bolivia, it goes from 2.1 GW (1.0%) to 
20.3 GW (4.4%); in Brazil, from 130.1 GW (62.2%) to 288.7 (62.0%); in Paraguay, from 
8.8 GW (4.2%) to 12.0 GW (2.6%); in Uruguay, from 3.2 GW (1.5%) to 4.2 GW (0.9%); 
finally, in Venezuela, installed capacity goes from 31.9 GW (15.3%) to 45.7 GW (9.8%).  
The installed capacity of Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela behaves 
similarly to RIS, since there are no alternative measures for these countries in the WIS. 
Table 27 shows the evolution of installed capacity (GW) and generation (TWh) for each 




Table 27. Evolution of WIS installed capacity and generation, by country (2015-2050) 
Countries 
Installed capacity (GW) Generation (TWh) 
2015 2025 2035 2045 2050 2015 2025 2035 2045 2050 
Ar 15.8% 14.6% 18.5% 19.4% 20.4% 14.3% 14.9% 15.5% 15.9% 16.1% 
Bo 1.0% 1.4% 2.2% 3.9% 4.4% 0.9% 1.4% 2.1% 3.0% 3.7% 
Br 62.2% 64.6% 63.3% 62.9% 62.0% 62.4% 63.7% 64.0% 64.2% 63.9% 
Py 4.2% 3.8% 3.0% 2.4% 2.6% 6.3% 4.8% 4.1% 3.4% 3.4% 
Uy 1.5% 1.6% 1.2% 1.0% 0.9% 1.1% 1.2% 1.0% 1.0% 0.9% 
Ve 15.3% 13.9% 11.9% 10.3% 9.8% 14.9% 14.0% 13.3% 12.5% 12.0% 
Mercosur 209.1 242.9 309.7 410.5 465.7 911.7 1,128.1 1,380.1 1,723.4 1,926.4 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
In Brazil, the installed capacity of large hydro (including Belo Monte, Itaipu, Madeira 
and Tapajós) stands out (although it is decreasing), as well as the installed capacity of 
wind onshore, NGCC and biomass. As one of the alternative measures in the WIS is the 
increased installed capacity of distributed PV in all 4 subsystems of the country, it can be 
seen that it reaches 2.1 GW (1.2%) in 2030 and 8.8 GW (3.0%) in 2050. In terms of 
generation, this value increases to 5.2 TWh (2030), 11.2 TWh (2040) and 20.3 TWh 
(2050).  
Another WIS alternative measure is the limit to expand large hydro in Brazil, which 
means that the reduction of generation hits a record of -14.3 TWh (2044) when compared 
to the generation of the same year in RIS. Finally, the last WIS particular measure 
considers lower investment costs of biogas (from second generation) power plants. This 
measure affects generation in Brazil (from 2041), reaching 5.7 GW (0.5% of total 
generation) in 2050. 
Thus, Brazil is the only country that undergoes significant changes when compared to 
RIS, either in installed capacity or in generation. The drop in generation from large hydro 
is offset by increased biogas, biomass and NGCC generation. Relatively to RIS, the 
generation from biogas reaches 5.7 GW (2050); generation from biomass reaches 6.3 GW 
(2030), 5.7 GW (2040) and 16.7 GW (2050); in the case of NGCC, the generation grows 
13.0 GW (2030), 10.8 GW (2040) and 5.7 GW (2050). It can be seen that the three 
alternative measures of the WIS led to greater diversification of Brazil’s power generation 




Similar to RIS, Mercosur loses ground in South America both in terms of installed 
capacity and generation, mainly due to Colombia’s growing weight in the regional energy 
scenario. Again, as in RIS, extra-Mercosur countries are not considered in the scenarios 
(only in MIS and WIS).   
Therefore, regarding the nature of its alternative policies, WIS touches the: (i) 
diversification of the power generation; and (ii) consideration of socio-environmental 
vulnerability. However, in the face of a pessimistic scenario in terms of regional energy 
integration, what is observed in the Mercosur region is an increase in installed capacity 
of +3.7 GW (2040) and +5.7 GW (2050) and of generation of +33.7 TWh (2040) and 
+32.1 TWh (2050).  
In addition, we can see the fall in transactions by TL in 2045 (-1 TWh, -5.0%) and 2050 
(-4.1 TWh, -19.4%), leading to the fall in the capacity factor of TLs between 2015 (4.7%) 
and 2050 (0.9%). This was mainly due to the drop in energy transmission from Paraguay 
to Argentina (by Yacyretá) and to Brazil (by Itaipu), as well as from Brazil to Uruguay 
(TL Presidente Médice - San Carlos). These results together confirm what has been 
systematically defended throughout the thesis, that is, scenarios of less integration are less 
efficient from the point of view of investments in expanding regional installed capacity. 
Drawing a comparison with sections 2.1. and 4.2, in this scenario of less energy 
integration there would be greater interference when it comes to geography, in addition 
to probably greater socio-environmental impacts.   
Moreover, it also indicates higher investment and operational costs. The former as a 
consequence of higher penetration of other renewables (non-hydro) technologies, such as 
photovoltaic distributed, and the latter due to higher fuel spending, as the NGCC plants 
become an important supply source (MOURA, 2017)253.   
Regarding the moderate integration scenario (MIS), it is noteworthy that installed 
capacity increases between 2015 (209.1 GW) and 2050 (455.7 GW). Despite this, the 
total installed capacity of MIS is lower in 2050 than WIS (-10.0 GW). Table 28 shows 
the evolution of installed capacity (GW) and generation (TWh) for each of the Mercosur 
countries in the period 2015-2050. 
                                                          
253 Similar to what happened in the Alternative Trade SAMBA (ATS), scenario of little integration proposed 




Table 28. Evolution of MIS installed capacity and generation, by country (2015-2050) 
Countries 
Installed capacity (GW) Generation (TWh) 
2015 2025 2035 2045 2050 2015 2025 2035 2045 2050 
Ar 15.8% 14.2% 18.2% 20.1% 20.4% 14.3% 15.1% 14.5% 15.2% 15.5% 
Bo 1.0% 1.9% 2.9% 3.5% 4.2% 0.9% 1.6% 2.4% 3.2% 3.9% 
Br 62.2% 64.6% 60.9% 61.0% 61.0% 62.4% 62.8% 62.4% 62.8% 62.8% 
Py 4.2% 3.9% 5.0% 3.8% 3.4% 6.3% 4.9% 6.1% 5.0% 4.6% 
Uy 1.5% 1.6% 1.3% 1.0% 1.0% 1.1% 1.2% 1.1% 1.0% 0.9% 
Ve 15.3% 13.8% 11.8% 10.5% 10.0% 14.9% 14.4% 13.6% 12.7% 12.2% 
Mercosur 209.1 244.5 311.8 403.6 455.7 911.7 1,095.4 1,349.9 1,693.2 1,896.2 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
In Argentina, the increase in installed capacity with the Garabí dam (1,152 MW, in 2016), 
Panambí (1,038 MW, in 2016), Yacyretá - 1st expansion (465 MW, in 2023), Yacyretá - 
2nd expansion (1,085 MW, in 2027), Yacyretá - Itacorá-Itatí (1,660 MW, in 2029) and 
Corpus Christi (3,500 MW, in 2030), as well as NGOP (after 2032), is compensated by 
the decrease in installed capacity of wind onshore (after 2027), NGCC (after 2022), 
geothermal (between 2034-2043), coal (2040) and CSP (after 2046). In Bolivia, the 
installed capacity of MIS compared to RIS over the period falls. Although there has been 
a significant increase with the expansion and creation of new binational power plants, 
especially in the 2020s and early 2030s, and a modest increase in installed coal capacity 
(from 2040 onwards), it is offset by the sharp drop in installed wind capacity onshore 
from 2035 and timid geothermal fall. 
In Brazil, the drop in installed capacity relative to RIS is significant especially since 2035, 
peaking in 2045 (-7.0 GW). In 2025, the strong increase in biomass and large hydro 
installed capacity overturns the installed capacity of wind onshore and thermals that use 
clean coal254. Paraguay’s installed capacity is an exception, given the expansion of 
Yacyretá - Villa Hayes TL (300 MW in 2019), Yacyretá expansions (3,480 MW at the 
end of 2029) and the start of the Corpus operation (3,500 MW, in 2030). 
                                                          




Neither in Uruguay nor in Venezuela is there a significant change in the installed capacity 
of the plants compared to RIS. This is strongly due to the fact that neither country is 
involved in expansion projects in MIS.  
Compared to WIS, Brazil’s installed capacity fell further in 2030 (-230 MW), 2040 (-8.7 
GW) and 2050 (-10.5 GW), peaking in 2045 (-12.2 GW). This is due not only to Garabí-
Panambí dam (2,200 MW), but also to the fact that, unlike WIS, no ‘alternative measures’ 
are considered, which have led to the increase and diversification of installed capacity 
and the Brazilian power generation.    
In terms of generation in the MIS, it grew by 108.0% between 2015 (911.7 TWh) and 
2050 (1,896.2 TWh), with the participation of the generation of Bolivia and Paraguay in 
Mercosur. Although total generation relative to RIS falls to 2025, it grows up to 2050 
(reaching maximum generation growth in 2041) due to new ventures particularly in 
Bolivia. The fall of generation in Argentina and Brazil is compensated by Paraguay, 
especially from 2035 on. Comparing the generation of the MIS with the one of the WIS, 
it is perceived that it is much lower in 2050 (-30.2 TWh). 
Thus, regarding the nature of its alternative policies, MIS considers the first three: (i) 
diversification of the power generation mix; (ii) consideration of socio-environmental 
vulnerability; and (iii) (bi)national projects that increase international transactions. Unlike 
the WIS, increased integration between countries has led Mercosur to drop installed 
capacity of -1.9 GW (2045) and -4.4 GW (2050) against RIS. Compared to WIS, installed 
capacity fell -2.3 GW (2040), -7.0 GW (2045) and -10.0 GW (2050), while the generation 
drop was -28.8 TWh (2030), -31.1 TWh (2040) and -30.2 TWh (2050).  
In addition, the increase in international transactions compared to RIS was observed 
through TL in 2030 (+10.8 TWh, + 34.1%), 2040 (+27.3 TWh, + 110.0%) and 2050 
(+19.1 TWh, + 89.7%). This was mainly due to the increased transmission of energy from 
Paraguay to Argentina (by Yacyretá) and, more timidly, from Paraguay to Brazil (by 
Itaipu). Also noteworthy is the role played by the new TLs of Bolivia with Argentina, 
Chile and Peru, which start operating from 2020 and correspond to about 7.3% of the total 
transacted in all operation period. Again, these results confirm that more integration 
scenarios are more efficient because they require less installed capacity. In MIS, Paraguay 




When it comes to the nature of its alternative policies, strong integration scenario (SIS) 
touchs all of them: (i) diversification of the power generation mix; (ii) consideration of 
socio-environmental vulnerability; (iii) (bi)national projects that increase international 
transactions; and (iv) harmonization of regional regulatory frameworks. In this way, 
installed capacity increases between 2015 (209.1 GW) and 2050 (453.7 GW), although 
to a lesser extent when compared to RIS. 
Table 29 shows the evolution of installed capacity (GW) and generation (TWh) for each 
of the MERCOSUR countries in the period 2015-2050.  
 
Table 29. Evolution of SIS installed capacity and generation, by country (2015-2050) 
Countries 
Installed capacity (GW) Generation (TWh) 
2015 2025 2035 2045 2050 2015 2025 2035 2045 2050 
Ar 33.1 34.1 57.8 81.5 93.5 130.5 164.8 196.4 258.6 294.5 
Bo 2.1 4.3 9.4 14.1 18.9 8.3 16.6 32.0 54.9 74.0 
Br 130.1 157.9 188.2 243.9 275.6 568.9 688.6 840.2 1060.7 1189.7 
Py 8.8 9.6 15.5 15.5 15.5 57.8 54.3 82.1 84.5 87.8 
Uy 3.2 3.8 3.9 4.2 4.5 10.1 12.4 14.4 16.6 17.2 
Ve 31.9 33.8 36.8 42.4 45.7 136.2 157.9 183.3 215.7 231.6 
Mercosur 209.1 243.6 311.6 401.6 453.7 911.7 1,094.6 1,348.5 1,690.9 1,894.9 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
Unlike WIS, increased integration between countries255 allows Mercosur to have a drop 
in installed capacity expansion of -3.8 GW (2045) and -6.3 GW (2050) compared to RIS. 
Compared to WIS, the installed capacity fell -8.9 GW (2045) and -12.0 GW (2050), while 
the generation drop was -28.8 TWh (2030), -30.3 TWh (2040) and -33.8 TWh (2050). 
Compared to MIS, the installed capacity fell by -1.4 GW (2040), -1.9 GW (2045) and -
2.0 GW (2050), while the generation drop was -210 GWh (2030), -2.0 TWh (2040) and -
2.2 TWh (2045). 
In this way, and after presenting the results of all scenarios, the following tables and 
figures will provide a comparative analysis of total installed capacity (GW) and total 
                                                          




(TWh) and technology generation, as well as electricity exchanges between countries 
(TWh)256, share of international transmission lines in total generation (%), and total 
emissions (MtCO2e). Table 30 below summarizes a comparative analysis between 
installed (GW) and generation (TWh) capacities of the four scenarios discussed. 
 
Table 30. Comparative installed capacity and generation, by scenario (2015-2050) 
Scenarios 
Installed capacity (GW) Generation (TWh) 
2015 2025 2035 2045 2050 2015 2025 2035 2045 2050 
RIS 209.1 244.2 307.5 405.4 460.0 911.7 1,094.4 1,347.0 1,691.9 1,894.3 
WIS 209.1 242.9 309.7 410.5 465.7 911.7 1,131.8 1,385.2 1,727.9 1,933.7 
MIS 209.1 244.5 311.8 403.6 455.7 911.7 1,095.4 1,349.9 1,693.2 1,896.2 
SIS 209.1 243.6 311.6 401.6 453.7 911.7 1,094.6 1,348.5 1,690.9 1,894.9 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
Figure 24 shows the graphical evolution of installed capacity (GW) for each alternative 
scenarios (WIS, MIS and SIS) relative to RIS; thus, each curve indicates the difference 
of the values of the scenarios analyzed against RIS. It is clear the direct relationship 
between greater integration and reduction of the need to increase regional installed 
capacity, as highlighted in section 2.3. Against the trend of MIS and SIS, there is an 
increasing trend in WIS installed capacity. 
 
 
                                                          
256 It is important not to use the term ‘trade’ in this type of exchange, due to the peculiarities of of energy 





Figure 24. Comparative evolution of net installed capacity related to RIS, by scenario, 
in GW (2015-2050) 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
Table 31 shows the installed capacity of Mercosur (GW) for each of the scenarios 
detailed by technology. Note the large and decreasing participation of large hydro, as well 
as the decrease of the participation of nuclear, diesel and fuel oil. On the other hand, 













Table 31. Installed capacity of alternative scenarios, by technology, in GW (2015-2050) 
Technology 
Installed capacity (GW) 
2015 
2050 
RIS WIS MIS SIS 
Biogas 0.0% 0.0% 1.9% 0.0% 0.0% 
Biomass* 4.8% 5.4% 5.9% 5.4% 5.5% 
NGCC 6.2% 8.4% 8.6% 7.2% 6.8% 
Clean coal 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Coal 1.8% 7.7% 7.2% 7.4% 7.6% 
CSP 0.0% 4.4% 4.2% 3.8% 3.8% 
Geothermal 0.0% 0.9% 0.9% 0.7% 0.7% 
Diesel and fuel oil 7.5% 2.2% 1.5% 2.2% 2.0% 
Nuclear 2.4% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 
NGOC 12.0% 4.9% 4.7% 5.8% 5.9% 
PV 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 
Distributed PV 0.0% 0.0% 1.9% 0.0% 0.0% 
Large hydro 64.8% 38.6% 36.0% 43.0% 43.2% 
Small hydro 2.8% 2.1% 2.2% 2.2% 2.2% 
Wind offshore 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 
Wind onshore 1.6% 24.7% 24.5% 21.8% 21.8% 
Total 209.1 460.0 465.7 455.7 453.7 
Source: own elaboration; * incineration. 
 
It is worth noting the strong fall in the share of nuclear energy in Argentina and Brazil, 
which leads us to question the approval of nuclear projects in the two countries, either 
because of their real competitiveness or because of (geo)political decisions. In addition, 
the participation of coal (increase) and clean coal (decrease) is highlighted, which leads 
to the need to discuss the urgency to promote carbon-pricing instruments (carbon tax, 
cap-and-trade or mechanisms hybrids) in the region, which would favor generation from 
less carbon-intensive technologies. 
Figure 25 does the same analysis of Figure 24, but based on the evolution of Mercosur 
generation (TWh). Again, the previous argument is ratified as it considerably increases 





Figure 25. Comparative evolution of net generation related to RIS, by scenario, in TWh 
(2015-2050) 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
Analogously to Table 31, Table 32 shows the generation in Mercosur (TWh) for each of 
the scenarios detailed by technology. Note the constant participation of bagasse 
incineration plants. It is also noticed that despite the expansion and construction of 

















RIS WIS MIS SIS RIS 
Biogas 0.0% 0.0% 0.3% 0.0% 0.0% 
Biomass* 4.8% 7.5% 8.2% 7.6% 7.7% 
NGCC 7.8% 7.6% 7.8% 6.5% 6.1% 
Clean coal 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Coal 1.6% 9.1% 8.8% 8.7% 9.1% 
CSP 0.0% 3.7% 3.6% 3.2% 3.2% 
Geothermal 0.1% 1.6% 1.6% 1.1% 1.1% 
Diesel and fuel oil 2.8% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 
Nuclear 2.4% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 
NGOC 6.3% 2.8% 2.7% 3.3% 3.3% 
PV 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Distributed PV 0.0% 0.0% 1.1% 0.0% 0.0% 
Large hydro 76.9% 45.6% 44.5% 49.8% 49.8% 
Small hydro 2.5% 2.7% 2.8% 2.7% 2.7% 
Wind offshore 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 
Wind onshore 1.2% 18.4% 18.1% 16.3% 16.3% 
Total 911.7 1894.3 1926.4 1896.2 1894.9 
Source: own elaboration; * incineration. 
 
In addition, there is an increase in international transactions with respect to RIS through 
TL in 2030 (+11.4 TWh, +36.1%), 2040 (+27.3 TWh, +110.2%) and 2050 (+20.5 TWh, 
+ 96.2%). This was mainly due to the increase in the energy transmission from Bolivia to 
Brazil, through Cachuela Esperanza (since 2030). However, the SINEA Project, despite 
its difficulties, has a marginal contribution to the installed capacity of South America 
(1.2% in 2050).  
Table 33 shows the electricity exchanges in SIS between South American countries in 
2050. Compared to Table 4 (Chapter 3), it is possible to perceive not only the 
quantitative increase in energy exchange between countries, but also the new 





 Table 33. Electricity exchanges in SIS between countries, in TWh (2050)  
Country 
Electricity exports (TWh) 





















Ar - 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 20,7 0,0 0,0 20,7 49,4% 
Bo 0,0 - 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0% 
Br 0,6 2,0 - 0,0 0,0 0,0 1,4 13,5 0,2 0,1 17,9 42,7% 
Cl 0,3 0,1 0,0 - 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,4 0,9% 
Co 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 - 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,2 0,6% 
Ec 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 - 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,2 0,4% 
Pe 0,0 0,5 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 - 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,5 1,3% 
Py 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 - 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0% 
Uy 0,9 0,0 0,9 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 - 0,0 1,9 4,4% 
Ve 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 - 0,1 0,2% 
Total 
exports 
1,8 2,6 0,9 0,0 0,2 0,2 1,5 34,2 0,2 0,2 
41,8 100,0% 
% 
exports 4,4% 6,2% 2,3% 0,0% 0,6% 0,4% 3,5% 81,7% 0,4% 0,6% 100,0% 
 
Source: own elaboration. 
 
This is evident from Figure 34, which shows both the evolution of the electricity 
exchanges (TWh) and the evolution of its capacity factor (%) for South American 
countries. Despite having installed capacity expansion in most countries in the region, 
transmission through international interconnections in MIS and SIS is increasing, 
especially in 2035 and 2045. On the other hand, in the case of WIS, this figure falls 
sharply from 43.2TWh (2015) to 17.2 TWh (2050). In spite of an increase in transactions 









Table 34. Electricity exchanges in SIS between countries, in TWh (2050) 
Scenarios 
Transmission (TWh) TL capacity factor (%) 
2015 2025 2035 2045 2050 2015 2025 2035 2045 2050 
RIS 43,2 32,4 28,2 20,5 21,3 4,7% 3,0% 2,1% 1,2% 1,1% 
WIS 43,2 34,5 29,2 19,5 17,2 4,7% 3,1% 2,1% 1,1% 0,9% 
MIS 43,2 36,6 55,9 46,5 40,4 4,7% 3,3% 4,1% 2,7% 2,1% 
SIS 43,2 36,2 56,6 47,6 41,8 4,7% 3,3% 4,2% 2,8% 2,2% 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
Figure 26 shows the evolution of electricity exchanges (TWh) for the period 2015-2050 
compared to the RIS. Again, the fall in WIS relative to MIS and SIS stands out. 
 
 
Figure 26. Comparative evolution of net electricity exchanges related to RIS, by 
scenario (2015-2050) 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
With regard to emissions, Figure 27 shows that there is a significant fall in MIS and SIS 
compared to RIS. This is due to the substitution of new thermal power generation for 
more intensive use of current installed capacity (expansion and new hydroelectric plants, 
increase of capacity factor of international interconnections, and advancement of 




5.1, energy integration in Mercosur (and South America as a whole) can (and should) 
consider the diversification of power generation  mix and the limitation of generation 
from non-renewable energies in order to unlock new sustainable growth opportunities and 
to improve the resilience of energy systems (WEC, 2017). 
 
 
Figure 27. Comparative evolution of net emissions related to RIS, by scenario, in 
MtCO2e (2015-2050) 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
Therefore, it is possible to notice that the change of installed capacity and generation with 
the initiatives in the different scenarios is quantitative and mainly qualitative. In terms of 
installed capacity, the change in RIS in 2050 is +5.7 GW (WIS), -4.4 GW (MIS) and -6.3 
GW (SIS). Regarding generation, the change in RIS in 2050 is +32.1 GW (WIS), +1.9 
GW (MIS) and +0.6 GW (SIS) is lower, since there are no extra assumptions about the 
demand behavior between the scenarios; in fact, maintaining demand on smaller installed 






6. Conclusions and recommendations  
 
This thesis questions and challenges many issues and concepts assumed as true by the 
specialized literature, which, consequently, have impacts on the different decisions of 
policy makers. For this reason, it was necessary to carry out an extensive literature review 
to understand how the concept of energy security results abstract and vague (in the sense 
that it fits almost everything) and often ends up as instrument for specific and 
disconnected purposes. The idea is not to eliminate the concept nor to disregard its 
relevance, but to show its limitations and changes over the last decades. Therefore, the 
thesis proposes the concept of regional energy security, which incorporates more than one 
country in the analysis and, to achieve it in the context of South America (and Mercosur 
in particular), an essential tool is the regional energy integration. 
In turn, regional integration is often divided into categories, such as 
economic/commercial, political and physical. Although this may make sense from a 
pedagogical and analytical point of view, we concluded that this has a very negative 
impact on the theory and practice of regional integration. This happens because energy 
integration, the cornerstone of this thesis, is often associated with physical integration, 
creating the illusion that it is therefore only a technical discussion. This subdivision into 
categories hides the interdisciplinary, transversal, dynamic and particular features of each 
experience, hindering dialogue beteen contributions from Economics, Politics, 
International Relations, Law, History and Geography, for instance. 
When it specifically comes to energy integration, we conclude that the concept of 
integration, which is already used indiscriminately, becomes even more confusing. This 
is because (i) integration is not synonymous of neither trade nor cooperation; and (ii) in 
the energy world, there is a recent discussion of the integration of non-conventional 
renewable energy (NCRE). Thus, the discussion of energy integration becomes more 
heterogeneous and, therefore, less precise.  
Another conclusion is that there is an extra blur when evaluating Mercosur, since there is 
no pattern for the countries analyzed: some studies only assess its original formation 




Venezuela or even Bolivia. In general, the official formation of the bloc is not respected, 
what makes it even more difficult to understand the literature. 
It has also been argued that studies of comparative regionalism are very common in the 
regional integration literature. While this may be interesting and positive, if it is not done 
with caution and care, the naive notion that there is an appropriate (single) path to follow 
would be reinforced, whether from the European (MIBEL and Nordpool), Asian 
(ASEAN) or Central America (SIEPAC) experiences as the only ways to be pursued by 
our regional energy initiatives. Therefore, we concluded that there are no one-size-fits-all 
solutions when it comes to regional integration, mainly when coping with energy 
integration. 
From the existence of different benefits and barriers to energy integration in Mercosur, 
we established that it would be necessary to deal with issues of commercial, operational 
and institutional natures. Events such as nationalization of assets (Bolivia and 
Venezuela), interruption of contracted energy supply (Argentina to Chile, and Venezuela 
to Roraima, and Petrocaribe) and request for renegotiation of the agreement signed 
(Paraguay for Brazil, in the case of Itaipu) created a bad and pessimistic history for the 
advancement of the process. In addition, the relative abundance of energy resources of 
the countries of the region does not push for integration, leading to (i) sub-optimal 
exploitation of these resources; (ii) overestimation of the need for investments; and (iii) 
underutilization of existing facilities and opportunities. 
Brazil is often given the essential role in regional energy integration due to its expertise 
with SIN, since it borders ten countries in South America (except Chile and Ecuador) and 
because of its territorial extension. However, we established that Argentina and Bolivia 
have a central role in promoting regional energy integration. The fact that they have 
borders with five countries each, water resources in abundance, and large-scale 
conventional and non-conventional reserves places them in a strategic position in 
promoting regional (physical) energy integration. Peru also plays a significant role, 
particularly due to its borders with four countries in the region and an enormous 
hydroelectric potential available. 
Although it is common in the literature, we should avoid proposals centered only on 
Brazil, using its neighbor countries as ‘annexes’ to supply its needs. Regional energy 




the different countries involved in the process. On the other hand, the recent fact that 
Brazil does not have substantial threats to guarantee its energy supply, the discovery of 
the pre-salt, the economic viability of new energy sources and the reduction of national 
demand itself may help distort the trust other countries have placed in Brazil. In this way, 
the current moment is an ideal opportunity for Brazil to return to this regional agenda, 
although the conjunctural uncertainties make it difficult and delay this movement. 
In general, it was possible to conclude that regional energy integration projects have been 
at the mercy of three main variables: (i) the famous (and old) dichotomy between 
government policy and State policy, which affects the support of certain interests in time 
(even by the lack of a solid project); (ii) the macroeconomic (inter)national context, which 
affects investment levels and priority agendas of these countries; and (iii) the asymmetric 
weight that projects play for the different countries involved, which affects the 
commitment and interest in making them regional realities. In addition, it was concluded 
that the institutional, regulatory and resource endowments structure between these 
countries is extremely diverse and, once again, asymmetric. 
It was also established that a peculiar characteristic of Mercosur regional integration (and 
South American in a broader way) is the so-called presidential diplomacy, in which there 
is protagonist action of the heads of State in the definition of the objectives, principles 
and foundations. In this way, the progress of the process ends up being dependent (and 
vulnerable) to the domestic political situation/ideology of the countries of the region, 
making a sustainable long-term project impossible.  
It was also showed the relative loss of participation of regional financing mechanisms, 
such as the IDB, CAF, FONPLATA, FOCEM and BNDES, in favor of China. From a 
geopolitical and geo-strategic point of view, this movement demands a prompt response 
from the countries of the region, either by the restoration of regional autonomy or by 
those who historically seek to represent regional leadership, as in the case of Brazil. 
Added to this, in practice the normative effort of Mercosur and UNASUR was not able 
to overcome political, technical, economic and regulatory barriers that prevent the 
advance of energy integration in Mercosur countries. Due to the intergovernmental nature 
of both Mercosur and UNASUR, both institutions end up presenting limitations to their 
performance. Besides, SGT-9 did not act to structure and coordinate concrete policies or 




Although Mercosur, through FOCEM, and UNASUR, through UNASUR-COSIPLAN, 
provide funds for projects in regional infrastructure, energy projects carried out by both 
institutions (i) are spatially concentrated in certain regions; (ii) are few (if compared to 
the total available value); and (iii) have been falling over time. As an adverse result, the 
region is experiencing not only the growth of Chinese influence, but the emergence of the 
Pacific Alliance (Colombia, Chile, Mexico and Peru), which sought to replicate this 
energy agenda on a more modest scale, seeking a true convergence of views between the 
countries involved. Moreover, the South American Energy Treaty seems very ambitious 
and therefore hard to move forward. 
Thus, Mercosur’s profile for the energy agenda has hitherto been based on simple bilateral 
energy trade agreements, energy interconnections for convenience and, at most, 
international (again binational) hydroelectric and/or gas pipelines, such as Itaipu, 
Yacyretá, Salto Grande and GASBOL. Ultimately, we concluded that there is no energy 
integration to date that (i) considers joint regional energy planning; (ii) is concerned with 
the harmonization of regulatory frameworks; and (iii) brings together producers, 
distributors and regional consumers in an integrated and participatory way. 
When it comes to the current scenario, regional energy integration should be (re)thought 
considering renewable energies, given the wind, solar and hydro potential of the region. 
More than punctually integrated in an ad hoc manner, it should be optimized taking into 
account the complementarity of intermittent renewable sources, rainfall regimes and 
consumption (given the seasonality of demand, with tradeoff between use of air 
conditioning and heaters in the region). Therefore, we concluded that energy integration 
would be an alternative to the expansion of national networks, ensuring (i) the reduction 
of idle assets; (ii) less interference with geography and the environment; and, 
consequently, (iii) lower socio-environmental impact.  
Considering the evolution of the SEES index for the period under analysis (1990-2010), 
it falls 8.9%. This suggests that the absence of joint planning and policies among 
Mercosur countries did not contribute to the improvement of the index, given the selected 
indicators.  
Its is expected that the SEES index guides policy recommendations based on an indicator-




approach to the subject. Thus, we established that the SEES index is completely in line 
with  sustainable development and climate change considering a regional logic. 
After evaluating the policies of the past until the present, the OSeMOSYS-SAMBA 
model was used to simulate scenarios of power sector integration in the region. As in the 
construction of the SEES index, the challenge was to deal with the lack of data and energy 
expansion plans in some countries. Undoubtedly, it will require political will and 
‘diplomatic engineering’ to carry out the measures of each scenario in the face of such 
adverse political-economic context. 
The modeling exercise ratified the argument that greater electricity integration in 
Mercosur (and in South America as a whole) leads to a reduction in the need to increase 
installed capacity, as well as to lower geographic and socio-environmental impacts. 
As seen, oil and natural gas play little role in modeled regional energy integration 
modeled. Oil is an international commodity, so it is difficult to provide regional 
contractual arrangements based on oil, either for priority sales or supply guarantee, when 
it is a type of energy whose price is defined internationally. With regard to natural gas, 
investment in physical pipeline infrastructure requires large amounts of capital, as well 
as specific, dedicated assets, having a sunk cost nature; like oil, LNG facilitates access to 
natural gas without necessarily needing pipeline networks. Both reasons do justify the 
relative loss of Venezuela’s role in regional energy integration. 
As a general challenge, the current context in which the Mercosur countries find 
themselves is characterized by stagnation and economic recession.  
For the time being, the political context does not favor large long-term initiatives, since 
there is no convergence of strategic agendas between Mercosur countries. In addition, 
there is no short-term energy demand in Brazil that motivates investments in new power 
generation sources. The focus lies on Brazil, since both Eletrobras and BNDES have been 
key players in the elaboration and financing of regional energy projects. However, 
discussions about the privatization of Eletrobras is currently advancing and BNDES has 
recently reduced its disbursements. Once again, the events add uncertainty and insecurity 
to the scenario of regional energy integration. 
Therefore, we need to take into account new actors and agendas, such as social, 




organized civil society, in general, in the definition, implementation and realization of 
different international interconnection projects, as well as the construction of the new 
national, binational and/or multilateral plants. Energy, then, must be understood as a 
factor of socioeconomic development and, therefore, should aim at (i) promoting 
economic growth; (ii) universal access to safe, renewable and cheap energy; and (iii) to 
improve the quality of life, respecting environmental limits. In this sense, State plays a 
key role in conducting this process, so that it does not prioritize particular and/or exclusive 
objectives of big business owners, political lobbies and contractors. Private sector is also 
welcome to provide state-of-the-art projects and technologies and reducing financial 
burden on government budgets, alone or through public-private partnership (PPP). 
Concerning the limitations of the study, it is particularly important to note the difficulty 
of finding some official national data and the energy modeling itself. One of them 
concerns the formulation of SEES index, particularly the relative weight of countries and 
indicators. In order to avoid overweighing one dimension against another, equal weight 
was given to all indicators in each of the three dimensions. The same happened with the 
weight of the countries analyzed, despite the existent asymmetry between them. For 
future work, the relative weight of each indicator/country should be detailed validated on 
a case-by-case basis.  
Besides, a future challenge would be to expand the analysis of power sector integration 
towards other energy sources as oil and natural gas, and to other key demand sectors, as 
transportation. Although they were not the focus of the current analysis, these points 
deserve to be discussed in the near future. 
Another limitation of this thesis, particularly regarding the integration scenarios analysis, 
is their vulnerability to the political-ideological and economic context of the countries of 
the region. As shown, the regional integration trend has been influenced by these issues 
for decades, which compromises the viability of the results presented in section 5.2. 
Due to a series of assumptions, the intertemporal analysis may not consider eventual 
conjunctural changes in the region. As an example, the possible advance of carbon pricing 
instruments is not considered (for instance carbon tax, cap-and-trade or hybrid 
mechanisms), which would favor the generation from less carbon-intensive technologies. 




Partnership for Market Readiness (PMR), which will eventually influence future 
modeling results. 
As recommendations for future work, we suggest updating the SEES index , especially 
because its results are very sensitive to the lack of data from some of the countries, 
englobing any of the selected indicators. In addition, it is suggested that it incorporates 
costs into the social dimension, as well as appropriate weights for each of the indicators 
considered.  
Regarding the scenarios of the OSeMOSYS-SAMBA model, Guyana, French Guiana and 
Suriname should be also incorporated into the model in order to evaluate potential impacts 
of Arco Norte project on regional energy integration. Besides, it should incorporate other 
energy sources such as oil and natural gas, as well as key demand sectors like 




























































































Source: Adapted from BAUMANN (2014), based on CRETI et al. (2010); NPS = Nord Pool Spot; 
MIBEL = Iberian Market; TLC = Trilateral Market Coupling; EMCC = European Market Coupling 






















1 SIEPAC Sistema de Transmisión Regional (a) 230 300 Oper. 
2 Gt-Mx 
S.E. Brillantes (GT) – S.E. Tapachula 
(MX) (b) 
400-230 200 Oper. 
3 Co-Pa Cerromatoso (CO) – Panamá (PA) (c) - 400 Stud. 
Source: CIER (2017b); (a) 1.800 km: 283 km in Guatemala, 286 km in El Salvador, 275 km in Honduras, 
307 km in Nicaragua, 499 km in Costa Rica and 150 km in Panamá; (b) 101 km: 71 km in Guatemala and 





Appendix C. The GASBOL pipeline 
 














Appendix D. The Arco Norte Project and proposed interconnection 
 





Appendix E. The SINEA Project and proposed interconnection 
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Appendix G. National and international input data  
 
National data come from: Argentina (MPF, 2013; CNEA, 2015a; CNEA, 2015b; 
CAMMESA, 2015a; CAMMESA, 2015b), Bolivia (AE, 2012a; AE, 2012b; AE, 2013; 
MHE, 2014), Brazil (EPE, 2012; EPE, 2013; EPE, 2014a; EPE, 2014b; EPE, 2015a; EPE, 
2015b; ONS, 2014; ONS, 2015a; MME, 2006; MME, 2014), Chile (CDEC SING, 2012; 
CDEC SIC, 2013; MEN, 2014; MEN, 2015); Colombia (MME, 2011b; UPME, 2013; 
SIEL, 2015); Ecuador (MEER, 2012; CONELEC, 2013; ARCONEL, 2014a; 
ARCONEL, 2014b); Guyana (GPL, 2012); Paraguay (ANDE, 2015; VMME, 2014; 
VMME, 2015); Peru (MEM, 2014; COES SINAC, 2013; COES SINAC, 2015); Uruguay 
(DNE, 2013; ADME, 2015a; ADME, 2015b) and Venezuela (CNG, 2008; MPPEE, 
2013a; MPPEE, 2013b; MPPEE, 2014; CORPOELEC, 2015).  
Regional data come from Síntesis Informativa Energética de los países de la CIER 2013 
(CIER, 2013), Panorama General del Sector Eléctrico en América Latina y Caribe 
(OLADE, 2012), Apuntes Sobre la Integración Elétrica Regional y Propuestas para 
Avanzar (OLADE, 2013), Potencial de Recursos Energéticos y Minerales em América 
del Sur (UNASUR, 2013) and Agenda de Proyectos Prioritarios de Integración (IIRSA, 
2015).  
International data come from: WEO 2014 (IEA WEO, 2014), Energy Technologies 
Perspectives (ETP) (IEA WEO, 2012; IEA WEO, 2014; IEA WEO, 2015), ETSAP 
Technology Brief (IEA ETSAP, 2010a; IEA ETSAP, 2010b; IEA ETSAP, 2010c; IEA 
ETSAP, 2010d; IEA ETSAP, 2010e; IEA ETSAP, 2013a; IEA ETSAP, 2013b; IEA 
ETSAP, 2014), World Energy Perspective Cost of Energy Technologies (WEC, 2013) 
and World Bank (Word Bank, 2015). US EPA (2014), USGS (2006), US EIA (2015), US 
EPA (2014), WB Database, CEPALstat and UNdata. 
 
The life span of each technology modeled in accordance with the Energy Technology 
Systems Analysis Program (ETSAP) Technology Brief reports (IEA ETSAP, 2010a; IEA 
ETSAP, 2010b; IEA ETSAP, 2010c; IEA ETSAP, 2010d; IEA ETSAP, 2010e; IEA 
ETSAP, 2013a; IEA ETSAP, 2013b; IEA ETSAP, 2014). For fossil fuel technologies, 




Energy Technologies Perspectives report (IEA ETP, 2012; IEA ETP, 2014; IEA ETP, 
2015). 
The capital costs of each technology were identified from Energy Technologies 
Perspectives reports (IEA ETP, 2012; IEA ETP, 2014; IEA ETP, 2015) and World Energy 
Perspectives report (WEC, 2013). Capital costs of transmission lines were obtained from 
OLADE (2013) and IEA ETSAP (2014).  Investment costs were estimated using the 
capital cost and a discount rate of 8% during the time period required to build each power 
project. The fixed and variable costs were obtained from (WEC, 2013) and (IEA ETSAP, 
2010a; IEA ETSAP, 2010b; IEA ETSAP, 2010c; IEA ETSAP, 2010d; IEA ETSAP, 
2010e; IEA ETSAP, 2013a; IEA ETSAP, 2013b; IEA ETSAP, 2014). For strategic hydro 
projects, the lowest cost available in literature for large hydro was considered. Finally, 
capital cost reductions over time were applied for each technology according to IEA ETP 
(2012), IEA ETP (2014) and IEA ETP (2015)257. 
 
                                                          
257 Except for the data in Table 24, it is important to highlight that the key assumptions of the RIS scenario 
are the same as those of the RTS scenario presented in MOURA (2017). This is justified by the fact that 
both models are based on the analysis of the energy integration of (of part) South America countries, 


























Biogas 2,449 50 1.8 34 85 40 25 4 
Biomass incineration 1,905 13 0.5 34 66 35 25 4 
Coal pulverized 3,129 44 1 45 85 45 40 4 
Coal with CCS 6,530 102 1 45 85 40 40 4 
CSP 4,914 65 1.7 0 40 35 40 1 
PV 1,944 40 0 0 25 25 25 1 
Distributed PV 3,000 40 0 0 32 25 25 1 
Fuel oil 1,400 25 1.7 27 85 35 25 2 
Geothermal 3,966 120 0 0 85 15 20 2 
Hydro large 2,939 45 1 13 n.a. 100 60 5 
Hydro small 3,499 35 1 13 n.a. 100 60 2 
Hydro large (strategic) 2,351 26 0 13 n.a. 100 60 5 
NGCC 1,260 20 2.5 42 85 57 30 3 
NGOC 583 10 2.5 27 85 38 30 2 
Nuclear 7,200 115 3.1 50 85 35 40 5 
Wind onshore 4,104 114 0 0 42 100 25 1 
Wind offshore 1,620 36 0 0 31 100 30 1 
Distribution lines 1,491 0 0 n.a. n.a. 75-95 60 1 
Transmission lines 746 0 0 n.a. n.a. 93-96 60 1 
Transmission subsystems 448 0 0 n.a. n.a. 93-96 60 1 
 
Source: based on (MOURA, 2017, IEA ETSAP, 2010a; IEA ETSAP, 2010b; IEA ETSAP, 2010c; IEA ETSAP, 2010d; IEA ETSAP, 2010e; IEA ETSAP, 2013a; IEA 


























Biogas 1,905 50 1.8 34 85 40 25 4 
Biomass incineration 1,905 13 0.5 34 66 35 25 4 
Coal pulverized 2,313 44 1 45 85 52 40 4 
Coal with CCS 4,626 102 1 45 85 44 40 4 
CSP 2,160 65 1.7 0 40 35 40 1 
PV 972 40 0 0 25 25 25 1 
Distributed PV 1,000 40 0 0 32 25 25 1 
Fuel oil 1,400 25 1.7 27 85 35 25 2 
Geothermal 2,508 120 0 0 85 15 20 2 
Hydro large 2,939 45 1 13 n.a. 100 60 5 
Hydro small 3,499 35 1 13 n.a. 100 60 2 
Hydro large (strategic) 2,351 26 0 13 n.a. 100 60 5 
NGCC 1,260 20 2.5 42 85 62 30 3 
NGOC 583 10 2.5 27 85 42 30 2 
Nuclear 6,318 115 3.1 50 85 37 40 5 
Wind onshore 1,592 114 0 0 42 100 25 1 
Wind offshore 1,296 36 0 0 31 100 30 1 
Distribution lines 1,491 0 0 n.a. n.a. 94-97 60 1 
Transmission lines 746 0 0 n.a. n.a. 95-97 60 1 
Transmission subsystems 448 0 0 n.a. n.a. 95-97 60 1 
 
Source: based on (MOURA, 2017, IEA ETSAP, 2010a; IEA ETSAP, 2010b; IEA ETSAP, 2010c; IEA ETSAP, 2010d; IEA ETSAP, 2010e; IEA ETSAP, 2013a; IEA 




Appendix H. Location of the Madeira River dams 
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